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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Sarah Marie Griffith for the Master of Arts in History 
presented November 22, 2002. 
Title: The Courts and the Making of a Chinese Immigrant Community in Portland, 
Oregon, 1850-1910. 
This thesis studies the development of the Portland, Oregon Chinese 
immigrant community between 1850 and 1910. Chinese immigrants first arrived in 
Portland in the mid-1850s and quickly created businesses as well as social institutions 
they transplanted from China to the U.S. West. They also established intricate 
relationships among themselves and with members of the surrounding whitc 
community. County and state court records held at the Multnomah County 
Courthouse and National Archives in Seattle, Washington, reveal much about the 
Chinese immigrant community in Portland and provide a window into a society that 
left few written records. 
Through the analysis of hundreds of court cases held at the Multnomah County 
Courthouse in Portland, this thesis reconstructs four broad aspects of Portland's 
Chinese immigrant community. The first chapter discusses the arrival and 
establishment of Chinese immigrants in Portland. The sccond chapter discusses 
Chinese experience with white missionaries in the courts as both groups battled for 
custody rights to Chinese women and children. The third chapter looks at the case of 
United States v. John Wilson, which revealed how Chinese and whites had 
collaborated to establish one of the largest and most successful immigrant and opium 
smuggling rings on the West Coast. With the aim of profiting from Chinese 
exclusion, the white and Chinese operators of this ring bridged racial barriers that had, 
for decades, divided the two groups. In chapter four, finally, the thesis examines 
social conflict within the late nineteenth century Portland Chinese community. This 
chapter describes how internal conflicts in Portland Chinatown, stemming from 
traditional social associations transplanted from China, played as strong a role in 
shaping the Chinese community in Portland as did exclusion laws determined to end 
the entry of Chinese to the United States. 
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Introduction 
In the late 1850s, Chinese immigrants first arrived in Portland, Oregon. As 
their community grew, Portland Chinese found themselves at odds with their own 
countrymen as well as the surrounding white community. This thesis discusses the 
development, growth, and challenges faced by Portland's first-generation Chinese 
immigrants between 1860 and the turn of the century. It emphasizes the unique ways 
in which these people adapted to the demands, challenges, and opportunities presented 
in the U.S. West. 
Beginning in 1848, Chinese immigrated to the North American West to chase 
after gold in California. In 1858, when gold was discovered in southern Oregon, 
hundreds of Chinese left California for the new gold fields in the Rogue River Valley. 
At the same time, others migrated further north to seek opportunities in Portland, a 
city developing at the cont1uence of the Columbia and Willamette Rivers. Over the 
next four decades, a bustling, thriving Chinatown developed in the river city. A 
Chinese merchant class quickly grew up alongside a range of immigrant institutions, 
with merchant Chinese as these institutions' financial and organizational leaders. The 
community's infrastructure continued to develop in the years prior to the national 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which, through its discriminatory provisions, shaped 
Chinese American lives dramatically until the act's revocation in 1942. While 
nineteenth century whites viewed Chinese immigrants as a homogenous entity-
sharing culture, customs, and experience-in reality a distinct class culture developed 
in Portland's Chinatown, with common laborers, middle-level merchants, and elite 
Chinese merchants each fitting into a larger whole. 
Although Portland's nineteenth-century Chinese population eventually 
numbered in the many thousands, it did not leave the range of records that historians 
have used to reconstruct other Chinese communities along the Pacific Coast. For 
instance, Portland Chinese did not print Chinese-language newspapers nor did they 
leave behind many letters, much less extensive collections of correspondence or other 
written documents about the early years of Chinese immigration or about the texture 
of immigrant social life. 
To understand the development of Portland's Chinatown, then, it is necessary 
to delve into primary sources which are often overlooked and that document these 
immigrants' experiences. In this thesis, I have used court records from the county, 
circuit, and district courts, alongside English-language newspapers and the writings of 
white observers, to reconstruct the daily lives of Chinese. The thousands of court 
records, in particular, provide a wide array of details about the business and social 
aspects of Portland's early Chinese community. They testify also to the unique 
challenges and adaptations first-generation Chinese immigrants experienced in 
Portland and how these experiences shaped the way Chinese interacted with one 
another and with the majority white population. Finally, and perhaps most vital to 
Chinese immigrant studies, court records show that, contrary to the traditional historic 
record, not only did Chinese appear in the U.S. courts to plead cases against one 
another and against whites, they did so constantly, in both civil and criminal trials that 
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challenged the court to acknowledge their presence and claims to justice-even in the 
absence of citizenship. I 
Court records from these three local and state courts between 1858 and the turn 
of the century demonstrate the variety of challenges faced by Chinese immigrants. 
They shed light on the way Chinese interacted with one another, the patterns of 
conflict within Chinatown, and shifts in the demography of Portland's Chinese 
population between 1860 and 1910. Through these records, it is clear that Chinese 
struggled among themselves, as often as they did with whites, in individual and group 
efforts to establish authority and autonomy. During the earliest decades of Chinese 
exclusion, 1882-1892, the period that has received the most attention by historians, we 
see that Chinese continued to adapt and develop individual and community autonomy 
in and out of the courts, despite harsh anti-Chinese legislation that severely limited 
their freedom in the United States. 
Chapter One introduces, through demographic analysis, Portland's Chinese 
population. Beginning with 1858, it shows when and from where Chinese came and 
the physical geography of Portland's earliest Chinatown. As the Chinese population 
increased through the 1860s, so too did the daily struggles that individuals faced. This 
I While court cases that involved Chinese number in the thousands for Multnomah 
County, it must be remembered that court records, nonetheless, document only a 
portion of Chinese experiences. Specifically, the lives of those Chinese men and 
women who either brought cases to court or were brought to trial by individuals, the 
City of Portland, and the State of Oregon. To make up for this shortfall, I have tried to 
use a variety of primary sources that fill in gaps left in court records. These include 
letters from Chinese immigrants in other Chinese communities throughout Oregon, 
English-language newspapers, and mission reports from religious organizations that 
worked among Chinese in Portland. 
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chapter surveys some of the more common challenges immigrants faced in the 
decades leading up to exclusion. First, the chapter shows how Chinese laborers fit 
into a larger labor system and how traditional institutions transplanted from China 
aided laborers in their struggle for fair treatment in a white-dominated economy. It 
also describes the establishment and growth of a powerful Chinese merchant class, 
which helped immigrants find work through labor contracting and at the same time 
mediated conflicts between Chinese laborers and their white employers. However, as 
the Chinese population of Portland grew, so too did pressure for immigrants to 
assimilate into the American mainstream. As this chapter demonstrates, with 
increased pressure to assimilate to Western culture in the form of dress, religion, and 
language, came new conflicts among Chinese. While many adopted western capitalist 
economics, cultural assimilation was clearly more problematic. Over the first three 
decades of Chinese community development, the situation turned increasingly tense, 
leading to bloody altercations in the streets and houses of Chinatown. 
Chapter Two follows by demonstrating how Chinese were discriminated against 
in cases that had their roots in legal conflicts over culture and morality. The racist 
undertones and judicial violations of due process that pervaded these cases is in striking 
contrast to others, where money, trade, and even violence within the Chinese enclave 
were at issue. The courts accorded Chinese plaintiffs and defendants much the same 
treatment as it accorded whites in these latter cases. 
Beginning in the 1870s, missionaries established English-language schools in 
Portland. Chinese laborers and merchants attended mission schools primarily to learn 
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the English language. Others, however, adopted Christianity and were consequently 
ostracized by their fellow countrymen in the ethnic enclave. Missionary influence 
divided Chinese between those who subscribed to the missionary influence in 
Chinatown culture and those who fought the same influences in the streets and 
courtrooms of Multnomah County. A majority of the Chinese population resented 
aggressive missionary activity in Chinatown, such as street preaching, social reform 
programs, and mission and refuge homes. By the late 1880s and the 1890s, the results 
of these tensions appeared in the courts in the form of custody battles between Chinese 
immigrants and white missionaries. Missionaries, willing to accept those Chinese 
who converted to Western religious practices, worked against other Chinese who 
fought the assimilation process. Employing popular racist imagery, missionaries 
battled with Chinese in the courts for moral and cultural control, especially in cases 
that involved Chinese women and children who, missionaries believed, were at risk 
because of the vice they thought permeated Portland's Chinatown. Sympathetic 
judges and law enforcement officials reinforced these stereotypes, providing a legal 
mandate for the use of racist and ethnocentric images. 
Chapter Three centers on a different type of conflict between whites and 
Chinese during the era of exclusion. The U.S. District Court case, u.s. v. Wilson 
(1893), which involved some 28 white and Chinese opium and immigrant smugglers, 
displays some ofthe loopholes that existed in exclusion measures and how Chinese 
and whites used these loopholes to profit off the misfortune of Chinese who sought 
entry into the United States. More importantly, u.s. v. Wilson shows how 
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opportunities for illicit profit transcended the legal and cultural breach between whites, 
and Chinese. Chinese merchants in Canada, Portland, and San Francisco aligned with 
one another and with whites to tum profits off exclusion era laws. The events that led 
up to the case, and the trial itself, reveals that a distinct class structure had developed 
in Portland's Chinatown by 1890, with merchants serving as leaders among their own 
countrymen and as powerful dealers with white collaborators. 
Finally, Chapter Four documents internal struggles within Chinatown. As 
Chinese arrived in the United States, they organized themselves roughly along the 
lines of traditional social associations, most notably clan and district associations and 
secret societies, or tongs. In the first decades of Portland's Chinatown, under the 
leadership of powerful Chinese merchants, associations localized their power, 
providing merchant leaders, especially, with power in the immigrant enclave. With the 
advent of exclusion, a number of Chinese associations took advantage of the 
opportunities afforded them through prostitution, immigrant smuggling, and opium 
and gambling operations. At the same time, the localization of power and profit 
produced infighting between Chinese associations. Bloody battles between Chinese 
association members in the 1880s and 1890s demonstrate these divisions, and the 
ensuing court cases, supplemented by local newspaper reports, shows how the Chinese 
population divided in its allegiances to various secret societies and clan and district 
associations. By the late 1890s, Chinatown was clearly divided between those 
Chinese involved in illicit enterprises and those who sought to collaborate with white 
elites to end the battles between rival Chinese associations. 
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* * * 
I began collecting primary source materials for this thesis in November 2000. 
I started by reviewing State District Court records for the fourth Oregon District at the 
Multnomah County Courthouse in Portland, Oregon. While these cases revealed 
aspects of Chinese social history, their frequency did not yield enough information for 
extended scholarly research. I then browsed the Multnomah County Circuit Court 
records archived on microfilm in the Multnomah County Courthouse files room. It 
was here that I stumbled across thousands of court records from county and circuit 
courts that involved Chinese men and women. I also dug into probate records, which 
revealed that Chinese were involved in estate and guardianship cases in addition to 
civil and criminal trials. 
Because of the enormity and poor organization of the cases involving Chinese, 
I decided to approach the archive with both chronology and historical eras in mind. 
Out of the 1100 cases counted, I took a sample of 300 or so, 75 for each time period, 
divided into 1858-1870, 1870-1882, 1882-1892, and 1892-1910. I then reviewed 
carefully each of the selected cases to the end of understanding how trials at the local 
level changed as Chinese began arriving in Portland (1858-1870), settled (1870-1882), 
experienced exclusion (1882-1892), and moved their community into the twentieth 
century (1892-1910). I found, in the end, that the premises for civil and criminal 
cases-cases brought by individual Chinese against other Chinese, and by the City of 
Portland and the State of Oregon against Chinese defendants-did not change 
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dramatically after the advent of exclusion. I did see an increase in habeas corpus cases 
after 1882, but, for the most part, the reasons behind and the content of civil and 
criminal trials involving Chinese remained much the same through the exclusion 
period. At the same time, I did find that the demography of Chinatown had changed, 
and that these changes were reflected in patterns of litigation in the 1880s and after. It 
is this change over time in demography, class, and relationships between Chinese and 
whites that directs this thesis. And it is the collection of local court records, teamed 
with English-language newspaper reports and missionary documents that inform the 
history of first-generation Chinese immigrants in Portland. 
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Chapter One 
A New Hierarchy: 
Tradition, Adaptation, and Agitation in Portland's Chinatown 
In a series of probate court cases tried in Multnomah County between 1870 and 
1910, a pattern emerged that illuminates the adaptability of first-generation Chinese 
immigrants in the United States. Before the county court, Chinese immigrants, again 
and again, claimed the estates of fellow Chinese who had died while laboring for 
western railroad companies. 1 Two representative cases took place in December 1884 
and early January 1885. In these cases John Wah filed petitions to gain full 
administrator status over the estates of two deceased Chinese laborers. At first glance, 
the estates seem small and inconsequential. That of Chow Chou Chong was valued at 
$25, Chung Bok Quan's at only $5. 2 Regardless, Wah filed "notice of administrator" 
advertisements in The New Northwest, a small locally published newspaper as the law 
required, and submitted his petition to the court. In each instance, the court granted 
Wah full administrator status.3 
Although the settlements appeared routine, the cases did not end when Wah 
gained administrator status. A few weeks later, attorneys representing other Chinese 
1 Probate records held at the Multnomah County Courthouse show that, between 1870 
and 1910, Chinese immigrants filed many dozens of petitions claiming the estates of 
deceased Chinese. After reviewing over thirty such cases, it is clear that the majority 
of estate cases were settled in a similar fashion in the Multnomah county court. 
2 Chow Chou Chong, Est. 1127 (1885); Chung Bok Quan, Est. 1126 (1884) (hereafter 
Chung Bok Quan). 
3 Ibid. 
9 
immigrants filed petitions to reverse the settlement in favor ofWah.4 Attorneys for I 
Chung Gok and Wah Sing filed a complaint charging that John Wah had lied about the 
place of death when he claimed that Chung Bok Quan died in Portland. The petition 
claimed, instead, that the deceased had died while laboring for the Oregon Railroad 
and Navigation Company (ORRNC). Furthermore, attorneys for I Chung Gok and 
Wah Sing stated that John Wah was neither a creditor entitled to collect debts after 
death nor a direct relative of the deceased. To the contrary, the petition for reversal 
held that Wah based his petition on fraudulent claims in order to extort money from 
the ORRNC. 
In countering these petitions, Wah stated that his original claims were made 
"for the purpose of settling said estate honestly and faithfully." 5 He argued that I 
Chung Gok had organized a group of Chinese co-conspirators to claim brotherhood to 
the deceased fraudulently, gain control of the estate, and sue the railroad company for 
negligence. Such a claim would increase the deceased's estate's value from a few 
dollars to hundreds of dollars. 
The case of Chung Bok Quan ended in February 1885 when John Wah 
received full administrative control over the estate of the deceased. With 
administrator status to the original $5 estate, John Wah did in fact go ahead and sue 
the ORRNC for negligence in the death of Chung Bok Quan, successfully so as the 
4 My review of Chinese estate cases indicates that white attorneys knew they could 
profit from representing Chinese in negligence cases against railroad companies. For 
instance, Woodward & Woodward, a well-known Portland law firm, frequently 
represented Chinese petitioners in estate cases and were paid directly from the money 
?ranted to Chinese plaintiffs. 
Chung Bok Quan. 
10 
" 
"., 
court awarded him $300. It is apparent in this case, and dozens of others, that Chinese 
understood well how to make a profit off of the misfortune of their countrymen. Over 
several decades, Chinese turned similar negligence cases against railroad companies 
into a veritable racket. In some instances defendants went so far as to claim that they 
intended to transfer the money to the Consul General of the Empire of China in San 
Francisco for distribution to families of the deceased back in China. The likelihood 
that this actually occurred is slim.6 In most cases, Chinese were awarded over $300 
and, with minimal court and attorney fees, the profit margin was substantial. 
Historians have long overlooked local court records and the detail they provide 
about the daily lives of Chinese. Crime, economic disputes, and conflicts between 
Chinese immigrants and Chinese and whites are embodied in these many hundreds of 
documents. The prohibition against Chinese immigrants testifying in court against 
whites-which was established by the 1860s in most states with substantial Chinese 
populations-has led historians away from looking at court records, particularly local 
records that shy away from habeas corpus cases, that would otherwise illuminate the 
Chinese immigrant experience. In actuality, in the nineteenth century Chinese 
6 Ibid.; See also, Way Sing, Est. 1125 (Jan., 1825); Chow Chou Chong, Est. 1127 
(Dec., 1884); Low Chin, Est. 1606 (Feb., 1889); Chee Gim Sing, Est. 1972 (Dec., 
1890); Fang Dun Hong, Est. 1064 (Sept., 1884); Kim Kim Been, Est. 1065 (Sept., 
1884); Lee Fook, Est. 1066 (Sept., 1884); Wong Loy Hing, Est. 1067 (Sept., 1884); Bo 
Ah Fat, Est. 1068 (Sept., 1884); Kim Chung Hoy, Est. 1069 (Sept., 1884); Lee Ah Toy, 
Est. 1070 (Sept., 1884); Wong Ah Chew, Est. 1072 (Sept., 1884); Lee Ah Wong, Est. 
1071 (Sept., 1884); The timing of these particular cases suggests that the Chinese 
laborers died in a single accident. However, cases span at least three decades and 
attest to the ongoing nature of negligence cases and the success Chinese had in turning 
profits from these cases. The claims by the plaintiffs to the estates suggests further 
that Chinese understood fully that fatal railroad accidents offered an opportunity to 
profit in suits against the ORRNC and other employers of Chinese. 
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immigrants were constantly in court, where they regularly testified through white 
lawyers against whites as well as other Chinese. Chinese immigrants regularly sued 
whites for a variety of damages, criminal cases were brought against Chinese by the 
City of Portland and State of Oregon, and custody battles over Chinese women and 
children were common.7 And while racism and discrimination were not uncommon 
in courts, Chinese won a fair share of court battles and usually received sentences 
similar to those given whites. 8 
In these and other cases, the archives of Western courts shed light on the daily 
challenges that Chinese faced in Portland and the American West in general. While 
the existing literature about Chinese in the courts focuses on high-profile habeas 
corpus cases that Chinese filed during the era of exclusion, the records of daily events 
that plagued Chinese have, as yet, been studied only sparingly.9 The existing 
7 Custody cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
8 Larceny and assault cases, especially, reveal the similar sentences given whites and 
Chinese. In most, the white or Chinese defendant receiving a small fine and time in 
jail; usually between a few weeks and up to one year in the state penitentiary, 
depending on the nature of the crime. 
9 Historians Alexander Saxton, Stanford Lyman, and Gunther Barth led the way in 
developing Chinese immigrant history in the west. Their studies focused on labor 
competition, racism and anti-Chinese legislation, and the differences and similarities 
between European and Chinese immigration in the nineteenth century. See Alexander 
Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); 
Stanford Lyman, Chinese Americans (ABC-Clio Books: New York, 1974); Lyman, 
The Asian in North America (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Books, 1977); Lyman, 
The Asian in the West (University of Nevada Press: Reno, 1970); Gunther Barth, 
Bitter Strength: A History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). For more on Chinese and habeas corpus, See, 
Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle Against 
Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994); Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the 
Shaping oj Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of California Press, 
12 
scholarly focus on the politics and jurisprudence of exclusion and discrimination 
unfortunately veils understanding of how Chinese experienced and overcame 
challenges emanating from their own ranks. 
F or instance, the county court archives of Portland, Oregon, in the years 
between 1860 and 1910 show that violence between Chinese was common. The 
community was not, as previous histories have suggested, a homogenous group 
working for the good of all. Rather, cases show that assault and larceny by Chinese 
against other Chinese immigrants was common. Other cases demonstrate the 
competition and violence between Chinese fighting for control of prostitutes and 
prostitution rings in Portland. County archives also reveal the development of a new 
1995); John Wunder's studies of Chinese in the U.S. West use both local and federal 
court cases to illuminate the Chinese experience. See, esp., John Wunder, "The 
Chinese and the Courts in the Pacific Northwest: Justice Denied?" Pacific Historical 
Review,(1983), 191-211; Wunder, "Law and the Chinese on the Southwest Frontier, 
1850s-1902, Western Legal History, 2 (1989), 139-158; Wunder, "Chinese in Trouble: 
Criminal Law and Race of the Trans-Mississippi West Frontier," Western Historical 
Quarterly 17 (1986), 125-141. For comparative studies of Chinese and other East 
Asian immigrants and Native Americans, see, Ronald Takaki, Iron Cages: Race and 
Culture in 1 fjh Century America (Oxford University Press: New York, 1979); Takaki, 
Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1987); Takaki, Journey to Gold Mountain: The Chinese in 19th 
Century America (Chelsea House Publishers: New York, 1994). On European 
immigration in the 1830s see, Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the 
Great Migrations That Made the American People, Second Edition (University of 
Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2002), John Higham, "Integrating America: The 
Problem of Assimilation in the Nineteenth Century," in Jon Gjerde, Major Problems 
in American Immigration & Ethnic History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1998), pp. 16-22; Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America, Revised 
Edition (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press, 1984); John Bodnar. 
"Immigration Portrayed As an Experience of Transplantation," in Gjerde, ed., Major 
Problems in American Immigration &Ethnic History, pp. 8-16; Kathleen Neils 
Conzen, "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the USA," in Ibid., pp. 22-
31. 
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social hierarchy among Chinese immigrants. As immigrants arrived in Portland, they 
adapted their social and economic relationships to fit new challenges. Out of this 
process of adaptation developed a new merchant elite that was, for many decades, 
highly active in the courts at a variety of levels. To understand the internal 
challenges-within Chinatown-we must focus our attention on individual 
communities such as Portland, Oregon. Archival material from county, district, and 
circuit courts help illuminate some of the common challenges that Chinese immigrants 
experienced and some of the ways in which they addressed them. 10 
This chapter explores three aspects of the Chinese immigrant experience in 
Portland. It first discusses the demographic structure of Chinatown between 1850 and 
1890. When immigrants settled in Portland, they constructed a geographically 
isolated enclave. There they established businesses along lines similar to those found 
in southern China, the origins of most Chinese immigrants who came to the U.S. 
West, but, at the same time, they adapted elements of their community to the specific 
conditions of American society in the western United States. Second, this chapter 
focuses on how adaptation shaped the merchant and laboring classes in Chinatown, for 
both laborers and merchants adapted their roles in the United States to fit the needs of 
10 For community-specific studies on Chinese immigrants see, Sandy Lydon, Chinese 
Gold: The Chinese in the Monterey Bay Region (Capitola, Calif.: Capitola Book 
Company, 1985); Jeffrey Barlow, China Doctor of John Day (Portland, Ore.: Binford 
& Mort, 1979); Sucheng Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California 
Agriculture, 1860-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Xinyang 
Wang, Surviving the City: The Chinese Immigrant Experience in New York City, 
1890-1970 (Lanham, Mass.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Sarah M. 
Griffith, "Ethnicity, Solidarity, and Tradition: A Study into the Dynamics and 
Complexities of the Chinese Immigrant Community in John Day, Oregon, 1860-1906" 
(Undergrad. Thesis, Lewis and Clark College, 2000). 
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white businesses-the primary source of employment for thousands of Chinese 
immigrants. As these two groups adapted, they simultaneously altered the relationship 
between Chinese laborers and merchants. A hierarchy of power developed in 
Portland's Chinatown that placed merchants at the top of the immigrant social ladder, 
created a dependency on the part of Chinese laborers, and linked both merchant and 
working class Chinese to the corresponding white power hierarchy in significant ways. 
Third, while a complex process of economic adaptation shaped the lives of Chinese 
immigrants, uneven cultural assimilation to Western practices, especially in regard to 
traditional religious beliefs and social associations, created resentment between 
Chinese immigrants and led to internal violence among them. 
Demographics 
It is important first to understand when and from where immigrants to 
Portland's Chinatown came. It is also important to note the demographic makeup of 
the first-generation immigrants who settled in the urban hub. Portland's Chinese 
enclave developed in a pattern similar to other cities in the North American West. 
Chinese arrived in Portland as early as 1851, with the establishment of steamer trade 
between China and Portland via San Francisco. In the early 1850s, most Portland 
Chinese were merchants and businessmen, like Mr. Sung Sung, who established the 
Tong Sung boarding house and restaurant on Second Avenue .. I I 
II Chinese women, although in small numbers, arrived in Portland by the 1860s. As in 
other U.S. West Chinese enclaves, most Chinese women in Portland lived as 
prostitutes but others came as wives of Chinese men. For instance, in the estate trial 
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These early Portland merchants-and prostitutes-catered to a migratory 
Chinese population that passed through Portland on its way to rural areas where 
mining and other laboring opportunities existed. 12 By 1857, an urban laboring 
population became evident as Chinese found employment as cooks in restaurants and 
in the homes of wealthy whites. The 1860s brought more Chinese to Oregon, 
especially after the 1858 discovery of gold in southern Oregon. Immigrants migrated 
north to the urban hub of Portland. At the same time, a Chinese immigrant merchant 
class developed providing goods and services to the growing migratory and permanent 
populations. By 1870 the Chinese had become the largest ethnic group in Portland, 
and their community spread from Ash Street to Salmon Street and from the waterfront 
to Third Avenue. 
In 1870, Multnomah County, where Portland was located, tallied 496 Chinese 
immigrants. By 1880, that number more than doubled to 1,961, and the average age 
of Chinese residents was twenty-six. Twenty to thirty-year old males dominated 
Chinatown; like other Chinese immigrant communities in the North American West, 
Ah Jack, Ah lung, the wife of the deceased, petitioned the court for administrator 
status of her husband's estate. In this case, the estate was quite large, totaling over 
$1000. Ah lung, in court against a handful of Chinese creditors, failed to win her 
case. See, Ah Jack, Guar. Est. 702 (1857); For information on other Chinese 
immigrant enclaves and Chinese women living in those regions, see Anne M. Butler, 
Daughters of Joy, Sisters of Misery: Prostitutes in the American West, 1865-90 
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1985). 
12 Prior to the 1880s, the majority of Chinese immigrants listed in census records lived 
in rural regions of Oregon. When rural industry took a downturn in the 1880s, many 
Chinese migrated to Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle, swelling the populations of 
these urban Chinese enclaves into the many thousands. 
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women composed only a small portion of the population. 13 By 1880, Multnomah, 
Wasco, and Clatsop County's Chinese immigrant population had increased to 2,317 
and by 1890 the number totaled 5,148. In 1890, then, Chinese Portlanders accounted 
for more than 10 percent of the approximately 46,000 people in the city.14 
As Chinese immigrants became a permanent presence in Portland they opened 
businesses, worked as laundrymen and cooks, and served as domestics in the homes of 
wealthy whites. Others resided in the cramped boarding houses of Chinatown until 
they found work through one of the many Chinese labor contractors, at which time 
they moved to shanty camps in outlying areas. IS Immigrants came to the city by ships 
from China and San Francisco or by land from rural regions throughout the Far West. 
In the city, they surely welcomed the familiar sites, sounds, and people from home 
that urban concentration afforded. For instance, during their stay in Portland, 
immigrants could view a traditional opera at the Chinese Theater, play card games like 
13 In 1870, for instance, out of the 496 Chinese enumerated by census takers, only 41, 
or 8 percent, were women and the majority of these were listed as prostitutes. The 
statistics presented here document those Chinese who lived in Multnomah, Clatsop, 
and Wasco Counties-all but 40 of which lived in Multnomah County and, more than 
likely, in the city blocks that made up Chinatown. 
14 See Nelson Chia-Chi Ho, "Portland's Chinatown: The History of an Urban Ethnic 
District," (Portland, Ore.: Bureau of Planning, City of Portland, Oregon, 1978); P. 
Scott Corbett and Nancy Parker Corbett, "The Chinese in Oregon, c. 1870-1880," 
Oregon Historical Quarterly, (1977), 73-85. The 1880 census listed no alteration in 
the female population in Multnomah, Wasco, and Clatsop counties. In fact, in 1880, 
over 98 percent of the Chinese immigrant population was male. The Corbetts 
documentation of the Chinese population through census records from Wasco, 
Multnomah, and Clatsop Counties provides the best available estimate. 
IS By the 1870s Chinese immigrants had spread out to areas beyond Chinatown. 
Photos collected at the Oregon Historical Society show small shacks where Chinese 
vegetable farmers lived, directly below some of Portland's most well-known and 
wealthiest businessmen. Court records show that Chinese spread to the east side of 
the Willamette River as well. 
17 
Fan Tan and Keno, visit the Chinese joss house for worship, or purchase time with 
Chinese prostitutes who were indentured in the squalid brothels that dotted 
Chinatown. In the ground level storefronts of Chinatown, businesses sold items like 
dried shark's fins, preserved eggs, geese and ducks (either live or preserved in oil), 
and fruits and confections. In Chinese drug stores immigrants could purchase eclectic 
items such as dried reptiles, preserved snakes, elk horns, ginseng, and a large 
assortment of medicinal herbs. Vegetable stalls, fruit stands, and chicken coops 
undoubtedly reminded immigrants of home, as did the crowded streets that bustled 
with laundry operators carrying poles and baskets and men going here and there for 
business and pleasure. 16 
Above the street-level storefronts were boarding houses where permanent and 
temporary residents rented rooms. The crowded living quarters were plagued by theft 
and burglary; in these quarters up to 20 persons might be crowded into a small 12 by 
20 foot room. 17 On festival days and during funeral services Chinese flooded into the 
streets of Chinatown dressed in traditional smocks and caps. From the balconies of 
dwelling houses they would watch the processions as they wound through Chinatown. 
English-language newspapers frequently described these burial processions, remarking 
on the exotic practices of mysterious Orientals. In an 1891 article from The West 
16 Ho, "Portland's Chinatown," 13. 
17 Records from the Multnomah County District Court show that burglary and assault 
was common in Portland's boarding and dwelling houses, both white and Chinese-
owned. For more on the types of burglary and violence and punishment, see State of 
Oregon v. Yee Chung Chik, Judgment 9976; State of Oregon v. Su Sin, Judgment 
7109; State of Oregon v. Ah Wong, Judgment 6098; State v. Jim Loon, Judgment 6099, 
State of Oregon v. China Joe, jointly indicted with Ah Quang, Judgment 7111. 
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Shore, a locally-published society magazine, a reporter described, with both confusion 
and admiration, the events that accompanied Chinese New Year. "At night the streets 
are brilliant with a multitude of many-colored, balloon-shaped lanterns of all sizes. It 
is between the hours of six and eight that the authorities permit the firing of crackers, 
and then the noise is like that of a battle.,,18 
Despite Portlanders curiosity about the Chinese immigrant population, whites 
more generally frowned on and feared the Chinese people, their laboring class 
particularly, and their habits and customs. English-language newspapers complained 
about the crowded living quarters in Chinatown, stereotyping Chinese, especially non-
merchant Chinese, as morally depraved and a threat to the moral well being of 
American society. Complaints about squalid living conditions and the destitute lives of 
Chinese women appeared often in the pages of the Daily Oregonian. A characteristic 
1865 article stereotyped Chinese men as "drunken loafers" and labeled Chinese 
prostitutes "disgusting specimens of decrepi[t] humanity" who were given police 
whistles to call on officers while "decent Americans" had to hunt for protection 
against violent Chinese men. 19 
In the legal arena, anti-Chinese sentiment was clearly represented through a 
series of laws. Early Oregon laws that targeted Chinese were similar to those passed 
in California. In June 1873, the Portland city council passed the "cubic air" ordinance 
that required the chief of police to arrest all persons living in a building that contained 
less than 550 cubic feet of air for each occupant. Fifty-two Chinese violators were 
18 The West Shore, "Chinese New Year and Theater," Feb. 28, 1891. 
19 Daily Oregonian, Nov. 22, 1865. 
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arrested on June 26 and 27, 1873, and all but two paid a five-dollar fine. In February 
1874, the city council prohibited the cutting of wood on sidewalks. In April 1874, it 
prohibited the carrying of swill or other offensive material without being properly 
covered. In November 1877 it prohibited the smoking, buying, or bargaining for 
opium (even through national law did not make the supply and distribution illegal 
until 1906). Attempts were made to impose a prejudicial tax on Chinese washhouses 
in 1863 and 1865. However, Mayor Henry Failing vetoed this act because of its 
discriminatory nature.20 These measures were justified on the grounds of public safety 
and fire hazards, but racial resentment resonated from them loudly. 
As early as the 1860s, conflicting opinions developed over the role Chinese 
would play in the United States generally and Portland specifically. A sl;1arp line 
divided those whites who needed inexpensive labor to supply their businesses and 
working class whites who saw the Chinese as competitors for jobs. A third opinion 
was voiced by social reformers who viewed the Chinese as a peril to the moral welfare 
of the American mainstream. In the 1870s, perceived labor competition added fodder 
to the already hot debate over the legality of Chinese immigration. As the U.S. 
Congress began to consider seriously immigration restrictions against the Chinese, the 
20 Early anti-Chinese laws in Oregon Territory included an 1857 ordinance that 
required every Chinese miner to pay the local sheriff a monthly tax of two dollars; 
failure to pay this tax permitted the sheriff to seize all property and sell it within the 
hour to the highest bidder. Additionally, according to the Oregon Constitution, 
Chinese were prohibited from voting. Oregon state law prohibited Chinese residents 
from owning real estate or working mining claims. After 1862-63, Chinese were 
forced to pay an annual tax of five dollars or face arrest and forced labor on public 
projects. Charles A. Tracy, "Race, Crime and Social Policy: The Chinese In Oregon, 
1871-1885," Crime and Social Justice, (1980), pp. 11-25. 
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Daily Oregonian expressed the local view. In a series of heated editorials, an Oregon 
proponent of exclusion wrote, 
every other element that comes to our shores is soon transfused into our own 
population ... [but] Chinese are an exclusive people, and are practically incapable of 
change or improvement.. .. New ideas find no way into their minds .... They are not an 
assimilable element, and they come in contact with our own people in a way which 
cannot in the long run be favorable either to morals or prosperity. 
The author continued that "there are branches of employment in which Chinese may 
engage without coming in competition with white labor, but these branches are not 
very numerous, and there are Chinese enough among us to fill them all for the 
present." 21 
Calling himself "Justice," a critic of this editorial, and of a corresponding anti-
Chinese meeting, wrote in response: "If the late demonstration against the Chinese is 
in the interest of American labor, then why not extend the condemnation to all 
foreigners and to labor-saving machinery." On the moral character of Chinese, Justice 
stated, "It is pitiable to see and hear swaggering, drunken fellows, almost rotten with 
disease, [t]alking of the bad moral influence of the Chinese. I venture to assert that 
nine out often who are engaged in this crusade would hire Chinamen iftheir interests 
could be served in that way.,,22 Editorials such as these illustrate how whites often 
fused questions of moral authority with labor competition, and how intertwined the 
21 Daily Oregonian, Mar. 22, 1879. 
22 Ibid. 
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two were in the movement for Chinese exclusion, providing a mutually reinforcing 
justification for all groups that promoted exclusion.23 
Although they failed to recognize it, editorial debates such as these highlighted 
an important fact. In regards to labor and class, Portland's Chinese immigrant 
population was not a homogenous entity. Chinese immigrants in Portland included, in 
addition to common laborers, middle-level merchants and labor contractors and a 
wealthy merchant elite. Some Chinese came to Portland with business savvy 
developed in China. Others originated from agricultural regions and understood 
irrigation and damming techniques that aided them in mining. Chinese immigrants 
adapted these skills to meet labor and business demands, to overcome challenges they 
faced in a hostile environment, and to take advantage of new economic opportunities. 
These local adaptations, in turn, prompted development within Chinatown of a 
social hierarchy different from that which immigrants had known in China. In China, 
Confucian moral order generally frowned on merchants who focused their lives on the 
pursuit of personal wealth. In the U.S. West, traditional Confucian social hierarchies 
were turned on their head as families were left behind and merchants came to 
prominence among immigrants who relied on that class for financial assistance, labor 
contracting services, and mediation services that protected laborers from unfair 
23 Opinions about Chinese immigration conflicted even after the passage of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. Anti-Chinese labor activists complained that Chinese 
competed with whites for labor while social reformers complained of the moral 
depravity of Chinese laborers and prostitutes. Additionally, whites cited Chinese 
immigrants unwillingness to assimilate to American religion, the English language, 
and mainstream customs. Many assumed that Chinese were inherently incapable of 
assimilation due to cultural heritage and a continued association with the dynastic 
leadership in China. 
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treatment by white employers.24 In these ways, Chinese merchants moved to the top 
of the social ladder while laborers, the majority of the immigrant Chinese population, 
remained at the lower end. This hierarchical restructuring affected the way Chinese 
associated with one another between Chinatown's development in the 1850s and 
through the 1910s. 
The development of a merchant elite in Chinatown 
In his article, "The Origins of Chinese Emigration to California Reconsidered," 
historian Y ong Chen has studied the development of the Chinese immigrant merchant 
class in the United States. Contrary to scholars who have depicted the Chinese as a 
population forced out of their homeland by social, political, and economic strife, Chen 
shows that many Chinese willingly left China to pursue opportunities in the North 
American West, despite well known perils awaiting them. Chen focuses on the 
merchant class and how these men had derived their understanding of business, 
particularly western-style business, in the southern delta region of China. 
This region was home to China's oldest and best-developed market-oriented 
economies. When British, French, and, later, U.S. merchants entered the China trade, 
merchants were ready and willing to learn from their foreign counterparts. The 
24 As I mention below, a Chinese merchant class had developed in the southern delta 
regions of China. These merchants held much power over local economies and 
probably did not experience the same Confucian hierarchy as in other regions of China 
where merchant trade, and especially trade with wealthy Western traders, was not as 
important to local economies. However, Confucian thought, generally, frowned on 
those who focused more on personal wealth than personal moral cultivation. See 
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1990), esp. 90-193. 
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development of a merchant class in southern China prepared merchants and 
experienced wage-earning laborers for survival, even success, in the United States' 
market economy.25 Furthermore, as western European and American fur traders 
entered these southern China markets in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the Pearl River delta region became a focal point of interaction between 
China and the West. Chinese in this region were the first to learn and take advantage 
of the 1848 gold discovery in California. And as more traders and missionaries settled 
in the southern delta region of China, English-language newspapers also established a 
place in the greater Chinese society. Papers such as the Alta California, the San 
Francisco Daily Herald, and the Daily Journal of Commerce made their way into the 
hands of Chinese merchants and skilled laborers. Articles reporting on the 
opportunities in California provided a catalyst for early Chinese immigration to the 
western United States. 
We can assume that Chinese merchants and laborers, who spread north from 
California to Oregon and, eventually, Portland, arrived with prior knowledge of the 
opportunities available to them and developed their communities in light of this 
knowledge. Merchants, for instance, provided basic services to the local Chinese 
community. As immigrants arrived on steamships from San Francisco and Seattle-as 
well as directly from southern China-merchants served as preliminary hosts. They 
met new immigrants at the docks and acquainted them with their new surroundings. 
25 Y ong Chen, "The Internal Origins of Chinese Emigration to California 
Reconsidered," Western Historical Quarterly, (1997), pp. 521-546. Chen expanded 
this analysis in Chinese San Francisco, 1850-1943: A Trans Pacific Community 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
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They also provided immigrants with financial and material assistance, especially when 
arriving Chinese shared a common regional origin in China.26 Merchants brought to 
their role a unique understanding of the challenges immigrants confronted when 
associating with the white community. Merchants came to possess an intricate 
understanding of how businesses, government, and law operated in the United States. 
Perhaps most importantly for the hundreds of Chinese laborers who, in the last half of 
the nineteenth century, arrived in Portland each year, merchants served as labor 
contractors. They controlled the placement of laborers in white businesses and helped 
protect laborers' rights and interests on the job. 
Merchants maintained a dominant role in their relationship with laborers. This 
was especially the case as the number of Chinese laborers increased while the wealthy 
merchant population remained fairly static. At the same time, merchants relied on the 
constant influx of Chinese immigrants whose demand for services only Chinese 
merchants could provide. For instance, in 1870, Chinese in Multnomah, Clatsop, and 
Wasco counties numbered 496; of these, more than 200 were listed as laborers. By 
1880 the Chinese immigrant population had almost quadrupled to 1,961, with more 
than 600 identifying themselves as laborers. During the same two periods, however, 
the number of merchants increased by only five, from six to eleven. 27 This small, and 
virtually unchanging number of merchants gained power as the immigrant Chinese 
26 Chinese district associations helped members find employment and acquaint 
themselves with their new surroundings. District associations based membership on a 
shared provincial connection in China. Clan associations, another traditional 
association with similar financial and social functions, based membership on direct 
blood ties. 
27 Corbett and Corbett, "The Chinese in Oregon." 
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population, especially laborers, burgeoned. They brokered the labor of hundreds of 
men and, at the same time, provided them with goods and services. Both Chinese 
laborers and white-business owners eventually became reliant on the services-goods, 
jobs, and labor-provided by Chinese merchants. And over time, the adaptability of 
merchants increased their influence among both Chinese and white populations. 
Chinese merchants in Portland adapted quickly to their new role inside the 
immigrant community. They first saw and met the demand for labor, and, as the 
immigrant Chinese laboring population grew, they met the demand for goods and 
services it created. In business, merchants fused their retail stores with labor 
contracting services. Contractors like the Wing Sing & Company helped immigrants 
both to find jobs and to assure that, once on the job, laborers were paid fairly and 
supplied with necessary tools, clothing, and food. Contractors placed anywhere from 
a few to hundreds of Chinese laborers with white logging and railroad companies. 
The contracts between the white and Chinese companies assured certain things for 
both the laborer and the white owner. Merchants assured laborers their provisions and 
promised whites that laborers would not strike while on the job. In addition, merchant 
contractors helped laborers fight their white employers when they were not paid. In 
fact, in numerous cases Chinese merchant contractors brought white businesses 
owners to court after they failed to pay laborers for work completed.28 
28 For details of contracts and compensation cases see, Kwong Loon Kee & Company 
v. C. Y.s. Sprague Company, Judgment 7736; Lee Chew v. Wing Hing Chewey, 
Judgment 9038; Hop Chong & Company v. Todd & Biven, Judgment 9192; Gai Kee v. 
J.s. and c.c. Miller, Judgment 19597; Chung Lung v. James Cooper, Judgment 7614. 
26 
For laborers, legal support was crucial to their survival in the United States. 
Merchant contractors had both the financial capacity and social status to bring the law 
to bear on white employers. Merchant contractors were also familiar with the U.S. 
legal system and aligned themselves with one another in court cases against white 
employers. For instance, court documents show that merchants often served as 
sureties in legal cases involving Chinese, assuring both the financial capacity and 
testimonial reliability of fellow merchants and laborers. In addition, by understanding 
the framework of U.S. law, these merchants could and did hire high-profile white 
lawyers to defend Chinese in court.29 These white lawyers made careers helping 
defendants file writs of attachment against the property of white companies and 
assisted them in the often-lengthy legal processes that accompanied breach of contract 
cases. Without the assistance provided by their Chinese contractors, laborers would 
have been incapable of retrieving unpaid wages from white employers. 
In a parallel way Chinese merchants provided services to the white 
community. Unlike laborers, merchants adapted quickly and thoroughly to the 
American economic and legal environment. Merchants did not threaten competition, 
as did laborers. Furthermore, merchants represented a common entrepreneurial ethic 
embraced by whites. Most Chinese merchants understood and used the English 
29 Chinese in Portland generally used the same lawyers for their cases. These included 
A.H. Tanner's firm, Senator John Mitchell's law firm, Woodward & Woodward, and 
C.A. Mulkey's firm. This patter is similar to that described by Lucy Salyer in her 
study Chinese immigrants in San Francisco, especially in cases of habeas corpus. See, 
Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers and Salyer, Entry Denied: Exclusion and the 
Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1991 ). 
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language; they were consequently seen as a group more capable of adapting to the 
American mainstream. Yet what whites were less willing to realize was that these 
same merchants who spoke English and adapted to the American business 
environment were, on the whole, more closely tied to the cultural norms of Chinese 
society. Merchants were more likely, for instance, to educate their children in 
English-language schools but less likely to abandon ties to their responsibilities to 
family and cultural tradition in China. Chinese merchants were also those who headed 
traditional <1lan and district associations, as well as secret societies, all common in 
China, once they were living in the United States. Simply put, Chinese merchants 
served as the leadership for and financial backers of the traditional elements of 
Chinese society that were transplanted, and cultivated, in the U.S. West. 
Specifically, Chinese merchants maintained financial ties with family in China, 
encouraged the return of remains of immigrants who died in the United States, and 
provided funds for the maintenance of traditional burial plots in their homeland. 
Merchants maintained strong connections, economic and cultural, with China at a time 
when whites chastised immigrants for their unwillingness to become a part of the U.S. 
economic system.30 At the same time that these Chinese merchants sought to maintain 
the traditional framework of Chinese tradition and responsibility in the United States, 
30 In some cases, whites combined their dismay for the social and economic customs 
of Chinese in defending their anti-Chinese sentiment. For instance, "It is one of the 
grounds of complaint against John Chinaman that he lives in the poorest possible 
style, thus not contributing to the support of those thousands of industries that go to 
sustain our complex industrial system and give work to the mechanics; and, doubtless, 
this is a just cause of objection since the best citizen is he who spends his money and 
thus returns it to the channels of trade and provides work for thousands," The West 
Shore, Feb. 28, 1891. 
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outside influences, especially white missionaries, permeated the cultural and 
geographic borders of Chinatown. With this permeation developed a division between 
Chinese who maintained Chinese institutions and beliefs and those who chose 
assimilation over tradition. 
Divisions inside Chinatown 
As the Chinese population in Portland grew in the last half of the nineteenth 
century, so too did the cultural infrastructure of the community. Immigrants brought 
with them social institutions and, similar to their businesses, adapted them to fit new 
conditions. For instance, when immigrants died in the United States, merchants, in 
connection with friends of the deceased, usually coordinated the shipping of their 
remains to family in China. Additionally, merchants served as go-betweens for 
families in China and their relatives in the United States. When ancestral burial sites 
and temples in China needed renovation, merchants collected funds from relatives that 
resided in the United States.31 Merchants also led clan and district associations that 
31 In John Day, Oregon, well-known merchants, Lung On and Ing Hay, were 
frequently called upon to assist in financing the renovation of ancestral burial sites and 
temples in China. Requests for funds by families in China were were often sent to 
Chinese merchants in the U.S. West who could locate sojourning immigrants. Once 
requests were made, merchants and clan leaders organized contributors and sent their 
offerings to the family. For letters detailing this occurrence see, Kam Wah Chung 
Collection, Oregon Historical Society, Microfilm 74, Reels 1-6. 
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formed the backbone of social life in Portland's Chinatown. In these ways, merchants 
nurtured and perpetuated trans-Pacific connections.32 
While merchants oversaw the maintenance of cultural institutions and trans-
Pacific relationships they also accepted a certain level of cultural adaptation. For 
instance, first-generation immigrants who started families in the United States often 
sent their children to English-language schools run by European American religious 
and social reform organizations. Laborers also understood the benefits of learning 
English, but, because most laborers were sojourners without family in the United 
States, the importance they placed on learning English was not as great and served as a 
temporary means to an end and as a way to help them cope with discrimination in the 
United States. The balance between assimilation and tradition posed particular 
challenges for Chinese immigrants and created division among their ranks. As white 
social reform movements increased in the 1880s and 1890s the pressure for 
immigrants to assimilate also accelerated. The decision to assimilate proved 
especially trying for those immigrants who valued cultural norms and the preservation 
of ethnic identity and autonomy. 
For many immigrants, the retention of Chinese language, religion, and social 
institutions marked the fundamental features of both personal and ethnic identity. As 
U.S. laws increasingly attacked Chinese in the United States, many Chinese 
immigrants embraced these traits as a tool to maintain the survival of immigrant 
32 For more detailed discussion on the transplantation of traditional social networks to 
Portland see Chapter 4 below; Chen, Chinese San Francisco; Lyman, The Asian in 
North America, pp. 88- 118. 
30 
culture. For instance, prostitution as a social, and economic, institution in the 
immigrant culture was threatened in 1875 when Congress passed the Page Act. The 
Page Act banned the immigration of Chinese women to the United States but could 
not diminish the importance of prostitution within the immigrant culture. After the 
passage of the law, Chinese men continued to battle in the U.S. legal system to 
maintain control of prostitution networks while the white majority looked on in 
general frustration. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act banned non-merchant 
immigrants from coming to the United States, but it could not quell the social 
networks that, operating underground, assisted illegal immigrants in entering the 
United States. And the 1888 Scott Act and 1892 Geary Act tightened exclusion by 
requiring immigrants to register themselves in the United States. Yet these laws could 
prohibit neither the retention of native language nor the immigrant social institutions 
that helped Chinese in their cases on writs of habeas corpus in U.S. courts. In these 
ways, retention of social norms and language were important to incoming Chinese as 
well as those already battling discrimination in the United States. Chinese in the 
Unites States who abandoned cultural traditions were often viewed as selling short 
their fellow countrymen. 
Beginning in the 1860s, social reform movements began to target these 
elements of Chinese immigrant culture in Portland. European American religious 
organizations targeted Chinese prostitution and vice and encouraged language 
acquisition in the hope that language would lead to conversion and eventually be 
transmitted to China via Chinese immigrants who had sojourned in the United States. 
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Missionaries-and so- called benevolent organizations-penetrated the geographic 
borders of Chinatown, and approached those Chinese who seemed most willing to 
adopt Christianity and white American culture. As early as 1869, the Daily Oregonian 
reported that the Young Men's Christian Association had opened a Chinese language 
school in Portland and noted (with pleasure) that ten Chinamen had applied for 
admission and that some of these already had a working knowledge of the English 
language. These Chinese the Daily Oregonian praised for "marked quickness" in 
learning the alphabet; at the close of the lesson of one hour the newspaper preened that 
the students could "point to any letter of the alphabet which might be named.,,33 In 
1876, another Daily Oregonian article reported that several Chinese converts held a 
celebration for new Chinese baptisms, and an 1877 report from Salem noted that a 
Chinese language school had been established in that town, welcoming all Chinese 
who wanted to learn English to attend.34 Religious organizations were quite open 
about their goal of converting Chinese to Christianity through language schools and 
were confidant in their eventual success. As one reported, "We have a substantial 
proof that the hearts of the Chinese are not incapable of gratitude, liberality and 
affection. Treat them well; teach them the knowledge of our language, and lead them 
to Christ, and all wiII be welL" 35 
While most Chinese used the mission schools for their own purposes-the 
practical benefits of learning English-some did in fact convert to Christianity. Some 
33 Daily Oregonian, Aug. 17, 1869. 
34 Ibid., Nov. 14, 1876; May 17, 1877. 
35 Ibid. 
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immigrant Chinese in Portland were baptized, and others regularly attended services 
and practiced street preaching inside Chinatown.36 Still other Chinese immigrants 
joined "Christian scholar societies" and were praised for their devotion. Discussing 
the choice of one male Chinese immigrant to adopt Christianity, the Daily Oregonian 
reported: "Many eyes were wet with tears, as he told of his sufferings, caused by his 
heathen father after he professed Christianity." Knowing Chinese risked persecution 
when they converted to Christianity, one missionary stated, "Several [Chinese 
immigrants] lost situations on which they depended for support and one confessed that 
he came after 'cruel scourging,' publicly to give himself to God." 37 In a published 
36 In a November, 1875, Daily Oregonian article, the Baptist Church noted that, "The 
school commenced with 75 Chinamen present and had on an average, 45 during the 
first six months ... ten members of the school had publicly professed faith in Christ. 
Twenty had formed themselves into a Christian Knowledge Society," Daily 
Oregonian, Nov. 23, 1875. The Baptist mission in Portland had at least 20 Chinese 
students in the late 1870s that formed themselves into a "Christian Knowledge 
Society" which met weekly to study the Bible. It was reported in one publication that 
"in this society all gambling, drinking, visiting houses of ill-repute and opium 
smoking was strictly prohibited .... From the moment oftheir first examination of the 
Bible, Joss is neglected". Baptist Annals oj Oregon, 1844 to 1900 (2 vols., 
McMinnville, Ore., 1905), 1: 203-204. 
37 In a 1905 published account from the Baptist Annals of Oregon, Rev. C.H. Mattoon 
reported on a similar case of a Portland Chinese man who had converted to 
Christianity. "After three months' attendance, one of the pupils left for Astoria 
[Oregon]. His heathen uncle had removed him from all Christian influence, and 
threatening to disown him if he did not forget the school. His teacher wrote him a 
Christian letter. In his reply, he said, 'I know you can only pray for me. I hope you 
will ask God to keep me, for I am walking in the way of difficulty, and I had myself 
ready to ask Him to help me to walk in the King's highway. I pray that you will help 
me to know Christ, and that I may be able soon to enter the wicke[d] gate." And 
another report from the same publication noted that there were ten Chinese enrolled at 
the Portland Episcopal school in 1875. Opposition to their involvement in the school 
was so strong that five of the Chinese converts left the church with only three of those 
five returning at a later date. Two of the three returnees "lost good positions as clerks 
for their heathen relatives, and considerable money for their course." Ibid. 
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account, another missionary reported, "After the Baptism of the converts, many of the 
regular pupils stayed away for a time, intimidation and threats of violence being used 
to prevent their coming, but afterwards they returned.,,38 In the streets of Portland's 
Chinatown, many faced taunts, and street preachers were sometimes run out of the 
Chinese district by their fellow countrymen. In other instances, even more serious 
repercussions were felt, as an 1868 newspaper article noted: "A night or two since an 
attempt was made by several Chinamen on Alder street, to murder one of their 
countrymen, on account of some disagreement concerning religious belief.,,39 
Throughout the 1870s, newspapers continually reported violence against 
Chinese who converted to Christianity and embraced aspects of American culture. A 
particularly revealing case took place in the Portland Chinatown joss house in October 
of 1878. In this case, Charley Lee Quong, Lee Jaw, and Lee Jong murdered Chin Sue 
Ying, purportedly because of the latter's conversion to Christianity. Chin Sue Ying 
made no secret of his conversion and frequently visited Chinatown and the local joss 
house to express his devotion to Christianity. This persistence led to his murder in the 
joss house that October night. 
The original conflict between two groups of Chinese began several days before 
the murder when Chin Sue Ying visited the joss house and intentionally knocked over 
a religious pot that sat on the joss house alter. Other Chinese in the joss house quickly 
demanded that Chin Sue Ying leave. When he refused, Lee Quong went down to the 
street and asked a police officer to remove Chin Sue Ying from the joss house. The 
38 Ibid., p. 203. 
39 Daily Oregonian, July 10, 1868. 
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officer asked if he wished for the intruder to be arrested, but Lee Quong responded no, 
"I know him, I'll have him arrested to-morrow.,,40 However, Lee Quong did not go on 
to have Chin Sue Ying arrested, and Chin Sue Ying returned to the joss house on the 
evening of October 3, accompanied by two other Chinese men, allegedly to deface the 
altar. 
In later court testimony, Chin Sue Ying's companions that night, Wo lung and 
Lun Sing, testified that they and Chin Sue Ying had, prior to the affray, been scholars 
at the Chinese mission school in Portland. When the three men went to the joss house 
that evening, Chin Sue Ying apparently approached the altar and attempted to throw a 
piece of raw meat at the temple idols. In reaction, Lee long grabbed Chin Sue Ying's 
arm and yelled for him to stop. When he refused, Lee long drew a hatchet from his 
coat and struck Chin Sue Ying over the head. The two men battled for control of the 
hatchet. Chin Sue Ying managed to wrest it from the hands of Lee long but not before 
Lee long pulled a pistol from under his clothes and shot Chin Sue Ying. Lee long 
shot Chin Sue Ying and then fled the building with his companions. 
During the trial, witnesses for the state testified to the fact that the 
confrontation at the Chinese joss house had been building for some time. During Chin 
Sue Ying's first altercation at the joss house, Lee Quong had yelled epitaphs at Chin 
Sue Ying that translated roughly to "a man who acts like a prostitute"-a reference to 
40 State of Oregon, Respondent, v. Charley Lee, Indicted under the Name of Charley 
Lee Quang, and Ah Lee, Indicted under the Name of Lee Jaw, Jointly Indicted with 
Lee Jong, Appellants, Oregon Reports, vol. 27, 237-258 (hereafter State of Oregon v. 
Lee). 
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Chin Sue Ying's conversion to Christianity.41 Witnesses also testified that, when Chin 
Sue Ying entered the joss house the next evening, the men already there had planned 
to attack Chin Sue Ying ifhe reappeared. The law firm of Dolph, Bronaugh, Dolph 
and Simon and Whaley & Fechheimer, who represented the non-Christian Chinese 
defendants, argued that the entire affray was accidental, a product of the heat of 
passion, but the district attorney, John F. Caples insisted otherwise, convinced the 
judge and jury that, because the two groups had fought before and the accused were 
carrying weapons in a house of worship, the murder of Chin Sue Ying was clearly 
premeditated.42 Each of the accused was found guilty and sentenced to death by 
hanging. 
For Chinese on both sides of the religious line, confrontations similar to this 
continued into the twentieth century. Pressures within Chinatown to maintain 
immigrant identity, culturally and economically, weighed heavily. For those 
immigrants who abandoned custom, language, and association with other Chinese, the 
cost could be deadly. Those who embraced publicly the American mainstream faced, 
at the least, ostracism from their own countrymen. And in an immigrant society that 
defined itself through its internal cohesion and the retention of custom, this ostracism 
constituted veritable exile. 
41 State of Oregon v. Lee, 250. 
42 The judge and jury ruled, specifically, "Direct proof of deliberation and 
premeditation is not required, but may be inferred from proven facts. Three men, all 
armed with deadly weapons, made a simultaneous attack upon a third, in a Chinese 
Joss-house, and killed him-one having approached from behind, and without saying 
a word, struck him a deadly blow on the head with a hatchet, while the others fired 
two shots into his body in rapid succession." It was held that these facts warranted the 
jury in concluding that the killing was premeditated. Ibid. pp. 214-215. 
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Conclusion 
The fonnation of a Chinese immigrant identity in Portland stemmed from 
many factors. Demographically, merchants governed a predominantly male 
community. Laborers depended on Chinese merchants for lodging, entertainment, 
goods and services, and above all labor connections to white employers. Merchants 
also provided crucial representation and support for laborers and other Chinese in 
court battles against whites. Merchants' understanding of the U.S. legal system 
provided a safety net when immigrants were docked payor held at ports of entry 
during the early years of Chinese exclusion. Through economic and partial cultural 
assimilation, Chinese merchants established themselves as elites within the immigrant 
culture. However, this level of adaptation by merchants did not necessarily translate 
into religious and cultural assimilation to the American mainstream. While merchants 
adapted their business practices to the American economy, they, more than non-
merchants Chinese, perpetuated the retention of trans-Pacific relations that kept 
Chinese immigrants connected to their Chinese families, customs, and language. 
On the other hand, immigrants outside the merchant class faced different 
challenges from both the white and Chinese communities. To many whites, non-
merchant immigrants, especially laborers, were viewed as competitors for jobs and a 
threat to the domestic moral order. While newspaper reports frequently depicted 
Chinese immigrants as morally depraved, they seldom attacked Chinese businesses or 
the Chinese merchant class per se. Instead, they viewed the "Chinese problem" in 
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Portland as one rooted in the laboring class. Chinese, and especially non-merchant 
Chinese, also posed a perceived threat to the white moral code. To overcome this 
perceived threat, missionaries targeted the majority non-merchant class and 
encouraged religious assimilation through schooling in the Chinese mission schools. 
But in tum, those immigrants who embraced assimilation faced severe reprisals from 
their fellow countrymen who insisted on retaining customs. Pressure to assimilate-as 
subsequent chapters will show-----continued both to unite and divide the immigrant 
Chinese population as it strove to defuse and develop ethnic autonomy in the United 
States. 
If 
I' 
38 
Chapter Two 
A Division Between: 
Missionary Influence and Conflict in Portland's Chinese Enclave, 
1879-1900 
In the Baptist Church's 1875 annual report, a representative commented on the 
success of the church's missionaries among Chinese in Portland, Oregon. On the 
Mission School he noted, "To human sight, the project was Utopian; to the eye of 
faith, a certainty, for the spirit of Him who made the human heart had spoken and His 
children know that, though China is ten thousand miles across a trackless sea, the 
Chinaman is a 'neighbor.",1 Despite this seemingly positive assessment, missionaries 
in Portland had a combative relationship with the Chinese immigrant community. 
Those Chinese who attended mission schools and converted to Christianity were 
praised for their willingness to adopt western morality and lifestyle. On the other 
hand, missionaries dealt harshly with Chinese immigrants who rejected mission 
teaching, preaching, and conversion campaigns. Missionaries based their opinion, and 
justified that opinion, on racialized images of Chinese immigrants as drug addicts, 
gamblers, and sexual predators. 
This chapter looks at how Christian missionaries established and carried out 
their missions and rescue campaigns in Portland's Chinatown. Through mission 
schools, street preaching, and legal battles, missionaries sought to alter the moral 
landscape of the predominantly male Chinese enclave in Portland. More importantly, 
this chapter shows that Chinese, in the era of social and moral reform that swept the 
1 "Annual Report of Chinese Mission School, Portland, Ore., for the Year ending Nov. 
l3, 1875," Daily Oregonian, Nov. 23, 1875, Oregon Historical Society Collections. 
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country from the 1880s through the tum of the century, were discriminated against in 
court battles that hinged on the establishment of moral authority. In legal cases that 
involved financial disputes or violence, Chinese were granted due process rights in 
keeping with constitutional procedures. However, in cases that involved issues of 
morality, especially child custody and prostitution, Chinese experienced racism and 
violation of due process. 
Beginning in the 1870s, missionaries established English-language schools that 
appealed to laboring and merchant Chinese. Most Chinese attended mission schools 
to learn English, with a few eventually converting to Christianity. Missionaries 
praised converted Chinese and saw them as a group capable of spreading the Christian 
faith to China upon their return. Missionaries also began "rescue campaigns" in the 
1890s. These campaigns were similar to those in San Francisco that Peggy Pascoe has 
described in Relations of Rescue.2 Rescue campaigns carried out by Portland 
missionaries took Chinese women and youngsters out of Chinatown to live with 
missionaries or American hosts. Chinese immigrants did not stand by idly. Instead, 
they united with one another to retain custody of women and children who, they held, 
had been seized by benevolent associations. During legal battles, missionaries 
racialized Chinese using images widespread among the majority white community and 
ethnocentric notions that highlighted the perceived cultural and moral superiority of 
western society. 
2 Peggy Pascoe, Relations of Rescue: The Search for Female Moral Authority in the 
American West, 1874-1939, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1990). For 
information on Protestant missionaries among the Chinese immigrant community in 
San Francisco, see Wesley Woo, "Chinese Protestants in the San Francisco Bay Area," 
in Such eng Chan, Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community ill America, 
1882-1943 (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 145-213. 
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Mission Background in Portland 
Missionary influence among Chinese began at least a decade before sweeping 
numbers of immigrants began arriving in the California gold fields in the 1850s. By 
the 1840s, Protestant missions in China were in full swing, although their success was 
modest to say the least. By 1840 less than one hundred baptisms had occurred within 
the Protestant mission in China.3 As the 1850s began, missionaries on furlough 
brought Chinese visitors to the United States and encouraged their direct involvement 
in mission work among Chinese immigrants that had, by 1852, established 
Chinatowns throughout the U.S. West. These converted Chinese served as translators 
and teachers in mission schools in large Chinese communities like San Francisco as 
well as small Chinese settlements in places such as Portland and Salem, Oregon. 
In the earliest years of mission activity in these Chinatowns, missionaries' first 
interest was the conversion of Chinese to Christianity. They reached this end by 
opening mission schools that offered free English-language courses to Chinese 
immigrants. Baptist and Presbyterian churches established homeland mission schools 
in Portland and Salem, Oregon as early as 1875. Missions, generally administered by 
men but operated by women and Chinese converts, openly constructed their schools to 
encourage the conversion of Chinese immigrants to Christianity. In their 1875 report 
to the Baptist Church committee, representatives of the Chinese homeland mission 
reported that the primary object of mission activity in the Portland was for "the 
conversion of the Chinese" and focused on "doing good to a needy class groping for 
light.,,4 The Presbyterian mission took a more nuanced approach .. In a statement 
3 Daniel Liestman, "To 'Labor for the Conversion of the Heathen Who Came in Our 
Midst': Protestants and the Chinese in Nineteenth Century America," Winifred E. 
Weter Faculty Awards Lecture, Seattle Pacific University, April 14, 1994. 
4 Daily Oregonian, Nov. 23, 1875. 
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presented to the 1890 Oregon Synod, for example, mission school coordinators 
highlighted the importance of teaching arithmetic, geography, grammar, and history. 
They followed by defining the end purpose of work among the Chinese. As 
Reverends F. G. Strange, S. D. Fulton, and Elder C. Gaddis reported, 
Some of the Chinese desire to learn English. These can be reached "by 
baiting the gospel hook with the English alphabet." ... Christianity is 
taught directly or indirectly all the time, and the teachers are cheered by 
seeing the greater portion of the scholars losing their respect for idols, 
many openly avowing their disbelief in the superstitions of their 
countrymen, and some becoming the true followers of Jesus. 5 
Despite the assured tone of this and other early reports of the hope that 
English-language classes could turn Chinese immigrants away from their traditional 
religious convictions, home missionaries in Portland were aware of the fact that 
Chinese immigrants did not come to the United States to adopt western morality and 
religion. In an 1891 report the Presbyterian Synod noted, 
In this country, the great motive with the Chinaman is a desire to make money. 
To this everything bends, and with it nothing is allowed to interfere. He has 
not come here for his health, for study, for amusement, much less to get 
religion, but to get rich. It is hoped that study will aid this. Hence the 
5 "U.S. Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Synods, Oregon Minutes of the Sessions, 
1st_16th , 1891-1906," Vol. 1, no. 1, 1891, pp. 8-9, Oregon Historical Society 
Collections; The 1878 Baptist Mission meeting reported similar approaches to 
converting Chinese immigrants, via Chinese representatives: "During the summer 
preaching was conducted by Rev. Dong Gong and the Christian brethren. The 
numbers attending were large, respectful, and attentive ... One result of these street 
meetings was to educate an intelligent and powerful minority of the heathen Chinese, 
and to bring them into sympathy with the Christians. Singing Christian songs was 
found to be one of the best ways of teaching Christian truth." See, Rev. C.H. Mattoon, 
"Baptist Annals of Oregon, 1844-1900" (2 vols., McMinnville, Ore., 1905), 1: 304. 
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willingness to go to school. One needs to be careful lest religion too, shall be 
adopted, because it will pay.6 
Another report from 1894 reported, with a clear tone of frustration, 
We are doing everything we can think of to help the Chinese, and a 
measure of success attends the efforts. The Usual school has been 
maintained and regular Sabbath services, Sabbath school and prayer 
meetings. We have suffered as all work among the Chinese in this 
country suffers, from removals both to China and to other cities ... What 
is accomplished in this country is not the most important thing. But to 
send Christian Chinese men and women back to their own country to 
help their own people, is our aim. That end we see reached every year. 7 
The desire to send Christianized Chinese men and women home to preach Christianity 
originated decades prior to this testimonial. In fact, in 1875 the Baptists recruited 
native speakers to preach directly to Chinese in their native language. The Reverend 
Dong Gong was recruited in the late 1870s by the church which reported in its 
minutes, 
Street preaching was conducted for some time during the summer by Bro. 
Dong Gong assisted by several converts. Before the departure of the last ship 
to China, loaded with Chinese, four hundred were publicly addressed. Thus 
the disciples of Jesus are endeavoring to obey His command, "Go ye into all 
the world and preach the gospel to every creature. 8 
6 "u.s. Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.," 2: 107. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Daily Oregonian, Nov. 23,1875. In Daniel Liestman's study of Protestant missions 
in the western United States, he notes that street preaching and conversion activities 
led by converted Chinese missionaries were rarely viewed positively among the 
immigrant community. Leistman wrote, "Among the Chinese people too there was 
opposition to the home mission efforts. Converts faced various degrees of censure, 
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Most reports that came out of Presbyterian and Baptist meetings carried an 
ethnocentric bent. One report from 1875 noted, "A strong and increasing moral and 
civilizing influence over forty other pupils, the majority of whom have already 
renounced their idol worship of their ancestors, and are ready to be led to the light.,,9 
More strongly, missionaries cited the Chinese as a particularly pitiable class, ascribing 
to them a cultural background that not only allowed vice in the legal sense, but even 
mandated that vice. Of particular concern was the perceived Chinese propensity for 
gambling, opium smoking, and prostitution, practices that had developed in China and 
that immigrants had transplanted to the United States. It was the desire to control and, 
more importantly, end vice among the Chinese population that encouraged Christian 
missions to establish schools for Chinese and sponsor street preaching among the 
immigrant population. 10 
punishment, and ostracism for their decision ... Y ong Gim of Sacramento requested 
police protection when he preached publicly. Street preaching in Oakland ended with 
threats against the lives of the Chinese preachers." See, Leistman, "To Labor for the 
Conversion ofthe Heathen," pp. 28-29. 
9 Daily Oregonian, Nov. 23, 1875. 
10 For more on traditional Chinese schools for second-generation children see, 
Timothy 1. Stanley, "Schooling, White Supremacy, and the Formation of a Chinese 
Merchant Public in British Columbia," Be Studies, 107 (1997), 3-28. For more on 
Chinese prostitution in U.S. West Chinatown's and white American's impressions of 
Chinese prostitution, see Neil Larry Shumsky, "Americans and Segregated 
Prostitution," Journal of Socia I History," (1986), pp. 665-679; Neil Larry Shumsky 
and Larry M. Springer, "San Francisco's Zone of Prostitution, 1880-1934," Journal of 
Historical Geography, 7 (1981), pp. 71-89; Ivan Light, "From Vice District to Tourist 
Attraction: The Moral Career of American Chinatowns, 1880-1940," Pacific 
Historical Review, 43 (1974), pp. 367-394. 
44 
"Rescue Missions" in Portland 
As Portland's Chinese immigrant population grew through the 1870s 
missionaries reassessed their approach to converting Chinese to Christianity and 
stamping out vice in the city's Chinatown. In addition to education and street 
preaching, the Baptist and especially Presbyterian churches established women's 
home missions. This group was in charge of locating Chinese women who would 
otherwise be unable, or unlikely, to attend mission schools. In 1873, the Presbyterian 
Church established the Chinese Woman's Home. The Home was designed to house 
Chinese women "who are susceptible to kindly influence and desire" in a place where 
"influence and desire to change their life may be received.")) The Woman's 
Missionary Society sought to "rescue" young girls who were in "prospective bondage" 
and from their male keepers. After rescuing these girls, generally by forcibly taking 
them from Chinatown, missionaries set up schools where "religious instruction is 
regularly given both to those living in the Home and to women gathered from 
outside." In Portland's Chinatown, the Reverend William Holt and his wife Kate were 
in charge of establishing and carrying out the Presbyterian rescue mission. Under the 
Presbyterian Church's Portland branch of Home Missions, the Women's North Pacific 
Presbyterian Board of Missions (WNPPBM) served as the representative for wayward 
Chinese women and children. The WNPPBM located and took women and children 
out of houses of prostitution and accepted these groups who came to the Mission for 
safety. With the help oflaw enforcement officials and encouragement in the press, the 
)) Joshua Bolles, "Historical Sketches of the Missions among the North American 
Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church" (Philadelphia, 1891), p. 36-40. 
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WNPPBM succeeded in seizing numerous Chinese women and youngsters. They 
fought for legal custody in county courts against Chinese men and women who 
claimed legal guardianship to the subjects in question. After rescuing women from 
Portland's (and San Francisco's) Chinatown, the women's missions went to work in 
instructing "inmates" on "habits of industry" such as sewing and household 
management. Additionally, daily sessions at the school included religious 
. . 12 InstructIOn. 
Historian Peggy Pascoe has examined the history of Donaldina Cameron's 
Presbyterian Mission Home in San Francisco, which resembles closely Portland's 
Presbyterian mission movement. Founded in 1874, the San Francisco Presbyterian 
Mission Home for Chinese provided a model for Portland's WNPPBM. Both the San 
Francisco Presbyterian Mission Home and the WNPPBM saw their "rescue" of 
Chinese women from houses of prostitution as "skirmishes in a righteous battle 
against sexual slavery.,,13 As Pascoe describes, mission rescue stories, which turned 
into a veritable literary genre during the late nineteenth century, sensationalized 
12 Like Protestant missionaries, Baptist representatives working among the Chinese 
population in Portland faced both success and failures during their earliest years. One 
report noted that the "high Christian ground taken in relations to the treatment of 
Chinese women," in 1877 ended with a "serious secession" in overall membership of 
Chinese at the Baptist Mission. And another report from 1879 noted the presence of 
Chinese women who willing sought the aid of the Baptist Mission: "Some questions 
relative to Chinese women threatened trouble for a time, and caused much 
anxiety ... Three [Chinese] women sought the protection of the mission; after carefully 
examining each case, two were provided for. The other was shot on the street while 
attempting the second time to escape from the degrading life she was compelled to 
lead." See, Mattoon, "Baptist Annals," pp. 304,306. 
13 Peggy Pascoe, "Gender Systems in Conflict: The Marriage of Mission-Educated 
Chinese American Women, 1874-1939," Journal of Social History, 4 (l988), pp. 631-
668. 
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images of Chinese prostitutes and their depraved male Chinese keepers. Rescue 
stories were accompanied by equally sensational portrayals of illegal Chinese 
organizations like the so-called tongs that were thought to control the Chinese 
prostitution trade in the American West. And while missionaries avoided racist 
stereotyping of the Chinese immigrants who were educated in mission schools, they 
were more than willing to use racist stereotypes of Chinese immigrant culture in their 
custody battles with Chinese. 
Two types of Chinese custody cases occurred in the 1880s and 1890s. Some 
cases, like that of Chan Lon Heung (1883) involved abandoned children and set white 
rescuers against Chinese immigrants seeking custody of those children. These cases 
illustrate the relative success that Chinese immigrants had in winning custody cases 
over Chinese women and youngsters when their cases went unchallenged by whites. 14 
In the case of Chan Lon Heung, for example, Chinese immigrant Chan Bo stated that 
Chan Lon Heung was fourteen years old and was without parents or other relatives or 
friends. For some time prior to the case, he stated, he had supported Chan Lon Heung 
and was willing to assume the education and material support of the youngster ifhe 
was awarded custody. Chan Lon Heung also testified that she desired the court's 
approval of Chan Bo's guardianship and accepted his testimony as true. With the 
support of Chinese merchants Seid Back and N.W. Gow as sureties (or financial 
backers), Chan Bo was awarded full custody of Chan Lon Heung on June 5,1883. 15 
The case of Chan Lon Heung was not unprecedented in Portland. Many 
14 In the matter of the estate of Chan Lon Heung-a minor, Est. 927, June 6, 1883. 
15 Ibid. 
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Chinese sought custody of Chinese women and children. Some did so out of concern 
for their well being. These cases were brought to the county court by concerned 
friends of families, or families that were unable to care for their children because of 
poverty and other conditions. Other women and children were claimed by concerned 
immigrants after they fled the brothels where they were kept as prostitutes. In other 
cases, Chinese men fought for guardianship rights with the goal of prostituting women 
in brothels, indenturing them to lives of squalor and abuse. Yet, a third type of 
custody battIe, those in which whites contested Chinese claims, challenged the 
autonomy of Chinese immigrants who brought their custody requests to the circuit 
court. In these cases, especially when white missionaries pressed cultural and moral 
grounds for claiming legal guardianship, the court generally denied custody to Chinese 
claimants. These cases were marked by racist arguments and popular imagery about 
the inferior cultural, ethnic, and moral background of Chinese society and immigrant 
culture. 
Two cases exemplify the conflicts-cultural, religious, ethnic-that occurred 
in these custody battles over Chinese women and children. In the spring of 1889, the 
WNPPBM appealed a judgment previously reached by the Multnomah County circuit 
court. The decision had granted full guardianship of two young sisters, Ah Won, age 
eight, and Ah Tie, age ten, to Yum Chung, who claimed to be the girls' uncle, and 
Fung Que, who insisted she was their stepmother. In the original case, the court's 
grant of custodial rights was based on the testimony of the uncle and stepmother and 
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other Chinese witnesses. 16 And, like the case of Chan Bo, the claimants relationship 
to the youngsters in their and others' court testimony was undisputed, until, that is, 
missionaries heard of the case and seized the youngsters from the house of Fung Que, 
claiming they were housed in ill-conditions and in need of protection. In June 1889, 
the WNPPBM filed a petition, under the Abused and Neglected Children's Act 
(enacted in February 1889 by the Oregon legislature), for the arrest and surrender of 
the two Chinese children. 17 Under the same benevolent charities act, the Boys and 
Girls Aid Society (BAGAS), a local charitable organization founded in 1885, jointly 
amended the petition and the court awarded custody of the children jointly to the 
WNPPBM and BAGAS. 
In their original petition, the two charitable organizations based their claim to 
custody on their "strong suspicion" that the girls were being housed, not in the custody 
of caring Chinese relatives but, rather, in a "house of ill-repute." They charged that 
Fung Que "was a woman of notoriously bad character" and that the children "were 
being trained to lives of immorality and vice, and unless removed from said evil 
16 In re North Pacific Presbyterian Board of Missions v. Ah Won and Ah Tie, Oregon 
Reports, Jan. 1890, pp. 339-350. (hereafter NPPBM v. Ah Won and Ah Tie). 
17 See "An Act to confer certain powers upon certain benevolent or charitable 
corporations, incorporated under the laws of Oregon, in relation to the control and 
disposition of homeless, neglected, or abused children," in WNPPMB v. Ah Won and 
Ah Tie, pp. 339. The Boy~ and Girls Aid Society (BAGAS) was a secular 
organization established to house abused and neglected children, some of whom were 
taken by the state of Oregon and placed in the home and others who were placed in the 
horne by parents unable to care for their own children. Because the names of the 
youngsters in this case were not found in the BAGAS "list of wards," it can be 
assumed that the BAGAS filed a petition jointly but provided only temporary living 
quarters. Officially, according to the court decision, custody of Ah Won and Ah Tie 
fell on the NPPBM. 
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guardianship and influence would almost inevitably become prostitutes and 
criminals.,,18 On these grounds, the two organizations, citing the Benevolent Charities 
Act, asked the court to transfer the children to the temporary care of the BAGAS, until 
full custody could be arranged at the women's mission home. 
In response a cross petition was filed by yet another Chinese immigrant, Wong 
Chin Way, who claimed to be the guardian of the two youngsters and their estates and 
the brother of deceased father, Wong Sing and brother-in-law of the deceased mother, 
Hing Toy. In his petition, Wong Chin Way denied the accusations against Fung Que 
and Yum Chung. He alleged that the relationship ofYum Chung existed in fact and 
that, if the children were taken from their relatives and guardian and given to the 
mission society, the missionaries would attempt to entice them from the religion of 
their father and mother and relatives stillliving. 19 Wong Chin Way added that, if the 
court upheld his petition for guardianship, he intended to send Fung Que and the 
children to live with their grandmother in southern China.20 After further deliberation, 
the circuit court judge awarded the BAGAS temporary custody of the children until 
appeals on both sides were resolved. 21 
18 In re North Pacific Presbyterian Board of Missions v. Ah Won and Ah Tie, Oregon 
Reports, Jan. 1890, p. 340. (hereafter NPPBMv. Ah Won and Ah Tie) 
19 Ibid. 
20 Wong Chin Way's petition was supported by fellow Chinese immigrants, Wong 
Mon, Oak, and Wong King Chick. In an unrelated trial in 1893, Mon Oak was 
indicted for smuggling opium through a West Coast criminal network. Mon Oak was 
listed as "medicine man" and "opium merchant" in the 1890 Polk's Directory for 
Portland. 
21 Review of archival materials housed at the headquarters of the Boys and Girls Aid 
Society in Portland, Oregon, it appears that the BAGAS served only as a temporary 
housing station for Chinese children seized by missionaries. Only three Chinese 
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In their first petition, the benevolent organizations cited both the poor living 
conditions of the children and the bad character of the uncle and stepmother as 
primary reasons for their custody request. The two groups freely wielded racist 
stereotypes to support their claims. During the second appeals stage, in July 1889, 
missionaries reemphasized racial stereotypes in their claims. As this trial began, 
Wong Chin Way's testimony, and the opposing arguments of the missionaries, 
developed into a battle for moral authority. At face value, the debate between the 
Chinese and white petitioners was over the living conditions of the children and the 
opportunities they possessed for education and material advantage. Underneath this 
debate however, was a more elaborate, and loaded, issue. The fight for moral 
authority was hashed out over a two-day period with Wong Chin Way beginning the 
debate during the first day of the trial. 
Responding to missionary claims that, unless the children were "removed from 
said evil guardianship and influence" they would "almost inevitable become 
prostitutes and criminals, Wong Chin Way argued that, in fact, "if the children were 
taken from their relatives and said guardian and given to the said petitioners [the 
WNPPBM and BAGAS] they would attempt to entice them from the religion of their 
father and mother and their relatives now living.,,22 Wong Chin Way established, 
further, that he was a man of sufficient means and standing in the community and was 
names are listed in BAGAS records and these date from the twentieth century. From 
the lack of permanent Chinese residents at the BAGAS we can assume that mission 
homes were the final destination for immigrant women and children removed from 
Chinatown. 
22 WNPPBM vs. Ah Won and Ah Tie, p. 343. 
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able to care for the youngsters along with their existing Chinese relatives. He 
highlighted the importance of the children being raised in a home where custom, 
language, and culture were cultivated, and he emphasized the goal of the children's 
eventual return to their grandmother's home in China. 
After hearing the testimony of the missionaries and of Wong Chin Way, the 
court again ruled that the children remain in the temporary custody of the BAGAS. In 
October 1889, however, Wong Chin Way filed a third petition stating the ship Coloma 
would sail from Portland to China on October 15, 1889. The Captain of that vessel, 
Cyrus Noyes, was cited as duly able to see that the girls reached their grandmother's 
home safely ifthe court allowed for their travel. Wong chin Way again stated that the 
children's' "surroundings and teaching" at the BAGAS "were contrary to that of their 
parents." Because of that, claiming to speak for the family, he asked the court to 
permit the children's' return to China aboard the Coloma. In their counter petition, the 
BAGAS stated that Wong Chin Way's petition was nothing more than a desire to 
"obtain possession of them [Ah Won and Ah Tie] and remove them from the custody 
and possession of said society, so that they might be kept as property and trained up 
for dissolute and immorallives.'.23 On October 15, the court ruled that the children be 
turned over to Captain Cyrus Noyes to travel to Hong Kong. They were to be 
delivered to their relatives and taken to their grandmother at Chow Bow. But the case 
was not over. Again, the BAGAS filed a petition against the shipment of the children, 
and this one was accepted by the court, which-without explanation-ordered that the 
23 Ibid., p. 343. 
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children be placed in the care of the BAGAS until further notice. 
This final petition was particularly revealing because of the racist stereotyping 
employed by the missionaries-and its apparent embrace by the court. In his closing 
statement, Judge c.J. Thayer declared, 
The purpose of the [Benevolent] Act is to secure to homeless, neglected 
or abused children nurture and support during their tender years, and 
such an education and training as will give them a fair start upon the 
journey of life. Its aim is to develop whatever good qualities they may 
possess and thereby restrain the bad ones, in order that they may 
ultimately become useful to society, instead of being a pest. The 
establishment ofthe Boys' and Girls' Aid Society was intended ... for a 
humane and practical object, designed to alleviate misery and suffering 
and to promote the welfare of the community.24 
Judge Thayer went on to praise the BAGAS and WNPPBM, contending that "The 
high standing and reputation in the community of those having charge of the 
institution insures confidence ... and we may properly assume that if those children are 
allowed to remain under its control and influence, their mental, moral and physical 
condition will be greatly improved.,,25 In the missionaries' and judge's minds, the 
"welfare of the community" quite clearly referred to the moral code of the majority 
white population, a moral code symbolized by the WNPPBM and BAGAS. Even 
more explicitly racist rhetoric tainted Judge Thayer's closing remarks: "The Chinamen 
such as we have among us can rarely be trusted" and they generally exhibit "a total 
disregard of virtue, candor and integrity, and have shown such a propensity to 
cunning, deception and perfidy, that if they were to engage in an effort to accomplish 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., pp. 348-349. 
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an apparently meritorious object a strong suspicion would arise that there was some 
covert, sinister scheme at the bottom of it.,,26 Falling in line with the arguments of the 
missionaries, Thayer went on to declare that "our societies of to-day, whether in the 
church or out of it, are seldom engaged in any narrow sectarian schemes, but are 
endeavoring to elevate and improve the moral and physical condition of the lower 
strata of humanity, in order to enable that class to secure more substantial 
happiness.'>27 In closing Thayer claimed, "something more is now required of 
mankind than a blind adherence to bigotry," and those men and women who engage in 
benevolent work, 
who search in the dregs and scum of society, and find suffering and 
abused children, and relieve their wants and necessities, and train them 
in the path of rectitude, with a view to rendering them useful in the 
world, instead of being a burden and a nuisance, are fit and proper to be 
the guardians of any child, whether of Christian or pagan extraction. 28 
In its final ruling, the court granted full custody to the WNPPBM, with the BAGAS 
serving as temporary ward. The court ruled that "a strong suspicion existed of a 
design to sell the children for immoral purposes," even though no direct evidence had 
ever been submitted to support such a claim.29 
Throughout the 1890s, missionaries allied with benevolent organizations, law 
enforcement officials, and sympathetic lawyers, continued to claim guardianship of 
Chinese children. Similar to missions in San Francisco and elsewhere, alleged 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 349. 
29 Ibid. 
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prostitutes and so-called "wayward" children were placed in the care of religious 
institutions and secular institutions like the BAGAS. Once in protective homes, 
women and children served as seamstresses for pastors or as live-ins who held jobs 
familiar to late-Victorian era women. Chinese were clothed in high-necked, ankle-
length dresses, wore bows in their brushed, braided hair, and learned to play musical 
instruments, sew, and keep house. Education was conducted throughout the day with 
various teachers, usually women like Kate Holt, who ran the Chinese Mission Home. 
All along, the home worked in conjunction with groups that shared the mission's 
goals, such as the attorney Thomas Strong, who regularly represented missionary 
organizations in court. 
At the same time, male Chinese immigrants grew increasingly adamant in 
contesting these benevolent groups' custody of Chinese women and children. They 
supported one another financially and through testimony in court. As missionaries 
attacked the integrity of immigrant culture and Chinese religion, familial norms, and 
language, immigrants, it appears in the sheer bulk of cases, resolved to fight for 
custody. The case of Suie Yea is a case in point. 
In July 1892 an established Chinese merchant, Louis Won, applied for and 
received guardianship of Suie Yea. 30 As in the case of Chan Bo, Louis Won testified 
that Ei Nayn, the mother of the young girl, had, before she died in San Francisco in 
1887, placed Suie Yea in his custody. He demonstrated that he had for some time 
maintained the child's daily welfare and education and wished legally to become her 
30 In the matter of the Guardianship of Suie Yea, a minor, Est. 2331, Multnomah 
County Court, Aug. 9, 1892 (hereafter Suie Yea). 
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guardian. After the court reviewed Louis Won's testimony, he was in fact granted full 
custodial rights. The case remained closed for three months, but in October of 1892, 
Jennie P. Martin, head matron of the Chinese Refuge Home, filed a petition on a writ 
of habeas corpus for the annulment of guardianship rights previously granted to Louis 
Won. According to Martin, fourteen-year old Suie Yea had, since May 1892, lived at 
the Chinese Refuge Home, and it was only after Louis Won approached the Refuge 
Home and demanded custody and possession of the girl that she was removed from 
the house.31 Martin defended the three-month gap in her filing of an annulment 
petition on the grounds that no notice of Louis Won's petition of guardianship had 
been shown to her and that the pending petition had not been revealed to the Chinese 
Refuge Home or its representatives. 
Martin sought to establish the claim of the Refuge Home and her petition for 
guardianship of Suie Yea in a number of ways. She stated that the Home was a 
benevolent corporation formed and existing under the laws of Oregon with the object 
and purpose of serving as a refuge home for Chinese girls and women. According to 
Martin, fourteen-year old Suie Yea had approached the Refuge Home of her own free 
will and convinced a representative of the Home that she was an orphan. Contrary to 
the claims of Louis Won, Martin testified that, to her knowledge, Suie Yea's father 
was still alive although no information could be provided about him. Martin made 
special note, in this as well as future petitions, that Suie Yea "stated that her reason for 
leaving her Chinese home was that she was beaten and abused and directed to wash 
31 In her testimony, Jennie Martin referred to the youngster as Fong Lang or Chy Lun. 
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the naked bodies of men, and that she would rather die than submit to such 
indignities.,,32 From that time on, Martin testified, the child had been sheltered at the 
Refuge Home with the Lady Managers acting in loco parentis. In their assessment, 
the Lady Managers concluded that the child "is an intelligent capable child, well able 
to make an intelligent choice as to who should be appointed her guardian or as to 
where she should reside.,,33 
Martin included in her petition descriptions of Chinese immigrant culture 
popular in mainstream stereotypes. After declaring that "Louis Won is not a person of 
good moral character," Martin denied that Louis Won had ever been asked by the 
mother of Suie Yea to serve as guardian. Instead, she claimed that Louis Won had 
purchased Suie Yea, about five years earlier, from a procuress in San Francisco for 
$460.34 The child, Martin stated, was held by Louis Won as a slave with the intent of 
either making her a domestic servant or selling her to a Chinese brothel. Finally, and 
in racially loaded terms, Martin stated that Louis Won was a married man with four 
children, all of whom lived in China. In the United States, Martin declared, Louis 
Won lived in Portland with a woman who was not his wife but, rather, his concubine. 
Images of concubines and their Chinese overlords were a familiar symbol in popular 
magazines like Harpers and West Shore. Concubinage in China was generally 
reserved for the elite class; merchants and laborers normally lacked the means to 
32 Ibid. It is not clear, when Martin referred to Suie Yea's "Chinese home," whether 
she meant the home of her father from which she was orphaned or the home of Louis 
Won, Suie Yea. 
33 Ibid. 
34 No evidence was ever submitted by Martin to validate these claims. 
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support concubines and neither did Chinese immigrants living in the American West. 
These charges were a useful tool for Martin, however, in making her case against 
Louis Won's guardianship rights. And the judge agreed. After considering Martin's 
petition, he ordered Suie Yea to enter her own opinion in court as to who would best 
serve as her legal guardian. 
On October 10, 1892, Louis Won presented his response to the county court. 
He supplied a striking denial of the charges against him. He began by denying the 
Suie Yea had voluntarily gone to the Chinese Refuge Home or that he had beaten, 
abused, or directed her to wash the bodies of naked men. He further denied that the 
Lady Managers of the Home had ever acted in loco parentis to the child, and he 
restated that Ei Nayn was, in fact, her mother. Finally, he denied that he had 
purchased the youngster or that she was being kept in a house of prostitution. 
Drawing on corroboration from other witnesses who testified in his behalf, Louis Won 
chastised the missionaries for their racist accusations. He concluded by defending the 
legality of both his marriage to a second wife, which was, in fact, common among 
Chinese immigrants in the United States, and the living arrangements he had 
established with his second wife in Portland. He testified that, "the woman with 
whom [he] lives is not his ... concubine ... but that he is married to said woman with 
whom he now lives in the City in accordance of the Chinese Laws and Customs." He 
attacked directly the claims of the missionaries by stating that he had no proof, nor had 
the Refuge Home provided any proof, that it was able to provide a nurturing 
environment, proper education, or "proper position and station in life for the youngster 
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any better than could he.,,35 
Along with his defiant denial of the accusations against him, Louis Won 
subpoenaed prominent Chinese and white character witnesses to testify in his behalf.36 
Among them were Seid Back, the well-known merchant who had earlier testified in 
favor of guardianship rights in the case of Chan Bo, and a prominent white executive 
of the U.S. Electric and Lighting and Power Company, Leander L. Hawkins. These 
men not only supported the testimony of Louis Won but also agreed to serve as 
sureties in all trials before and after the response phase. But to no avail. In their 
closing remarks, representatives from the Refuge Home declared their ability to 
maintain and keep her as a Chinese child and woman under the best 
influences, and will carefully nurture and educate her for her proper 
position and station in life, and, when she becomes of legal age, will 
look carefully after her, and, so far as they can, will see that she is well 
married or otherwise provided for in life.,,37 
Guardianship granted in the first phase of the trial was annulled, and young Suie 
Yea went to live in the Refuge Home until she reached the age of majority. 38 
Despite the assistance of well-known Chinese and whites, and his own 
documentation of his ability to support Suie Yea, the court ruled, without 
comment, in favor of Jennie Martin and the Chinese Refuge Home. 
35 Suie Yea, p. 29. 
36 Among those subpoenaed were D.M. Dunny, John Kelly, L.L. Hawkins, George L. 
Story, and Seid Back. Hawkins and Back were partners in a shipping company that 
traded goods between China and the United States. John Kelly garnered fame in 
Oregon after serving in the illegal smuggling of laborers onto ships in Portland. Ibid. 
37 Suie Yea, Est. 2331, appellate trial, p. 4. 
38 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
The guardianship cases of Chan Lon Heung, Ah Won and Ah Tie, and Suie 
Yea have a number of implications. In each case, Chinese petitioners submitted 
guardianship bonds that proved their financial ability to provide for the youngsters. In 
the cases of Chan Lon Heung, Chinese and white witnesses testified on behalf of 
Chinese petitioners and provided financial assistance necessary to bring the case to 
trial. And while Chan Bo succeeded in his case, Wong Chin Way, in the Ah Won and 
Ah Tie case, and Louis Won, in the case ofSuie Yea, both failed. Their documentary 
evidence, testimony, and white as well as Chinese witnesses failed to outweigh the 
racist and ethnocentric testimony of white missionaries-all of which was readily 
accepted and supported by judges, especially in the case of Ah Wa and Ah Tie. 
These three cases also represent how anti-Chinese racism remained strong 
through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. Even after passage of 
Chinese exclusion laws banning the arrival of laborers in the United States, whites 
sought domination over the immigrant Chinese culture. Missionaries saw their rescue 
campaigns in Chinatowns as battles with evil. They justified their missions by citing 
the moral threat the immigrant culture posed to the majority white public. In court, 
missionaries cited the inherent racial and cultural inferiority of Chinese immigrants 
and the larger Chinese society. And while missionaries could put aside their racist 
rhetoric when teaching Chinese men in mission schools, they were unwilling to set it 
aside in court battles over women and children. Missionaries saw Chinese guardians 
as purveyors of immorality that would inevitably be inserted into the souls of women 
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and children under their control. They fought their moral battles in an effort to protect 
the young and women from this inevitability. In the end, many Chinese women and 
children were placed under the protection of mission homes by the courts. Of these 
wards, many were eventually to marry to converted Chinese men whom missionaries 
approved. Others remained in the homes of missionaries as teachers and house 
women. 
Missionary influence in Chinatown and the division between white and 
Chinese moral superiority that played out in courts was only one aspect of white-
Chinese interaction. As the era of Chinese immigrant exclusion took root beginning in 
the 1880s, situations arose that allowed Chinese and whites to breach the cultural 
barriers that had, for decades, set the two cultures off against one another. In one 
telling example, the subject of Chapter Three, Chinese and whites collaborated 
closely-and illegally-turning profits off extensive West Coast immigration and 
opium smuggling operations. 
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Chapter Three 
Border Crossings: 
Race and Illegal Immigration in Portland and British Columbia 
In December 1893, the District Attorney for the State of Oregon indicted 
twenty-eight men in the United States District Court. In October of the same year, a 
450-pound shipment of opium was loaded aboard the steamer Wilmington in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. Suspicious of the shipment, a Vancouver customs 
agent telegraphed ahead to the Astoria, Oregon, customs house, located at the mouth 
of the Columbia River-the main waterway into the city of Portland. Working on a 
tip, the owners ofthe Wilmington headed downriver to retrieve the ship and dump its 
illicit contents. But customs agents had already apprehended the shipment.) Then 
began one of the largest nineteenth-century opium and immigration smuggling cases 
on the West Coast. Of the Portland-British Columbia operation, one San Francisco 
newspaper declared, "the [smuggling] has been carried to an extent and audacity little 
short of marvelous.,,2 
The men indicted, both white and Chinese, were charged variously with 
smuggling and concealing opium and aiding and abetting the landing of illegal 
) Approximately 450 pounds of opium was put on board the Wilmington at Vancouver, 
British Columbia. In court testimony, witnesses stated that William Dunbar, one of 
the men indicted in U.S. v. Wilson found out about the telegraph and sent two partners 
to Astoria to go out in a plunger (a small boat), meet the steamer, and tell the engineer 
to bum the opium. They failed to do this, as a revenue cutter was nearby, and the 
opium was seized. Another 500 pounds of opium was, however, successfully landed a 
few days later. 
2 Daily Oregonian, Dec. 11, 1893. 
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Chinese immigrants in the United States.3 In the thirteen months before their arrest, 
the indictment charged, Nathan Blum, William Dunbar, PJ. Bannon, and Glen O. 
Holman had conspired with Port of Portland customs officials to land illegal 
immigrants from China via ports in British Columbia. With the assistance of a 
Victoria, British Columbia, co-conspirator, Major John Wilson, the smuggling 
operation had quickly expanded to include an extensive network of powerful Chinese 
opium distributors, merchants, and legal and political representatives in both British 
Columbia and Oregon.4 
As the trial would reveal, the illicit trade in human cargoes after the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act had penetrated seemingly impermeable racial barriers that 
divided the general Chinese and white communities. White and Chinese co-
conspirators set aside racial assumptions about one another to tum profits off of 
immigrant exclusion and demand for opium in, and beyond, West Coast Chinatowns. 
Chinese merchants, it appeared, possessed power not only within their own 
communities but within the larger, white-dominated economy as well. And, in the 
3 The original case of United States v. John Wilson, Record Group 21, Folder 3875, 
Parts I, II, III, National Archives-Pacific Alaska Region (hereafter u.s. v. Wilson, File 
3875, RG 21, NARA) took place over a period of 18 days and returned 33 indictments 
involving 58 different persons. The appeal cases of various people indicted in the 
original case dragged on for more than two years. 
4 u.s. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. The grand jury reported seven indictments 
as true bills. The only one of these had anything to do with smuggling was one 
charging William Dunbar, E.P. Thompson, Nat Blum, Seid Back, Ching Chong Quie, 
and Chuck Kee with smuggling opium on six counts. Alleged to have been operating 
between the months of March and June 1892, the opium and immigration smuggling 
ring clearly functioned for much longer. Letters attest to the operations continuance 
for more than two years, and over that period, over 3,000 pounds of opium was 
confiscated on the steamers owned by the Blum-Wilson syndicate. See, Daily 
Oregonian, Dec. 10, 1893. 
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end, the trial revealed how common immigrants were reduced to the position of a 
simple commodity while Chinese merchants gained economic power in the white and 
Chinese communities. The social hierarchy within Chinatown, which placed 
merchants at the top of the social ladder, is clear. 
The Chinese immigration history that preceded the case of U.S. v. Wilson sets 
the stage for what, during the 1890s, constituted extensive smuggling networks up and 
down the West coast. Beginning after passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, 
illegal Chinese immigration through Canada became a veritable racket for those 
whites and Chinese who had the resources to set up and conceal the international 
smuggling operations. Historian Erika Lee, in her comparative study of illegal 
Chinese immigration along the Canada and Mexico borders, has documented the 
means by which smugglers brought Chinese to the United States. She shows that the 
racialization of Chinese immigrants in the decades leading up to the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act encouraged Chinese to adopt the racial identity of Native Americans 
and Mexican laborers as they crossed the two borders into the United States. 
Furthermore, according to Lee, the varying anti-Chinese laws in the three countries 
actually encouraged illegal immigration by forcing it underground.5 This chapter 
affirms that anti-Chinese immigration laws did in fact encourage illicit trade in 
5 Erika Lee, "Chinese Exclusion at the Borders with Canada and Mexico," Journal oj 
American History, (2002), pp. 54-86. Other historians who have studied illegal 
immigration include Roland L. De Lorme, "The United States Bureau of Customs and 
Smuggling on Puget Sound, 1851-1913," Prologue, 5 (Summer 1973), pp. 77-88; 
Hung-chan Kim and Richard W. Markov, "The Chinese Exclusion Laws and 
Smuggling Chinese into Whatcom County, Washington, 1890-1900," Annals oJthe 
Chinese Historical Society oJthe Pacific Northwest (1983), pp. 16-30. 
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immigrants and opium into the United States. Further, anti-Chinese immigration laws 
encouraged collaboration between Chinese merchants, laborers, and whites to master 
illegal immigration and opium smuggling across the Canadian-United States. Illegal 
immigration operations linking British Columbia to Portland were very much multi-
racial enterprises. Thus, on the one hand, large scale smuggling of illegal immigrants 
displays the breaching of racial barriers betweens whites and Chinese while, at the 
same time, it reinforced the merchant-dominated class hierarchy that had developed 
within the growing Chinatowns of both Portland and Vancouver. 
Chinese Exclusion Laws and the "Smugglers Paradise" of British Columbia 
At the time of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, anti-Chinese sentiment in the 
United States was especially strong among labor leaders and anti-assimilationists. 
After years of anti-Chinese sensationalism in the press, the public at large possessed a 
ready-made image of the Chinese as the "yellow intruder" who had come to the 
United States to exploit jobs, white women, and other opportunities for vice. 
Magazines like Harpers Weekly and the San Francisco Wasp highlighted the "Chinese 
problem" in their pages and often included cartoons depicting Chinese as either 
"cunning criminals or 'coolies' whose immigration constituted a harmful invasion of 
inferior and inassimilable aliens.,,6 These cartoons, along with heated editorials from 
common citizens, labor union leaders, and state and national politicians, increased 
anti-Chinese sentiment among the American public. When the 1879 Fifteen Passenger 
6 Lee "Chinese Exclusion at the Borders with Canada and Mexico," pp. 63-68. , 
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Bill (that intended to limit Chinese immigration to fifteen passengers a ship) failed to 
pass, the cry for stringent exclusion measures only increased. The Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882 satisfied these demands; it excluded all Chinese immigrants from entering 
the United States who were not merchants, students, visitors, spouses of Chinese 
merchants already in the country, or diplomats.7 
While the Exclusion Act satisfied many it did not effectively end Chinese 
immigration to the United States. The reasons were twofold. First, after the passage 
of the Exclusion Act, Chinese devised new mechanisms to enter the nation illegally 
through the porous Canadian and Mexico borders. In comparison to the United States, 
anti-Chinese restrictions in Canada and Mexico were moderate. Canada's 1885 
Chinese Immigration Act imposed a fifty-dollar head tax to be collected by each ship 
captain at the point of departure, but it still allowed Chinese to enter the country so 
long as they paid the head tax.s Once in Canada, slipping into the United States 
7 For more on anti-Chinese laws passed prior to the 1882 Exclusion Act See, George 
Anthony Peffer, "Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women 
Under the Page Law, 1875-1882," Journal of American Ethnic History, (1986), pp. 
28-46; Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration 
Policy, 1850-1900 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). The Geary Act, 
passed in May, 1892, continued the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Law for an additional ten 
years. Chinese laborers already in the United States were required to apply to the 
collector of internal revenue within one year after the passage of the act, for a 
certificate of residence. Those who failed to comply faced arrest and deportation. 
While stringent in written terms, customs agents were often ill equipped to enforce the 
laws. In a December, 1893, Daily Oregonian article, a collector at Portland reported 
that his office had received no official notification of the extension, nor had he been 
provided any information as to what type of action was to be taken when immigrants 
failed to register at the internal revenue service. See the Daily Oregonian, Dec. 1, 
1893. 
S U.S. newspapers frequently complained about lax Canadian laws regarding 
immigration. The West Shore, for instance, reported, "Chinamen are compelled to pay 
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required only a short walk or boat ride; in fact, most Chinese simply walked across the 
border into the United States.9 Mexico created another back door into the United 
States. During the first years following the U.S. Exclusion Act, both Mexican and 
Chinese officials encouraged Chinese immigration to Mexico. In fact, when China 
and Mexico signed the 1899 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Chinese immigration to 
Mexico increased, and the ability of Mexico to control illegal entry into the United 
States decreased. 10 
a head tax of fifty dollars to land in British Columbia, and they cheerfully pay this in 
order to secure a foothold from which they may gain the coveted entrance to the 
United States, to secure which they would willingly pay many times that amount if 
they could come direct. By this arrangement Canada gets the money and we get the 
Chinamen," The West Shore, March 14, 1891. 
9 On the demand of U.S. officials, the Canadian government agreed to tighten their 
anti-Chinese laws to mirror more closely those of the United States. The Canadian 
Pacific Railroad Company (CPR) was at first reluctant to adopt the new measures for 
fear that they would ruin that company's profitable trans-Pacific steamship business. 
However, in 1903 the CPR complied with two major stipulations tied to the tightened 
regulations. First, they agreed to examine all Chinese persons traveling on its 
steamships to determine, as best they could, that United States-bound passengers 
claiming to be admissible were in fact entitled to enter under U.S. law. Second, the 
company agreed to deliver all Chinese passengers seeking admission into the U.S. 
under guard directly to U.S. inspectors stationed at four designated ports along the 
Canadian border. In 1903, anti-Chinese sentiment and pressure from U.S. Bureau of 
Immigration and Department of Justice officials motivated Canada to increase its head 
tax on Chinese immigrants from $100 to $500. The increased head tax provide a 
strong deterrent to potential Chinese border crossers. In 1912 Canada also agreed to 
end the practice of admitting Chinese immigrants into the country if they had already 
been denied entry into the U.S. Finally, in 1923, Canada implemented the 1923 
Exclusion Act that completely abolished the head tax system and instead prohibited all 
people of Chinese origin or descent from entering Canada. Consular officials, 
children born in Canada, merchants, and students were exempted. See Lee, "Chinese 
Exclusion at the Borders with Canada and Mexico," pp. 76-78. 
10 The West Shore reported, "It is impossible to say how many Chinamen succeed in 
crossing the boundary line from Canada or Mexico and losing their identity [in?] the 
common monotony of some Chinese colony. It is certain that hundreds crossed in 
from Mexico ... The Canadian border is the one now offering the easiest openings for 
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As U.S. officials struggled to tighten barriers against admission, ports of entry 
became heavily fortified, especially San Francisco and Seattle. They could not, 
however, control the many loopholes that allowed smugglers entry to the United 
States with human cargo and opium shipments. Referred to as a "smuggler's 
paradise," the Puget Sound-British Columbia region offered smugglers a multitude of 
opportunities to conduct illicit trade undetected. An 1891 West Shore magazine article 
reported, 
The numerous islands in Puget [S]ound at the head of the Straits of 
Fuca ... offer special facilities for the operations of smugglers, who, using small 
sailing vessels and taking advantage of dark nights and their knowledge of the 
movements of the revenue officers, have little difficulty in crossing the line 
with cargoes of opium and its smokers, landing both in the hidden recesses of 
some American Chinatown. I I 
At major ports of entry, including Portland and other, smaller ports throughout the 
Puget Sound-British Columbia region, customs agents' inspection of ships became 
increasingly difficult. A lack of resources and trained customs inspectors increased the 
burden of inspecting incoming ships and their contents. Furthermore, corrupt judges, 
the guileless Mongolian," The West Shore, March 14, 1891. For more on United 
States-Mexico border enforcement and problems see, Lee, "Chinese Exclusion at the 
Borders," pp. 58-60. 
II The West Shore, March 14, 1891. It was not uncommon for smugglers to use 
fishing vessels to move illegal immigrants from initial points of contact, such as small 
islands in the Puget Sound, to final points of departure aboard larger steam ships that 
docked outside of the ports' jurisdiction. To divert attention from their activities, 
smugglers often repainted both fishing vessels and steam ships and changed the names 
of ships to confuse observant customs officials. 
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customs inspectors, and ship-owners increased the opportunities for Chinese 
immigrants to conspire with whites and evade exclusion laws. 
The case of US. v. Wilson displays the loopholes and corruption that followed 
Chinese exclusion between 1882 and the tum of the century. It allows a 
reconstruction of just how illegal immigration networks functioned during the early 
exclusion era and how white and Chinese merchants collaborated in producing an 
elaborate system of illegal immigration from Canada to the United States. Together, 
across the racial divide, white and Chinese merchants turned the misfortune of 
Chinese immigrants into a lucrative business. 
The establishment of illegal immigration networks 
Beginning in March 1892, Nathan Blum, William Dunbar, and E.P. 
Thompson, co-owners and operators of the Merchant's Steamship Company (MSC), 
entered into an agreement with the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) to bring that 
company's Chinese laborers to British Columbia and transport Chinese railroad 
workers, stranded in Canada, back into the United States. Like many early illegal 
immigration networks, companies like the Merchant's Steamship Company operated 
smuggling operations alongside legal businesses. In the case of the MSC, the new 
business involved the transport of passengers and agricultural goods between Portland 
and British Columbia. Shipments of produce, flour, and livestock from Eastern 
Oregon made up early shipments by the MSC. These operations facilitated the 
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development of the MSC's illegal dealings with the CPR. I2 In their first venture with 
the CPR in the early 1890s, the MSC collaborated with railroad officials to carry 
Chinese passengers from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Portland at the cost of $6 a 
head. I3 As demand increased, the MSC owners saw the opportunity to raise their rates 
for Chinese immigrants and did so to the tune of $10 a head in 1891. The railroad and 
steamship companies continued to operate their immigrant smuggling business at that 
rate until the Merchant's Steamship Company found new ventures that turned even 
larger profits later that year. 
By May of 1892, Blum, Dunbar, and Thompson realized that the potential 
profits from illegal immigration extended far beyond their initial arrangement with the 
CPR. They turned to Chinese merchants in Portland and Vancouver, realizing that 
they could increase their profits by combining their already established shipping 
enterprises with a system of immigrant transportation and opium distribution between 
the Chinese communities in the Puget Sound-British Columbia region and Portland, 
and, eventually, as far away as San Francisco. Prior to 1892, networks to smuggle 
opium and other contraband across the United States-Canada border did exist, based 
upon relationships between Chinese and whites. And while opium was not illegal in 
the United States until 1906, surcharges tallied at customs checkpoints diminished the 
12 The Canadian Pacific Railroad ran parallel to the U.S.-Canada border from the 
Pacific Ocean to Lake Superior. A report on illegal Chinese border crossing along the 
CPR route noted, "there are many places along the route where a crossing can be made 
by a person willing to spend the time and money necessary to effect it. But it is the 
Puget [S]ound where this illegitimate business has become a science." See, Ibid. 
13 The rate for transport of passengers was actually settled at $7 a head. See u.s. v. 
Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
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net profit accrued from legal shipments. By smuggling opium, coordinators of the 
illicit trade shipped many hundreds of pounds of opium from British Columbia to 
Portland, and even San Francisco, but did not pay taxes on the shipments. Profits on 
large shipments of opium often totaled in the many hundreds of dollars. 14 
During testimony in Us. v. Wilson, co-conspirator Nathan Blum described the 
development of an intricate immigrant-opium smuggling network that joined the 
Merchant's Steamship Company to Chinese opium manufacturers in Vancouver and 
Victoria. He and his partners "concluded that we wanted to handle all the China 
business [opium and immigrants] and we got together and saw where we could form a 
little trust or monopoly.,,15 The men raised immigration rates to $50 a head for travel 
aboard their two vessels, the Haytian Republic and Wilmington, and brought a 
Canadian, Major John Wilson, into the scheme. Prior to their illegal ventures, Major 
Wilson had served as agent for three companies-the Merchant's Steamship 
Company, the Oregon Flouring Mill, and Dunbar Produce and Grocery Company. His 
charge was to oversee all shipments of goods arriving in Vancouver aboard the two 
ships. Additionally, and to their advantage, Wilson had close ties to three of the 
largest opium manufacturers in Vancouver and Victoria. Finally, the operation of 
these illegal networks between the United States and Canada was not limited to 
whites. Ching Chong Quie and other large Vancouver opium manufacturers joined the 
14 For instance in June 1892 Nathan Blum and William Dunbar bought and shipped , 
365 pounds of opium purchased in Victoria, British Columbia, to Portland. The men 
purchased the opium for $2,592.50 and sold the shipment to Portland opium 
distributors for $3,976.25, thereby turning a net profit of$I,383.75, or 53 percent. 
See, Ibid.. 
15 Ibid.. 
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agreement, hoping to increase their own profits in opium manufacturing by fusing this 
with traffic in illegal immigration. 
Crossing Borders 
The lines that divided whites and Chinese were multifaceted during the era of 
exclusion. Racism and cultural differences marked significant divisions between the 
two. For decades, Chinese were chastised for their geographic isolation within 
western American Chinatowns and for their ostensible unwillingness to assimilate to 
mainstream American culture. Whites also (and ironically) criticized Chinese for their 
diligent work ethic, particularly in the case of Chinese laborers, whom many whites, 
especially working-class unionists, viewed as a competitive force in the uncertain job 
market of the industrializing West. 16 Racially, whites attacked Chinese as an inferior 
group, with origins rooted in a backward and heathen culture. And immigrants' 
unwillingness to assimilate was frequently attributed to their racial background. 17 
16 For more on the history of anti-Chinese discrimination in the United States see, 
Stuart Creighton Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the 
Chinese, 1785-1882 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1969); Daniel T. 
Rodgers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America, 1850-1920 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press,1974), pp. 69,221,162-173, esp. 171-172; Alexander Saxton, The 
Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971), pp. 179-259, esp. 220-228. 
17 English-language newspapers are particularly rich sources for understanding the 
anti-Chinese sentiment that spread across the western United States from the 1860s 
through the 1920s. In these papers, it is clear that the debate over Chinese 
immigration was complex to the point of being ironic. For instance, while some 
whites chastised Chinese for their unwillingness to assimilate, others cared little about 
the issue, and, instead, complained about Chinese laborers willingness to work long 
hours at low wages. A third group cared little about the work ethic of Chinese or their 
unwillingness to assimilate to the American mainstream and went so far as to praise 
72 
At the same time, whites viewed Chinese merchants and labor contractors 
more favorably, believing these groups had more fully conformed to conventional 
market behavior. Unlike laborers, merchants did not pose a competitive threat to 
whites. They operated businesses that catered to Chinese or operated labor contracting 
services that whites relied on to fill jobs which white laborers were less willing to 
take. As illegal immigration networks started to develop, then, Chinese merchants 
were in a good position to collaborate with whites who owned and operated 
steamships. Not only were Chinese merchants well regarded by their white 
counterparts, they were also well connected to the majority Chinese population. For 
decades, Chinese merchants had provided financial and social aid to immigrants, 
particularly laborers, who relied on their services for their livelihoods in the United 
States. As the Blum-Wilson smuggling network grew, the position of Chinese 
merchants in the immigrant community and the relationship already established 
between whites and Chinese merchants came to fruition. 
To succeed in the smuggling of immigrants and goods, Blum and Wilson first 
had to recruit federal, state, and provincial officials from Oregon and British 
Columbia. The first two collaborators were signed on in the spring of 1892 when 
Glen O. Holman, notary public for the State of Oregon, and P.l. Bannon, a Portland 
attorney, joined the MSC owners. Holman agreed to make 500 fraudulent Chinese 
certificates, with his notary seal attached, which assured merchants their return status 
Chinese for their work in developing the U.S. West through their work on railroads 
and in clearing land for agricultural development. This last group did, however, 
complain that Chinese had an inherent propensity for poor morals. They perceived 
immigrants as a threat to the moral code of the majority white popUlation. 
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to the United States. 18 PJ. Bannon agreed to furnish the steamship owners with, as a 
first installment, twenty blank immigration certificates with his name attached, 
purporting to have witnessed whites testify that an incoming immigrant was a 
merchant and not a laborer. 19 After obtaining these documents from Holman and 
Bannon, the steamship operators approached two additional government officials, the 
newly appointed Collector of Customs in Portland, James Lotan, and u.s. customs 
official c.J. Mulkey, who was recruited to the Blum-Wilson network with a monthly 
pay-off of approximately $1,200.20 As head of the Portland customs house, Lotan 
served as the inspector of all incoming ships and regulated all other inspectors at the 
port. With Lotan and Mulkey involved, Blum and company controlled the Port of 
Portland. They then turned to the task of finding and recruiting Canadian 
counterparts, drawing upon relationships already established through their legal 
business ventures. 
As customs agent in Victoria, British Columbia, Major John Wilson performed 
the same duties as James Lotan and his staff of inspectors in Portland. Before the 
smuggling operation began, Wilson had served as agent for the three legal businesses 
operated by Blum and Dunbar: the Oregon Flouring Mill, Dunbar Produce and 
18 See, Shawn Aubitz, "Tracing Chinese Immigration into the United States: The Use 
of Federal Documents-The Case ofMoy Ni Kee," Ethnic Forum: Bulletin of Ethnic 
Studies and Ethnic Bibliography, 2 (1987), pp. 64-75. 
19 U.S. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
20 In December 1893, CJ. Mulkey admitted that he was bribed to take part in the 
smuggling of opium and immigrants into the United States. Apparently, members of 
the Wilson-Blum network frequently complained that Mulkey and chief customs 
inspector, James Lotan, were making too much money for their role in the smuggling 
operation. Daily Oregonian, Dec. 10, 1893. 
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Grocery Company, and the Merchant's Steamship Company. In this role, Wilson led 
the inspections of all incoming shipments arriving aboard MSC vessels. Equally 
important, Wilson had extensive connections with the Chinese merchant community 
throughout the Puget Sound-British Columbia region. His job inside the smuggling 
ring was to recruit Chinese opium manufacturers by offering them two services: ships 
large enough to smuggle hundreds of pounds of opium through customs and a system 
for smuggling immigrants from Canada into Portland, both highly lucrative business 
ventures. Like Chinese merchants in Portland, merchants in British Columbia held 
high status among the immigrant population. They provided financial and labor 
services to Chinese immigrants and connected them with white business owners. 
Given these Canadian Chinese merchants' connections, they had little difficulty 
finding immigrants who wanted to enter the United States illegally. For the white 
organizers, Chinese merchants in Canada provided important services. They found 
immigrants who needed the services of the MSC, located portraits of Chinese 
immigrants to attach to fraudulent certificates, and signed documents necessary for the 
transport of immigrants from Canada to Portland. In court testimony, Nathan Blum 
described the system: 
I explained to him [Wilson] that we had made a deal on this side, whereby we 
could land Chinese laborers, and that the three large opium firms over there, 
Qoung Young [sic], Quong On Lung and Tai Yuen, were ready to furnish him 
with pictures. That he should take those pictures and send them over here to 
Dunbar and myself, giving the names of the Chinamen, their age and 
description as near as he could, that we would have certificates made out, to 
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turn to them and that the price for bringing them over and landing them was 
$120?1 
Of this $120, $50 was paid upfront by Chinese immigrants, usually through their 
Chinese merchant sponsors. Upon safe landing in the United States, another $70 was 
paid. In letters submitted as evidence in U.S v. Wilson, passage to the United States 
was set at $100 between the Chinese and white organizers. Of this, fifty dollars was 
distributed for getting each Chinese passenger through customs, ten dollars as fare to 
the ship owner, and the remaining forty dollars went "to the bank,"-that is, into the 
pockets of the white and Chinese smugglers. After Wilson stated that he could not 
"work here on less than $60" and Chinese deinanded that they make an additional ten 
dollars on each passenger, the fee for passage was raised to $120. 
Wilson's role in the operation was crucial, as he served as the head customs 
inspector on the Canadian side of the border. Shortly after the agreement was set, 
Blum traveled to Victoria to demonstrate how the certificates for Chinese immigrants 
needed to be completed in order to pass immigrants through customs inspections in 
Portland. As an agent for the steamships Haytian Republic and Wilmington, Wilson 
signed, at the close of this first meeting, 100 fraudulent certificates, thereby 
guaranteeing the right for Chinese to travel from Canada to the United States. Over 
the period oftwo years, Wilson would sing his name many more times, providing a 
necessary connection to Canada for the Blum syndicate. When this meeting ended, the 
21 U.S. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. Wilson's role was to go among the 
merchants of Chinatown, then locate immigrants who desired to enter the U.S. 
illegally and who were willing to pay $120 to do so. 
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cross-border network was put into operation. Now the men involved on both sides of 
the border needed only to locate Chinese immigrants who, in Canada, wished to enter 
the United States, outside Chinese merchants who wanted in on the opium trade, and 
Chinese merchants in Portland who wished to purchase smuggled opium. 
Racial Crossing and Collaboration 
As Erika Lee has observed, illegal Chinese immigration was a business defined 
by multiracial connections and relationships.22 Between 1882 and the turn of the 
twentieth century, judges and officials on the both sides of the United States-Canada 
border aligned themselves with illegal smuggling networks specializing in opium and 
immigrant trafficking. For Chinese, the business of smuggling was especially 
profitable. Merchants created a system in which immigrants borrowed money from 
merchants to pay their passage, agreeing contractually to repay it later, with interest, 
on a rotating credit system.23 Relationships between whites and Chinese also proved 
profitable for Chinese merchants who provided whites with a steady flow of illegal 
22 Lee, "Chinese Exclusion at the Borders with Canada and Mexico," p. 62. 
23 The credit-ticket system, which apparently was be used by merchants and 
immigrants in Canada and the United States between 1850 and the turn of the century, 
began in the southern delta regions of China. Here, emigrants traveling abroad were 
divided into two groups; those who were taken overseas in the coolie trade (especially 
to Latin America and Southeast Asia) and those who left voluntarily. Individuals who 
paid for their own fares were free, whereas those whose passage was financed by the 
so-called credit-ticket system were classified as semi-free. Through critics at the time 
generally classified Chinese as "coolie laborers," in reality, most emigrants to 
California, and later those who came from Canada to the United States in the Blum-
Wilson network, either paid their own way or, and especially in the Blum-Wilson 
smuggling operations, secured passage under the credit-ticket system. See Sucheng 
Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860-1910 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 21-26. 
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immigrants as well as a list of Chinese merchants who wished to purchase unchecked 
. 24 
opIUm. 
Three main opium manufacturers formed the basis of the Blum-Wilson 
network. The Tai Yuen and Company, Quong Yuen Tai Company, and Kwong On 
Lung served as go-betweens for potential Chinese immigrants and also served as the 
primary distributors of opium going from British Columbia to Portland and even San 
Francisco. Chinese opium manufacturers' influence throughout British Columbia and 
the United States was noteworthy, and they likely shipped opium to urban and rural 
Chinese communities alike. 
Generally, the smuggling conspiracy between whites and Chinese operated 
smoothly. Documents were forged in Portland and then transferred to British 
Columbia by captains who controlled their ships' pursers. The three primary Chinese 
merchant coordinators kept up a steady supply of illegal immigrants for the steamship 
company, and both sides profited. However, in the day-to-day business of the ring, 
white and Chinese relations were not always placid. Chinese merchant organizers 
frequently failed to sign the forged certificates properly and occasionally they also 
failed to provide the required photos for attachment to the fraudulent certificates.25 
24 Shipments of opium were, like all imported items at the time, required to go through 
customs checks where inspectors would list all items being brought into port and add 
the various taxes and tariffs to the costs of importation. Although it is unclear what 
the taxes and tariffs on opium were in the 1890s, it can be assumed, due to the 
quantity of opium being smuggled by the Blum-Wilson network, that profit margins 
increased significantly by not claiming shipments at customs. 
25The three Chinese firms, the Tai Yuen Company, the Quong Tai Yuen Company, 
and the Quong On Lung Company were asked to locate other immigrants already in 
the British Columbia region who wanted to bring Chinese illegally to the U.S. and 
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Technical problems such as these were often the subject of correspondence between 
Blum, Dunbar, and Wilson, but they did not trouble the smuggling operations as did 
the Chinese merchants' unwillingness to operate their end of the business according to 
standard procedures-as the whites understood such. The illegal nature of smuggling 
only increased the opportunity for Chinese to bend white standards of business. 
The multiracial nature of the Blum-Wilson smuggling network both 
encouraged collaboration between Chinese and whites and highlighted the inherent 
differences between the two groups. White operators were used to operating business 
on formal contractual agreements that outlined procedures in detail and required 
payment for services ahead of time. Chinese merchants, on the other hand, 
conventionally arranged business ventures on the basis of verbal agreements and paid 
for services at a later date-an example being the rotating credit system between 
Chinese workers and labor contractors. In the minds of their white partners such a 
system was foreign and unreliable. For Chinese merchants, retention of their system 
of business served as a means of control over smuggling operations. A September 
1892 letter between William Dunbar and Major John Wilson illustrates the issue: 
I again take up the matter of final payments[.] The firms are not treating us 
right[.] We take their words for $70.00 and surely when we wire the money ... 
men are landed they should take our word[.] You had better threaten them a 
little and tell them that you will personally guarantee my statements and if not 
correct will refund[.] They know now since each boat has made a trip that I 
Canada. Once found, these merchants were to gather photos of Chinese men that 
resembled the illegal immigrant closely enough to pass him through customs and for 
proof of identity if the immigrant ended up detained and in court. 
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carry out all I agreed to do. I think with a stiff talk from you they will come to 
time[.] You know by experience they bluff to the last moment but when we 
commence bluffing back they come to time[.] The fact of the matter is they are 
making $50 per head clear and they do not want to lose their business and your 
guarantee I think will satisfy.26 
In another exchange, the unwillingness of the Chinese merchants to compromise their 
business models was noted when Dunbar again wrote to Wilson: 
I have read over your letter this morning to Mr. Blum regarding the payment of 
the Chinese passage money. I cannot understand why the firm should take any 
exceptions to paying on arrival of the passengers here. The firm which you 
mention appears to be very independent. When we buy any goods from them, 
they make us pay cash in Victoria. And yet when we do any business for 
them, they want to take their own time in paying for it. We have always 
carried out our part of the agreement promptly, and we certainly think they 
ought to do theirs. There is no reason why we should wait their pleasure after 
the men arrive here for them to pay their passages. We have to put it up here 
before they get ashore and certainly after telegraphing their delivery the matter 
ought to be promptly settled. We cannot handle it otherwise so if they do not 
want to conform to this, we will have to find other places to deal. We have 
faithfully carried out our arrangement as made and shall expect all of those 
doing the business with us to do the same.27 
Considering the type and amount of business that the white and Chinese 
conspirators conducted, and the large investments that Chinese merchants made in the 
venture, it is not surprising that the Chinese would seek to maintain economic 
autonomy according to their own notion of business. The Chinese merchants had too 
26 u.s. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
27 Ibid. 
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great a financial investment in the venture to let whites bully them on matters of 
payment-the extent of which is apparent in the cipher code used by the Blum-Wilson 
organization. Three sets of cipher codes were developed by the white organizers to 
hide illegal smuggling of opium and, to a lesser degree, Chinese immigrants. Blum, 
Wilson, and Dunbar each received one set of cipher. They used the cipher code in 
letters and telegrams sent between Portland and British Columbia. 
Three cipher codes were distributed among the white organizers and carried 
titles that signified to whom each code belonged. Submitted as evidence in the u.s. v. 
Wilson, the cipher code titled marked "Morgan" is included below (Figure 1) and was 
used by Major John Wilson to coordinate opium shipments purchased in British 
Columbia and shipped to coordinators in Portland. Following these codes, three 
primary Chinese opium manufacturers conspired with Wilson in Vancouver and 
Victoria. Kwong On Lung, Tai Yuen, and the Qwong Yuen Tai Company organized 
both the transfer of immigrants and large shipments of opium from British Columbia 
to Portland. Opium was eventually sold to Chinese merchants in Portland and as far 
south as San Francisco?S 
28 Shipments of opium were generally loaded in British Columbia, broken into smaller 
cargos in Portland, and eventually distributed in Portland and San Francisco. In 
October 1892, William Dunbar and Nathan Blum traveled to San Francisco with 2,100 
pounds of opium in two or three large trunks. Two of the trunks were seized at the 
transfer office and the rest were sold to Chinese merchants in San Francisco. In 
September 1892, 1,400 pounds of opium landed in Portland. Approximately 700 
pounds were delivered to Chinese merchants in downtown Portland and the rest was 
loaded aboard another steamer to be sold in San Francisco. These were the general 
procedures for all opium shipments in the Blum-Wilson syndicate. See the Daily 
Oregonian, Nov. 19, 1893. 
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On a first look, we can gain some understanding of the intricate system that 
whites and Chinese devised to conceal the shipping of contraband goods and 
immigrants. For instance, "cheese," "cement," and "coal" all denote trouble with the 
shipment of goods. Sometimes Wilson was unable to meet ships in British Columbia, 
especially if they were delayed because of poor weather or if customs agents not 
associated with the network were present at the ports. The term "Dunsmuir" indicates 
that prices for shipping opium and immigrants were fluid, affecting the timing of 
shipments. Finally, agricultural references like "wheat," "oats," and "flour," hidden 
behind tonnage measurement, illustrate the size of the opium shipments transported 
between Oregon and British Columbia-amounting from 100 to 500 pounds. 
While opium was frequently confiscated at customs after captains failed to 
specify the actual amount shipped, it was not illegal to bring opium into the United 
States until 1906?9 However, the members of the Blum-Wilson network always 
concealed their shipments of the drug because of the massive amounts of opium they 
were transporting. On the other hand, illegal immigration was not concealed in the 
cipher code. Rather, the white organizers communicated by telegraph, frequently 
29 Thomas Gearin, prosecuting attorney in u.s. v. Wilson, specified "that the 
government had to show that the opium was imported, because it would not be 
'smuggled' unless it were clandestinely imported, and it had to be so imported before 
it could be unlawfully concealed or transported within the jurisdiction of the court." 
Daily Oregonian, Dec. 2, 1893. 
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"Mor an"JO 
Eggs, I will go to Vancouver to meet Wilmington Cowan, K[Q]wong On Lung 
Apples, I delivered it safely on board the Johnson, Tai Yuen 
Wilmington 
Cheese, I could not deliver it at all as things did Leiser, Qwong Yuen Tai Co. 
not look right 
Plums, I will go to Vancouver to meet Haytian Rates, Wilmington 
Pears, I delivered it safely on board Haytian Insurance, Haytian 
Barley, I delivered 100# Chop, Vancouver 
Wheat, I delivered 150# Soda Crackers, buy 100# 
Oats, I delivered 200# Extras Crackers, buy 150# 
Flour, I delivered 250# Oyster Crackers, buy 200# 
Corvallis, I delivered 300# Picnic Crackers, buy 250# 
Salem, I delivered 350# Sweet Crackers, buy 300# 
Dayton, I delivered 400# Ginger Snaps, buy 350# 
Walla Walla, I delivered 450# Mixed Crackers, buy 400# 
Albany, I delivered 500# Cookies, buy 450# 
Rice, I have drawn 5 days st JeIIy, buy 500# 
Sugar, I have drawn 7 days st Cement, there are too many officers around now 
Hops, I have drawn 8 days st Tons, I wiII try to put it aboard here 
Peas, I have drawn 9 days st Coal, I could not deliver here will go with it to 
Vancouver 
Beans, I have drawn 10 days st Dunsmuir, Prices have advanced considerably 
Table 1: The cipher code used by white and Chinese smugglers to transport opium 
from British Columbia to Portland aboard the Haytian Republic and Wilmington. 31 
30 "Morgan" referred to John Wilson in the sense that he was the person who delivered 
the opium to merchants and coordinated the buying of opium for these same 
merchants. The information collected here was originally submitted as a list to the 
court in U.S. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. The cipher code was used loosely 
in telegrams sent between Nathan Blum, William Dunbar, and John Wilson. 
Sometimes, names and shipments were concealed by cipher codes; in other cases, the 
communications were surprisingly open about who was receiving shipments of cargo. 
The variation in the code 
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listing the names and numbers of immigrants they were transporting illegally to the 
United States.32 
Specific telegrams between various members of the Blum-Wilson network 
explain the cipher code further. For instance, in October 1892 William Dunbar wrote, 
seems to have been based on the subject being discussed. When discussing shipments 
of opium, the code words, "flour," "wheat," and "chop," were used frequently and 
testify to the large shipments of opium that were being transported between British 
Columbia and Portland. On the other hand, when passengers arrived at ports of entry 
or when fraudulent certificates were sent to British Columbia for signatures and 
approval, no code was used. Instead, the telegrams stated openly what and who was 
making the fraudulent documents and to whom they were being sent. This variation is 
particularly notable since at the time, immigration was prohibited but was not hidden 
while opium was not prohibited but was hidden behind the cipher code 
31 Ibid .. In court testimony, Charles Murphy, district attorney for the State of Oregon, 
produced a series of letters written between the men of the Blum-Wilson syndicate. 
One letter, signed by Major John Wilson, alluded to the "Morgan" cipher. Addressed 
too William Dunbar at Portland, the letter stated that 425 tons of coal had been sent 
from Victoria to Portland but had not been packed suitably in egg boxes as they were 
to frail. Attorney Murphy stated that "the coal alluded to must have been opium" 
because coal would not have been shipped in egg boxes. In a more explicit statement, 
Nat Blum testified that the ring brought in approximately $200,000 worth of opium in 
one year. They received statements nearly every trip from Major Wilson of the 
quantity of opium shipped, money paid, and when shipment would arrive in Portland, 
all under the cover of the cipher. One statement was offered in evidence and gave 
notice of the shipment of 425 tons of coal, which Blum testified meant 425 pounds of 
opium. William Dunbar would go on to deny any knowledge of the cipher codes, the 
transport of opium aboard his ships, and any association with Nat Blum. See the 
Daily Oregonian, Nov, 30, 1893; Dec. 2, 3, 1893. 
32 Arranging the retrieval of opium and immigrants was no small task. Oftentimes, 
shipments of both were picked up, not directly from urban ports, but instead from 
stashes on small island outcroppings between ports like Portland and Vancouver. 
Again, The West Shore reported, "At the entrance to Victoria harbor there is a buoy off 
the Indian reserve, and this is where the smuggling vessels lie at anchor, presenting the 
most innocent aspect imaginable. When the financial arrangements for a cargo of 
opium and Chinese have been completed, small lots of the former are secretly taken on 
board, and enough Chinamen to make a load are told to get ready. Toward the close 
of evening two or three will stroll over to the reserve disguised as dishwashers. They 
are taken aboard one of the boats, and in the morning she goes out to fish." The West 
Shore, March 14, 1891. 
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"There are several of your largest flour accounts who are considerable overdue. Can 
you push up the amount due and remit, we are very short and require all the funds we 
can see.,,33 Ifit is assumed that Wilson and Dunbar used the word "flour" as a code 
word for opium, it can be assumed from this message that "largest flour accounts" 
refers to the Chinese opium accounts that Wilson coordinated in British Columbia. 34 
The frustration conveyed in the telegram demonstrates how the payment system 
between Chinese and white conspirators often produced delays in the shipments and 
other difficulties in dealing with customs officials. 
In addition to coordinating specific orders of opium shipments, Blum and 
Wilson used the cipher code to coordinate the receipt of opium shipments in British 
Columbia and Portland. Chinese and white middlemen in Portland often retrieved 
shipments and distributed them to opium merchants in Portland. During one 
shipment, Nathan Blum instructed Wilson, "Rates is due Van[ couver] about 
Wednesday morning and you must get Leiser to let 2 or 3 of his countrymen take it up 
as baggage and deliver to Pat [Patterson] or you can ship it to De Wolf as liquor and go 
up and unpack into a 2nd hand trunk and let the trunk go as baggage." As the cipher 
code denotes, "Leiser" refers to the Qwong Yuen Tai Company and "Rates" the 
steamship Wilmington. They also used the cipher code to organize Chinese 
middleman who picked up shipments at port. In court testimony, Nathan Blum 
33 u.s. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
34 Letters submitted as evidence in court were from a cache held by Wilson. While 
Wilson and Blum and Dunbar did in fact do business in agricultural products, the 
letters from this collection clearly pertained to the smuggling operations specifically. 
Considering this fact, it is not a stretch to assume ~he men were discussing opium and 
Chinese accounts in this collection of letters. 
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elaborated on this, describing an exchange with a contact by the name of Jackling. 
The letter stated, "Moy Heim [sic] from Portland came over to-night and will take a 
haul away with him[.] He takes for 100.00 and beats up Chinatown for them.,,35 In 
Portland, shipments of opium packed in trunks or as various legal products, were 
regularly thrown overboard and picked up by one of many white middlemen who lived 
downriver from the main ports along the Portland waterfront. These men also 
provided storage facilities for opium until it could be sold to Chinese merchants in 
Portland. 
It was more difficult to land opium in many cases than it was to land Chinese 
immigrants. One account on the matter noted, 
The landing of the opium is the most difficult part of the work. A Chinaman 
can be landed near some town and find his own way to a place of security, but 
the opium has to be carried, and it is not always easy to get in into Chinatown 
undetected. At points on the American shore repositories are maintained by 
some smugglers, whose opium is stored until opportunity offers to carry it 
away.36 
Beyond the cipher code and its relationship to the opium trade between 
Portland and Canada, letters in evidence in Us. v. Wilson establish the role Chinese 
35 Ibid. 
36 The West Shore, March 14, 1891. In the Blum-Wilson syndicate, three white men 
served as primary repositories for opium shipments in Portland. Sig Baer, Robert 
Garthome, and H.T. Berg retrieved shipments of opium thrown overboard by steamer 
engineers for pick-Up in the Willamette and Columbia Rivers. The three men also 
offered their homes to the Blum-Wilson syndicate for storage of large shipments of 
opium between the time they were landed and when they were broken down for 
distribution in Portland, San Francisco, and other destinations along the coast and 
throughout eastern Oregon. 
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merchants played in the recruitment and transport of illegal immigrants. As 
smugglers, Chinese merchants played a central role, organizing potential immigrants 
and providing financial loans to the poor among them. Numerous letters display the 
system that tied together Chinese merchants, immigrants, and the Vancouver-to-
Portland Blum-Wilson network. For instance, in a letter to Wilson, Blum noted that a 
check for $548.85, sent by a Chinese firm in British Columbia, had arrived safely in 
Portland. It covered the cost of eleven fraudulent tickets aboard one of the Merchant's 
Steamship Company's steamers. And in another letter Blum verified the receipt of 
$1,249.40, paid in one lump sum, for the passage of thirty-four immigrants brought to 
Portland per the request of a key figure in the smuggling operation. Because each 
passenger paid about one hundred dollars for passage, these numbers indicate the 
number of illegal immigrants (nine to twelve) traveling between Canada and Portland. 
Illegal immigrants coming to British Columbia and the United States direct from 
China also paid a one hundred dollar fee for their fraudulent entry certificates.37 
37 In some cases, the Blum-Wilson network brought Chinese laborers and family 
members directly from China to the United States and British Columbia, especially 
when high-ranking Chinese merchants requested such. William Dunbar testified that 
over an eighteen-month period, approximately 1,200-1,400 Chinese were brought 
from China directly. He did not, however, admit that all of the immigrants were 
brought to the United States and British Columbia illegally, or through the fraudulent 
certification produced by PJ. Bannon. Yet, in June 1893, PJ~ Bannon admitted to 
delivering about 100 fraudulent certificates to William Dunbar. Dunbar then turned 
these over to John Ross and E.P. Thompson. The two men took these blank 
documents, with a list of names, to China, where they located the Chinese requested 
and completed the documents. The men made frequent trips to China, and it can, on 
this evidence, be assumed that many of the Chinese immigrants who came directly 
from China did so under the auspices of forged return certificates. See the Daily 
Oregonian, Dec. 21, 1893. 
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The participation of Chinese merchants increased the efficiency, success, and 
amount of shipments in the Blum-Wilson operation. However, with the success of the 
enterprise came increased public and official scrutiny. Anti-Chinese immigration 
proponents frequently published pamphlets detailing the increase in illegal smuggling 
operations and the failure of customs agents to stop the trend. Nathan Blum wrote to 
John Wilson, 
Under a lately published pamphlet on the alighting of Jaybirds [Chinese 
immigrants] if they are not laborers or working birds and have been here 
before they may alight. Have Jim [James Lotan] quietly work along and land 
those that he can safely and let balance go to court.38 
Increased complaints over illegal immigrants complicated the operations of the Blum-
Wilson network throughout the fall and winter of 1892. As William Dunbar wrote to 
John Wilson, 
I cannot understand who has any right to make a fuss over this. Whether they 
are selling certificates or not, it is no ones business ... the treasury department is 
able to look after that without the newspaper reports. The Oregonian has given 
them a pretty stiff rebuke when it said some imaginary brain was telegraphing 
to that effect. 39 
Increased public and official scrutiny of custom houses and efforts to identify and 
catch fraudulent documents and illegal immigrants led the Blum-Wilson organizers to 
reassess their operations in the spring of 1892. 
38 u.s. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
39 Ibid. 
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A major problem that underscored this reassessment was customs agents who 
refused to participate in illegal smuggling operations. In his court testimony, Nathan 
Blum described the challenges to these hurdles and his syndicates' response. Blum 
testified that one inspector in particular, George W. Dillon, was constantly 
"telegraphing over here or giving information to Mulkey" about the illegal immigrants 
coming ashore aboard the two steamships.,,40 Blum also testified that chief customs 
inspector for the United States, James Lotan, suggested overcoming the challenges 
Dillon posed by bribing him with money made from the smuggling operation or 
pulling him offhis post as customs agent at Vancouver. Shortly thereafter, Dillon was 
moved to a new post at Tacoma, through which immigrants and opium were not being 
smuggled.41 
However, even with the help of Mulkey, Lotan, and other customs agents on 
the Blum-Wilson payroll, by the winter of 1892-93 it became clear that, no matter how 
40 c.J. Mulkey was an inspector for the United States Treasury Department. His 
duties as agent were to examine the books of customs houses and enforce navigation 
and Chinese exclusion laws, especially concerning the smuggling of Chinese. His 
district included Oregon, Washington, and Alaska. He first met Nat Blum on the 
wharf near the Haytian Republic in Portland. Blum took him to a local hotel, where 
he served the inspector a bottIe of fine wine before confronting Mulkey on his 
reporting the shipments of opium shipped aboard the two Blum-Wilson steamers. 
Although Mulkey would later deny being bribed at this time by Blum, other testimony 
shows that Blum and Mulkey established their working conditions at the hotel over a 
two-day period. The final agreement was to pay Mulkey approximately $1,200 a 
month to lie about shipments coming into Portland aboard the steamers and those 
being shipped out to British Columbia, San Francisco, and as far away as Honolulu, 
Hawaii. Daily Oregonian, Dec. 20, 1893. 
41 Ibid. George W. Dillon would later testify that, while acting as a special treasury 
agent, he had never received instructions from c.J. Mulkey to relax his vigilance in 
looking after the business of the Merchant's Steamship Company. Yet, Dillon did 
support the smuggling operations during his inspections of ships and frequently wrote 
letters to c.J. Mulkey under the name Oliver Budd at Tacoma. 
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large the bribes or how intense the threats, the Blum-Wilson ring faced increased 
difficulties in getting its human cargos past customs officials. Fraudulent certificates 
were frequently questioned as border controls tightened. Chinese were pulled off 
ships and detained at customs stations or in county jail. Under the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882, however, these detained Chinese were afforded the right to file writs of 
habeas corpus in district court.42 Through this procedure, Chinese had the right to 
contest their detention and establish their right to land in the United States. To do so, 
they had to locate at least one white citizen who would testify to their legal status as 
well as well as one or more legal Chinese resident who would do the same. In the 
winter of 1892-93, the increase in these detention cases was more and more the subject 
of letters from Dunbar to Wilson. In one, Dunbar wrote, "Regarding the passenger 
business. I think you understand the situation. Today most of our time has been taken 
up in the US court with the Habeas Corpus cases. There is [sic] 28 of them, which 
will take us all day [and] tomorrow to get through. I think most of them will land, still 
there may be a few who will have to return.,,43 For detained immigrants, detention 
always threatened deportation, but the Wilson ring, to maintain their business, did all 
they could to ensure favorable outcomes by arranging court cases ahead of time. 
42 Lucy Salyer has studied the history of habeas corpus cases among Chinese in Laws 
Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). See, also, Charles 
McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle Against Discrimination in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
43 Us. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. 
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Habeas Corpus and the Portland Chinese connection 
While Chinese merchants on the Canadian side of the Blum-Wilson network 
found and organized Chinese immigrants seeking entry into the United States, Chinese 
merchants in Portland served a different but equally important role in the illegal 
immigration operations. Seid Back, Lee Wing, Charley Young, Ju Hauk, and Chee 
How each served as interpreters during court cases in which Chinese detainees sought 
writs of habeas corpus to allow them to remain in the United States. As interpreters in 
the hearings, these prominent Chinese merchants were granted preference over their 
low-ranking illegal immigrant counterparts.44 For instance, the Blum-Wilson network 
depended on middle-level Chinese merchants to recruit common immigrants who 
wished to enter the United States. Each immigrant was charged a passage fee that was 
seldom less than the substantial charge of $120 dollars. Without an alternative these 
Chinese paid heavily and traveled in poor conditions aboard steamships. Little more 
than commodities, common immigrants were referred to as "Chinamen" or 
"heathens. " 
On the other hand, middle-level Chinese such as the opium merchants in 
British Columbia were treated with a substantial measure of trust and respect. They 
were indispensable to the smuggling business, recruiting illegal immigrants and 
44 In the following passages I will use "common immigrants" to describe illegal 
immigrants traveling from British Columbia to Portland, "middle-level Chinese," to 
describe merchants and opium manufacturers who facilitated the recruitment of 
Chinese and the ordering and distribution of opium, and "high-level Chinese" to 
denote the wealthy merchants and court interpreters who worked alongside the Blum-
Wilson network in Portland. From these categories we can see the status hierarchy 
that Chinese in America inhabited and how it played out among Chinese and between 
Chinese and whites involved in the Blum-Wilson smuggling enterprise. 
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simultaneously purchasing large shipments of opium. Furthermore, middle-level 
Chinese merchants in Canada, well connected to the large Chinese communities in 
Vancouver and Victoria, collected the photos that Blum and Wilson attached to 
fraudulent entry papers. To whites, middle-level Chinese merchants were considered 
"friends" who might deserve preferential treatment depending on the nature of their 
orders and the help they provided in smuggling goods and immigrants.45 
Even more than the middle-level Chinese merchants, whites treated the 
highest-level Chinese merchants, including customs and court interpreters, with even 
greater trust and respect. During court testimony in Us. v. Wilson, this preferential 
treatment was apparent. Interpreters such as Seid Back frequently enjoyed discounted 
rates aboard the steamships owned by Blum and Dunbar and accommodations equal to 
those given to preferred white partners. Friends of Seid Back enjoyed similar 
treatment on the strength of Seid Back's name. As Nathan Blum testified, "Seid Back, 
45 Middle-level merchants often made special requests for immigrants to be brought to 
the United States and British Columbia. During the fall of 1892, for instance, a 
member of the Tai Yuan Company requested a young male friend or relative be 
brought to the United States directly from China. Young Chinese men were often 
turned away at ports because they did not qualify for the categories of merchant, 
diplomat, or student that would otherwise allow them entry. In this case, special 
arrangements were made by the Blum-Wilson coordinators to create a special 
document, at a hefty price, that would allow the youngster to enter the United States 
for eventual transfer to the Tai Yuen Company member. See, Ibid. In another case, 
William Dunbar made special arrangements to bring Chinese prostitutes, at $450 a 
piece, to Chinese merchants in British Columbia. He stated, "there was a great deal of 
trouble landing women and it was worth more than men," Daily Oregonian. Dec., 21, 
1893. 
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in addition to getting Chinamen landed here at a reduced rate also paid a reduced rate 
of $20 for passage instead of $50 like the rest of the Chinamen.,,46 
Seid Back and his associates played a crucial role in the illegal ventures of 
Blum and Wilson. Not only did Seid Back serve as a primary interpreter aboard ships 
and in habeas corpus proceedings, he also recruited Chinese interpreters and oversaw 
their work in the courtrooms for the Blum-Wilson syndicate. This was particularly 
important for Chinese immigrants because in many cases the habeas corpus hearing 
was their last chance to stave off deportation. For white smugglers like Blum and his 
associates, Chinese interpreters ensured that their operations would remain 
concealed-and successful. Because Seid Back had an intimate understanding of the 
courts and was well regarded in both the Chinese and white communities in Portland, 
he was a crucial link in the success of both immigrants and those who conducted the 
I· . 47 smugg mg operatIon. 
Not only did high-level Chinese merchants like Seid Back serve as interpreters 
in habeas corpus cases, they also worked alongside criminal and non-criminal customs 
agents aboard the steamships owned by the Merchants Steamship Company. During 
Wilson's trial, Nathan Blum elaborated on this point. When the court asked whom the 
46 u.s. v. Wilson, File 3875, RG 21, NARA. When Blum referred to a $50 charge for 
passage aboard MSC steamships he probably referred to the reduced rates charged to 
middle-level Chinese merchants. Most middle and high-level Chinese received 
reduced rates while common immigrants paid full fare. 
47 Seid Back was a wealthy merchant in Chinatown and unofficial leader of Portland's 
Chinese community. He frequently entered court pleas on his own behalf, served as a 
surety for Chinese indicted in civil and criminal cases, and associated with prominent 
white Portlanders, with some of whom he had extensive business dealings. In fact, 
during the trial of u.s. v. Wilson, Seid Back was supported by some of Portland's 
best-known white merchants, including Henry Failing and H.L. Hawkins. 
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white conspirators had on board the ships interpreting for the Chinese immigrants, 
Blum stated, "Why Seid Back he was there-well, I should say in about 90 percent of 
the cases.,,48 And when the prosecution presented evidence about the role interpreters 
played in the habeas corpus hearings, Nathan Blum again elaborated on the role that 
Chinese interpreters played in the scheme; 
These Chinamen were brought in this court to be landed on a writ of Habeas 
Corpus, and Seid Back got this English speaking Chinaman here by the name 
of Lee Wing who acted as interpreter, and it was quite an advantage to these 
chinamen, and he fixed the thing all up with Lee Wing in my presence. I heard 
Seid Back fix this thing up in my presence. He told Lee Wing what questions 
to ask and what answers to make, and it made no difference what these 
chinamen on this stand said, whether they swore to anything relating to the 
case or not, this chinaman interpreted it so, and he stood right here.49 
Blum testified later that Seid Back and his associates also recruited Chinese who 
coached detained immigrants on their court testimony. Seid Back's Chinese 
associates had free reign in the county jails where detained immigrants were held. 
They appeared constantly-and successfully-in court, aiding detainees in 
establishing that their entry was legal. In one particular case, the judge, apparently 
suspicious of the Chinese interpreter, requested the court rotate in a new interpreter for 
habeas corpus cases. As Nathan Blum later testified, Seid Back arranged the switch; 
48 Ibid .. 
49 Ibid. 
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Seid Back took me [Blum] down to his confidential chinaman ... Charley 
Young, and Charley was as good as the other fellow only he had a better 
memory; he did not have to write it [the defense statement of Chinese 
detainees] down on the book. Charley and I came up to the county jail where 
these chinamen were incarcerated and the jailer admitted Charley and I in there 
and I told Charley what to tell the Chinamen and he told it to them, and when 
he got on the stand the next day, and before going in the Court, I introduced 
Charlye [sic] Young to Judge Gilbert as a reliable interpreter and he acted as 
interpreter and we landed these chinamen. 50 
Conclusion 
The close collaboration between Chinese interpreters and whites in both 
smuggling and, in turn, manipulating of the courts, encouraged the crossing of racial 
barriers that otherwise divided the white and Chinese populations. While common 
immigrants suffered constant discrimination on the part of whites, middle and high-
level Chinese traveled in elite circles despite the racial tensions that marked white-
Chinese relations. The relationships that developed out of collaboration between 
whites and middle and high-level Chinese merchants afforded these Chinese no small 
measure of power among both their countrymen and whites. Chinese merchants like 
Seid Back enjoyed high status among the Chinese community for facilitating 
immigration during the exclusion era, as well as for the financial assistance they 
provided immigrants who otherwise could never have afforded to immigrate to the 
Unites States. 
50 Ibid. 
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Well known Chinese merchants in Portland used their status in both the 
Chinese and white communities to alter the outcomes of habeas corpus cases. They 
were allowed to board ships and coach Chinese on their court testimony because they 
were respected as English-speakers among a white community that privileged those 
immigrants who had adapted to the English language and u.s. market economy. They 
entered courts on the recommendation of trusted white community members and aided 
in the landing of hundreds of Chinese in Portland. 
In the end, 33 indictments were filed against 58 people. Witnesses, who 
testified for the state, including Nat Blum, H.T. Berg, and Robert Garthorne, were 
either released from prosecution or paid small fines for their role in the Blum-Wilson 
operation. William Dunbar was sentenced to two years in county jail and a $5,000 
fine. c.J. Mulkey, the collector of customs, received a sentence of one year in the 
county jail and a $5,000 fine. James Lotan and Seid Back, both indicted on 
immigration smuggling, were found guilty and sentenced to heavy punishment. Both 
Lotan and Seid Back appealed their cases three times. Finally, in 1895, the men were 
found guilty on a reduced sentence. Lotan was fined $5,000 and Seid Back $3,000. 
Thomas (T.A.) Jordan and Herbert Adams, both minor players in the operation, were 
jointly indicted on two counts for smuggling opium.51 Major John Wilson was 
indicted on ten counts charging he smuggled opium, on various occasions, from 
51 The first count alleged that in January 1893 Jordan and Adams smuggled 500 
pounds of prepared opium into the United States from British Columbia. The second 
count alleged that the men aided and abetted N. Blum in smuggling 500 pounds of 
opium in January 1893. Jordan was captain of customs inspectors and Adams was 
engineer of the steamer Wilmington. 
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British Columbia to the United States. Because he was a Canadian citizen however , , 
the U.S. court system could not extradite him to the United States for tria1.52 Most of 
the other Chinese defendants were released from the charges against them, and only 
two Chinese were indicted on perjury charges as interpreters for habeas corpus cases. 53 
Most of the men, both Chinese and whites, indicted and sentenced in Us. v. Wilson 
went on to hold prominent positions in Portland and maintain those positions to the 
end of their lives. 
52 Wilson was charged with smuggling the following shipments of opium: July 1, 
1892,300 pounds; July 12,450 pounds; June 4,365 pounds; October 28,500 pounds; 
November 26, 2,090 pounds; July 28, 300 pounds; August 20, 800 pounds; September 
2, 1,400 pounds; January 27, 1893, 1,020 pounds; February 22, 1,100 pounds. 
53 Louie Gow was indicted for perjury in a Chinese habeas corpus case tried before 
Referee Lafferty in November 1892. In the case, he claimed that he had known Louie 
Ah Fat for at least six years as a merchant in Portland. The court later judged that 
Louie Ah Fat was actually a first-time laborer attempting to enter the United States 
with a forged return certificate and false testimony by the Chinese witness. Charles 
Newell faced similar perjury charges after he swore in a habeas corpus hearing that he 
knew Wong Teong to be a member of the Foot Yie Company in Portland. Again, 
Wong Teong was a Chinese laborer. Daily Oregonian, Dec. 20, 1893. 
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Chapter Four 
Chinese Associations in Portland: 
Unity and Division within Adapted Social Institutions 
"The Highbinder Must Go!" screamed the headline of the Morning Oregonian 
on December 5, 1888.' Two days before, Chinese immigrant Mah Bing was shot 
fatally during a skirmish in front of Yuen Lee's gambling house in downtown 
Portland. Ah Seen, one of the few material witnesses who agreed to testify, said that 
he did not know who fired the shots that wounded Ah Ling, Wong Chung, and Lup 
Yick. Lup Yick, on the other hand, told local reporters a story that could have been 
taken directly from the pages of a popular gazetteer. He stated that Wung Woon fired 
five or six shots while Koon Dock fired down at him from above and Quin Chung 
Lung shot from within the store across the street from the gambling house. In the 
article, the author stated what might seem an obvious conclusion: "the Chinese fight of 
Sunday afternoon has stirred up considerable feeling not alone among the white 
people, but among the better class of Chinamen themselves.,,2 
While the Daily Oregonian responded to reports of violence in Chinatown, the 
majority population possessed little understanding of the social relationships behind 
this incident. Stories of violence between rival Chinese secret societies in the Daily 
Oregonian during the weeks following the shooting consisted of piecemeal reports 
about Chinatown's secret societies. Reporters compiled testimony from Chinese 
willing to share information, and the rest was filled in with popular stereotypes that 
, Daily Oregonian, Dec. 5, 1888, p. 8. 
2 Ibid. 
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had for decades shaped the public's understanding of Chinese immigration and-to 
whites-the mysterious institutions they had established within Chinatown. Like 
other reports written and read by whites, newspapers had a tendency to lump all 
Chinese associations into the category of "tong" or "secret society.,,:1 
In reality, first-generation Chinese social institutions in the United States need 
to be understood as three unique but overlapping organizations, with distinctive but 
overlapping goals and membership. As both the Chinese population and the complex 
web of Chinatown social institutions increased, conflicts arose for various reasons. 
Competition between rival social associations was at the root of many conflicts. 
Homeland rivalries transferred to the United States encouraged the alignment of 
Chinese along traditional lines of association. The desire to recruit members, and 
funds derived from membership fees, encouraged violent behavior. Competition for 
control of illicit trade only deepened internal conflict. By the turn of the century, 
collaboration between Chinese associations and white law enforcement officials 
severed the Chinese population into two camps, those who sought to resolve violence 
through mediation and those who furthered their goals through the use of violence.4 
:I English-language newspapers often reported on secret societies, which they also 
referred to as "White Lily Societies." Gazetteers both romanticized secret societies 
and sent fear into white readers who viewed the societies as a threat to the moral code 
of the majority population and a criminal element not easily suppressed through 
traditional policing. For more on Chinese secret societies and immigrants in Oregon, 
see, Oregon Historical Society, microfilm collections, Grant County News, West 
Shore, and the Daily Oref?onian. 
4 See Linda Kay Strong, "Mutual Support Organizations of Northwest Chinatowns," 
Pacific Northwest Forum, 6 (1992), pp. 29-37; Douglas W. Lee, "Sacred Cows and 
Paper Tigers: Politics in Chinese America, 1880-1900," Annals of the Chinese 
Historical Society, 32 (1989), pp. 86-103; Eve Armentrout-Ma, "Chinese Politics in 
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Portland's Chinese associations can be seen both as fitting into a larger 
historical context and as unique to this city, because of their independence from the 
centrally-based Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco. This chapter shows, first, 
how Portland's Chinese associations were transplanted to Portland from China, and 
how, in many ways, they resembled the structural framework of Chinese associations 
in other western urban enclaves. Second-and contrary to existing scholarship that 
places the Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco at the center of illegal activities 
on the Pacific Coast, such as illegal immigration, opium importation, and prostitution 
traffic-the chapter emphasizes the extent to which Portland's Chinese associations 
were dominated by local leaders. The Portland associations were not simply branches 
of the Chinese Six Companies based in San Francisco, but, instead, gained strength 
from localized activities, both benevolent and illegal in nature. Traditional social 
associations served as aid societies, operated illegal networks, and in some cases 
collaborated with members of the white community to further the goals of individuals 
and groups.) 
the Western Hemisphere, 1893-1911: Rivalry Between Reformers and Revolutionaries 
in the Americas," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis, 1977), pp. 76-
81, 118; Yung-Deh Richard Chu, "Chinese Secret Societies in America: A Historical 
Survey," Asian Profile, 1 (1973), pp. 21-38. 
5 For interpretations on the role of the Chinese Six Companies in Chinese 
immigration, see Patricia Cloud and David Galenson, "Chinese Immigration and 
Contract Labor in the Late Nineteenth Century," Explorations in Economic History, 
24 (1987), pp. 22-42; Charles J. McClain, Jr., "Chinese Immigration: A Comment on 
Cloud and Galenson," Explorations in Economic History, 27 (1990), pp. 363-378; 
Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigration: Reply to Charles McClain," Exploratiolls 
in Economic History, 28 (1991), pp. 239-247. 
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Background: Chinese Associations and their Role in Portland's Chinese Enclave 
As was the case in other Chinese communities in the Ameri~an West, 
Portland's immigrant associations can be categorized into three primary groups: clan 
associations, district associations, and secret societies (or tongs). As Stanford Lyman 
wrote long ago, these three types of Chinese organizations were often lumped together 
in a single category by white Americans, especially newspaper reporters.6 In actuality, 
each of these groups provided distinct services to the Chinese immigrant community, 
framed their organization on social associations developed in China, and united 
members along lines of place of origin, name, and family relationships. Chinese 
associations were modified in the United States to confront challenges faced by 
immigrants. Associations also adapted their structures to take advantage of new 
opportunities and demands in the United States, such as trade in illicit goods and 
prostitution. Finally, each of the immigrant associations provided areas of autonomy 
for Chinese both within the immigrant enclave and from white outsiders who sought to 
control and reshape immigrants along western religious, cultural, and social lines. 
Clan associations were the first of three social associations transplanted to the 
United States from China. Clan associations can be traced to family lineage 
communities of southeastern China. These associations based membership on a 
6 Stanford M. Lyman, The Asian in North America, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 
1970), pp. 103-119. See also Gunther Barth, Bitter Strength: A f!is{()~y of the Chinese 
in the United States, 1850-1870 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ul1Iverslty Press, 1964), 
pp. 28-29, 75-79, 80-87, 90-97,119-120; L. Eve Armentrout Ma, "Chinatown 
Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Movement, 1882-1914," in Sucheng Chan, ed., 
Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 147-169. 
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shared surname and established identity and clan brothers on direct blood 
relationships. Chinese merchants served frequently as the leaders of clan 
associations.7 They assumed many of the duties previously held by lineage leaders in 
China and offered advice, and in some cases financial assistance, to members. 
Storefronts owned and operated by merchants often served as living quarters for clan 
association members, and opportunities for social interaction often took place in these 
quarters. Rotating credit systems, operated by clan associations, served as jumping-off 
points for members who wished to open businesses and helped members to meet debts 
or purchase legal services.s 
The second traditional Chinese association transplanted to the United States 
was the district association, or huiguan. As in China, district associations in Portland 
included individuals who shared a common geographic origin in China, spoke a 
common dialect, or belonged to a shared ethnic group.9 The district association, like 
the clan association, served as a credit and loan society and employment agency. 
Leaders of these groups commonly supported members financially in court cases by 
serving as, sureties. As the nineteenth century proceeded, district associations in 
7 Although records for clan associations in Portland are few, in eastern Oregon and 
southeastern Washington State, the Ing clan was particularly well known for its role in 
bringing family members to the United States to work in mines and on railroad 
projects. See Jeffrey Barlow and Christine Richardson, China Doctor of John Day 
(Portland, Ore.: Binford & Mort, 1979), pp. 4-34. 
R See Sucheng Chan This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, , , 
1860-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. xxi, 5-6, 52, 292, 404. 
9 For more on traditional associations in China and their transplantation in the United 
States see Brynna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and 
Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); 
Lyman, Chinese Americans (New York, 1974), pp. 29-53. 
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Portland, and other urban enclaves united, eventually transforming into Chinese 
Consolidated Benevolent Associations (CCBA) in the early twentieth century. District 
associations, and eventually the CCBA, frequently supervised contract immigrant 
labor and provided an organizational basis for craft and merchant guilds. 10 In many 
cases the leaders of district associations arbitrated conflicts between Chinese over such 
issues as gambling and district association rivalries transplanted from China to the 
United States. District association leaders also served as mediators during disputes 
between Chinese and whites, especially over labor contracting and labor performed. 
Members relied on the leadership, and in many cases, the English-language skills, of 
association leaders. The multi-faceted role provided by district associations and the 
ties of allegiance these associations embodied gave them substantial authority in 
Portland's Chinatown. 
Finally, the secret societies, also called tongs or triads, created the third and 
perhaps best known (in the white community) Chinese immigrant association in 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century Portland. I I Secret societies in the United 
States were derivative from the Chinese triad society and Freemason societies. As 
Stanford Lyman has explained, for centuries in China the secret society served as the 
10 Lyman, The Asian in North America, pp. 106-107. 
II This chapter used the term "secret society" to describe the third type of Chinese 
association. Nineteenth-century newspapers and magazines frequently used the term 
secret society and "tong" or "triad" to describe Chinese associations engaged in illicit 
trade. The traditional character, and meaning, of "tong" however was used in average 
business names as well as to describe groups involved in illicit trade. Triad societies 
were perhaps the most famous of China's traditional clandestine associations and were 
synonymous with secret societies in U.S. Chinese immigrant c?mmu~ities. For ease 
of incorporating published material into the chapter, secret SOCIety WIll be used. 
103 
principal agency of protest, rebellion, and banditry. They also provided a "haven for 
those who blamed officialdom for their agricultural or professional failures, or for 
those who had been expelled from their village, expunged from their lineage groups, 
or who had run afoul of the law." Additionally, secret societies in China often 
controlled the sale of illicit goods and services and provided occupations and avenues 
to upward mobility for those unable to achieve success through legitimate means. 12 
As large numbers of Chinese immigrants arrived in the United States in the 
1850s, so too did the secret society. By the late 1870s, these secret societies soon 
controlled illicit enterprises-illegal immigration, prostitution, and gambling and 
opium dens. Although newspapers emphasized and sensationalized these activities, 
secret societies did in fact contribute to the well being of their members, altering the 
traditional model to fit the needs of an immigrant community that confronted 
persistent discrimination. For instance, secret society leaders funded the construction 
of religious and community buildings within Chinatowns, housed destitute widows 
and orphans, and provided financial assistance to members. 
More so than the other two traditional associations, secret societies remained 
out of the sight of white Americans. Especially after the crescendo of anti-Chinese 
laws in the 1880s and 1890s, cIan and district associations often united publicly and 
visibly in the courts and in politics to contest discrimination. Secret societies, on the 
other hand, did not seek to alter, oppose, or challenge anti-Chinese legislation, 
focusing instead on internal political, social, and financial conditions within 
12 Lyman, The Asian in North America, p. 48. 
104 
Chinatown, and the organization of illicit trade networks. Secret societies were 
frequently composed of Chinese who had been ostracized by Chinatown's dan and 
district associations. Economically, the societies met financial goals through the 
opium trade, prostitution, and the operation of gambling houses throughout 
Chinatown. Through these enterprises, secret societies gained substantial political and 
social influence, as well as economic power, in the Chinese enclave. The fact that 
many members were toughs and thugs only increased the degree of control secret 
societies held. 13 
Traditionally, four main motives prompted secret societies and their 
henchmen; control of the drug trade, gambling, and prostitution; the sometimes violent 
playing out in the United States of Chinese social conflict; revolts of poor Chinese 
against the merchant oligarchy of Chinatown; and rival claims to a woman. 14 
Orchestrated "tong wars" between rival secret societies served as the avenue through 
which these battles played out, and it was these "wars" that gained so much attention 
on the part of English-language newspapers and the police. 
13 Originally found in Barkerville, British Columbia, a collection of rules of a Chinese 
secret society illuminates the experience Chinese immigrants involved in a secret 
society. Broken down into 42 regulatory rules and further divided into three broad 
sections, the document, written sometime around 1882 details fiscal policies, rights, 
privileges, and responsibilities of members, and the relationships between mutual aid 
societies and members. Protection by fellow members was afforded those who were 
assaulted from within or without the society and punishment for violence against 
members was also detailed. See W.E. Willmott and Berching Ho, "Rules of a Chinese 
Secret Society in British Columbia," in Lyman, ed., Asians in North America, pp. 95-
102. 
14 Lyman, The Asian in North America, p. 110. 
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Toward a Theory of Localization: Labor, Illicit Trade, and Violence among 
Portland's Chinese 
These three traditional social associations were well established in Portland's 
Chinese community by the 1880s. The decade was also marked by anti-Chinese labor 
agitation and the enactment of immigration laws that directly hindered the ability of 
Chinese to immigrate to the United States or to find jobs once there. As employment 
collapsed in rural areas dominated by mining, logging, and railroad building, Chinese 
migration to the cities increased. Competition for jobs in the cities, Portland included, 
became intense, producing frustration and violence in Chinatown. I:; 
Many historians have studied the affects that anti-Chinese laws and the 
urbanization of Chinese had both on individual immigrants and the traditional social 
associations in urban hubs as a whole. The Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco, 
for example, are cited frequently to demonstrate the changing roles traditional 
associations played during the era of exclusion. 16 On this point, historians have 
established the influence the branches of the Six Companies had on illegal 
immigration and the organization of contract labor during the 1880s and 1890s in 
urban areas outside San Francisco. And while this branching out on the part of the 
15 See Chen Tzu Wu, ed., Chink! A Documentary History of Anti-Chinese Prejudice in 
America (New York, 1972); Shih San Henry Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America 
(Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1984); Tsai, China and the Overseas 
Chinese in the United States, 1868-1911 (Fayetteville, Ark.: University of Arkansas 
Press, 1983). 
16 See especially, Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigration and Contract Labor," 
pp. 22-42; McClain, "Chinese Immigration: A Comment on Cloud and Galenson," pp. 
363-378; Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigration: Reply to Charles McClain," pp. 
239-248. On urbanization and crime among Chinese immigrants See, Paul Takagi and 
Tony Platt, "Behind the Gilded Ghetto: An Analysis of Race, Class and Crime in 
Chinatown" Crime and Social Justice, (1978), pp. 2-23. , 
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Chinese Six Companies surely occurred, emphasis on ·its San Francisco base obscures 
understanding of how local associations altered their roles on the local level to fit 
h .. 17 C angmg CIrcumstances. When we shift perspective and look more closely at local 
associations, it is apparent that they provided the structure of everyday life in the 
Chinatowns of the West. This was surely the case in Portland. 
Three aspects of Chinese society in Portland demonstrate this theory of 
localization. First is the way in which labor contracting, employment, and the 
procurement and repayment of debts gave shape to Portland's Chinese associations in 
the 1880s. These associations became the mainstay of the community; association 
leaders fused traditional Chinese forms of mediation with U.S. court intervention. 
Second, associations were at the center of the local labor market-and the conflicts 
that ensued over work in the 1880s. Third, this chapter examines conflict between 
Chinese associations and shows how organized crime in Chinatown hinged on local 
competition between Portland associations as well as conflict between Portland 
17 References to the Chinese Six Companies' role in immigration, both legal and 
illegal, did show up in English-language newspapers. In December 1893, for instance, 
the Daily Oregonian, reporting on the implementation of the Geary Law (which 
further restricted Chinese immigration to the United States and required Chinese 
immigrants already here deported if they did not file for resident certificates), 
reported, "It is believed that if the government shows that it intends to deport all 
unregistered Chinese, the Six Companies will take notice accordingly, and assist 
instead of retarding the operation of the law." Adding to this story, local Chinese 
immigrant Seid Back remarked, "My countrymen will abide by the decision of the Six 
Companies, of course." Stories similar to these documented that the Chinese Six did 
playa role in legal immigration to the United States, but few reports speak directly to 
a notable presence of the Chinese Six in Portland .or their involvemen~ in smuggling 
cases tried in Portland. Rather, these were operatIOns run by local Chmese, merchants 
especially, who had a stake in immigration and opium trade networks. See the Daily 
Oregonian, Dec. 1, 1893, p. 4. 
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Chinese and branch representatives of the San Francisco Chinese Six Companies. By 
framing the history of Chinese associations in this way, it is possible to see how the 
power of the secret associations was in fact highly localized, a product of Portland, not 
San Francisco. While similar to those in San Francisco, the secret societies of 
Portland were by no means dependent on them. 
Labor Contracting, Debt Procurement, and Legal Conflict in the Chinese Community 
In Portland, as in San Francisco and other Pacific Coast cities, district 
associations, or huiguan, served as innkeepers for traveling Chinese laborers, credit 
and loan societies, and employment agencies and labor contractors. As Chinese 
flooded into Portland after rural labor opportunities dissolved, the services provided 
by Portland's district associations changed, and their power within the community 
increased. As many historians have noted, a primary function of the district 
association was the provision of financial assistance based on a rotating credit 
system. 18 In this system, members of district associations were loaned money to be 
repaid with interest after a specified period of time. When members failed to repay 
their debts promptly, and internal mediation failed, district associations went to court 
to collect. 
In July 1884, such a case occurred. In that month, Wong Doon brought 
members of Fing Lung and Company to court for failure to repay a loan of $1,533. 
The load was originally granted in the fall of 1883 and, in keeping with district 
18 See, Lyman, Asian in North America, pp. 103-118. 
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association rotating credit regulations, was to be repaid by February 1884 at an interest 
rate of eight percent per annum. After being late a mere five days, Wong Doon, with 
sureties King Chow, Dock Wa, and Luck Wa, applied for a writ of attachment against 
the property of the Fing Lung and Company. I') In a similar case, Chin Chun Ban 
brought Yuen Chong and Company to court after district association members Chin 
Chun Ban and Chin Chow Chin loaned the defendants $1,400 and $500 respectively. 
When the loan was three months overdue, the plaintiffs concluded that mediation had 
failed and forced the association into the U.S. circuit court. This pattern defines scores 
of cases, attesting to Chinese district association leaders using the courts regularly to 
resolve conflicts over loans. The arrangement and uniting of various Chinese in 
multiple court cases show how members of credit systems, and inevitably, district 
associations that controlled substantial amounts of capital, used their funds to assist 
needy Chinese who shared membership in district associations. In many instances the 
cases were dismissed, and the two parties settled outside of court-the initial threat of 
court action was apparently sufficient to force repayment. 20 
Another case in the Multnomah County District Court involved an individual 
who was loaned funds by various district association members and then failed to repay 
the debt. In June of Gim Fook, Dick Fong, Sam Nam Lou, and Lai Nam Lou brought 
Sam Lee to court after he failed to repay $2,450 in loans. Gim Fook had loaned Sam 
Lee $1,050, Dick Fong loaned $700, Sam Nam Lou loaned $150, and Lai Nam Lou 
19 Wong Doon v. Fing Ling and Co., Judgment # 12294, July 15, 1886. 
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loaned Sam Lee $550. The plaintiffs won their case with a final settlement of $2,450 
plus court costs?O 
By the 1880s a strong merchant elite, under the auspices of district 
associations, gained control of Portland's labor contracting services. 21 Merchant 
leaders of district associations who operated stores and contracting companies used 
their understanding of the courts and American business to defend Chinese immigrants 
in court. Merchants signed contracts with whites and supplied Chinese bosses and 
labor gangs to logging and railroad companies throughout Oregon and beyond. Under 
these contracts, whites would pay the Chinese contractor after labor gangs finished 
work. The Chinese contractor, almost always a merchant, would then pay the Chinese 
men who served on the work gangs. Inevitably, labor contracting produced conflict, 
especially when employers refused to pay Chinese laborers for their services. 
In January, 1893, Gai Kee brought J.S. and c.c. Miller to court after the latter 
failed to pay the plaintiff $432.50 for the labor of two gangs of ten Chinese workers 
contracted to cut 2000 cords of wood for the Oregon and California Railroad. The 
plaintiff testified that c.c. Miller paid him $87.50 after the first gang of laborers 
finished their work in Milwaukie, Oregon, but failed to pay the remaining $432.50 for 
the second gang's work. In court, Gai Kee submitted a copy of the labor contract 
(written in traditional Chinese characters) as evidence. In response, J .S. and c.c. 
Miller testified that the second gang of laborers failed to complete the contracted 
20 Gim Fook v. Sam Lee, Judgment # 10059, June, 13, 1884. 
21 Sucheng Chan reaches a similar conclusion in her study of Chinese immigration in 
California's Sacramento Valley. See, Chan, This Bittersweet Soil, pp. 368-370. 
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work. But, in the end, the Chinese plaintiffs won their case and an additional $200 for 
court costs. Indeed, many labor contracting cases ended favorably for Chinese labor 
contractors. Their success turned on the financial and testimonial support of district 
association members, who paid lawyers' fees and testified in favor of Chinese 
plaintiffs. Over the years, the fusion of merchant elites and labor contractors and 
district association members proved essential in many cases brought against whites. 22 
Not only did Chinese associations bring whites to court on the grounds of 
broken contracts, they also brought to court fellow immigrants who served as 
middlemen for white-owned companies. Chinese labor contractors often struggled 
with these Chinese labor brokers when the latter delayed payments or refused to pay 
altogether. Chinese labor brokers and bosses were central to the contracting system, 
serving as interpreters during contract negotiations and in the labor camps as well. As 
two court cases from 1881 and 1883 demonstrate, agreements between Chinese labor 
contractors and their middleman counterparts could be ridden with conflict, and in the 
ensuing conflicts the district associations played critical roles.2:l 
22 See, Gai Kee, IS. and c.c. Miller, Judgment # 19697, Jan., 1893; Chung Lung v. 
James Cooper, Judgment # 7614, Jan., 188l. Chinese labor contractors also provided 
provisions for laborers who were sent out in gangs to work for white-owned 
companies. In another case tried in MuItnomah County Circuit Court, the Hop Chung 
company sued J.c. Todd and J.F. Biven of Todd & Biven for goods sold and delivered 
to a labor site. The plaintiffs claimed that they delivered 400 mats of rice to the site in 
the spring of 1883. The aggregate cost of these shipments was $885, and the Chinese 
labor contractors eventually won their case in the sum of $803.05 .. See Hop Chung 
and Company v. Todd & Biven, Judgment # 9192, June 11, 1883. 
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In 1881, Kwong Loon Kee and memhers of his company, Ah Top, Ah Kam, 
Wong Tuck, and Ah Looey, together sued the C.Y.S. Sprague Company.24 Their 
complaint held that the white-owned company failed to pay $900 for providing 200 
laborers to clear railroad track between the Sandy River and the Dalles, Oregon. In 
addition to the c.Y.S. Sprague Company, the Kwong Loon Kee Company sued the 
Chinese middleman, Ah Sam, who had coordinated the original agreement. The 
Kwong Loon Kee and Company won the case for the sum of $900. In a similar case, 
Chinese labor contractor Lee Chew sued Wing Hing Chewcy for failing to pay thirty 
or so Chinese laborers for their work for the Oregon Railroad and Navigation 
Company.25 Again, the court judged that the Chinese middleman had failed to uphold 
the contract signed between the Chinese contractor and white-owned company. Lee 
Chew and his associates were awarded $197 and court costs. In these cases, merchant 
elite contractors aligned themselves financially with one another to fight hreach of 
contract cases against whites and Chinese middlemen and were thereby able to pay 
Chinese laborers the money due for their work.26 
These cases are significant in two respects. First, they show how Chinese were 
active in court cases against whites on a regular basis. Chinese labor contractors and 
24 In this case, Chin Loong signed as surety up to $2000, and the district association 
members and co-owners mentioned above served as witnesses. See Kwong Loon Kee 
and Company v. CM.S. Sprague, Judgment 7736, Feb. 18, 1881. 
25 Lee Chew v. Wing Hing Chewey, Judgment 9038, May, 1883. 
26 In this case, Lee Chew brought Wing Hing Chewey to court independently. Once 
underway, the Chinese labor contractor and Chinese defendant aligned themselves 
with wealthy merchants like John Wah, who signed as surety for the defendant, 
thereby agreeing to pay all court costs for the defendant. In cases such as this, court 
costs would likely have been too great for individual Chinese to meet. Social and 
financial support was crucial to Chinese plaintiffs and defendants alike. 
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merchants were not afraid of suing wealthy white companies as well as fellow 
Chinese. It is often assumed that Chinese did not stand a fighting chance in court 
against whites, but in fact not only did Chinese do so frequently, they employed 
powerful social and financial institutions transplanted from China in these cases and 
often won. 
Furthermore, Chinese middlemen who aligned themselves with whites-and 
thereby against Chinese district associations and the merchant elite-fared less well. 
Because they aligned with whites, they were marginalized by Chinese social 
associations and always subject to the power of the labor contractors and their fellow 
district association members. For instance, in the Kwong Loon Kee case, the Chinese 
plaintiffs aligned with two wealthy outside Chinese merchants who assured financial, 
legal, and community support within Chinatown. But the Chinese middleman, Ah 
Sam, had no such allies. Instead, he had only a tenuous business connection to a white 
company, which likely viewed him as useful only as a supplier of cheap labor. 
Eventually, these connections-or in the case of Ah Sam, lack of Chinese 
connections-determined the outcomes of many cases. 
Secret Societies, Their Activities, and Change over Time: Patterns of Localization in 
The 1880s 
Historians have studied the development of Chinese associations in the United 
States, focusing on the Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco and their connections 
to other Chinatowns in the American West. The Chinese Six Companies represented a 
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coalition of the six primary district associations that were transplanted to North 
America during the earliest years of Chinese immigration.27 Historians Stanford 
Lyman and Gunther Barth have shown that the Chinese Six Companies, in San 
Francisco were a centralized unit that dominated labor contracting, the traffic of illegal 
immigrants, prostitution, and gambling. While Lyman and Barth describe the role of 
the San Francisco Chinese Six in immigrant communities throughout the West, they 
fail to show how the internal power structures of Chinese communities outside of San 
Francisco were, in their own right, structured. The Chinese associations in Portland, 
understood as distinct organizations, wielded influence and power on the local level 
distinct from that of the San Francisco Chinese Six. 
This local structure of power is best illustrated by Portland's secret societies-
their activities, membership, and internal conflicts, as these were documented in 
newspaper articles and court cases. As Gunther Barth wrote in Bitter Strenfith: A 
History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870, Chinese secret societies often 
hid their illegal activities (prostitution rings, gambling, and opium and immigration 
27 Lucy Salyer and Charles McClain have been particularly thorough in their research 
of the role played by the Chinese Six Companies during the early years of exclusion. 
Before 1882, the Chinese Six Companies had primarily an internal community focus, 
addressing issues that occurred within the Chinese community rather than involving 
themselves in state or national politics. However, with the advent of Exclusion, the 
Chinese Six Companies organized large-scale campaigns to fight exclusion directly. 
See Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immifiration and the Shaping of 
Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 
Press,1995); Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Strugfile Afiainst 
Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994). 
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smuggling) behind a fa<;;ade of benevolent activities.28 By the 1860s, Portland's 
Chinese secret societies were providing the city's predominantly male Chinese 
population with prostitutes, opium, and gambling houses as well as housing and loans. 
Secret society henchmen, often referred to as "highbinders" or "hatchetmen," provided 
protection for their societies' leaders and for each other (and for their society's illicit 
activities). In the 1880s, English-language newspapers frequently reported on 
violence and confrontations between secret societies and sensationalized the activities 
of so-called "highbinders," who in essence were the society's soldiers. Like the Six 
Companies of San Francisco, Portland's powerful secret societies frequently battled 
each other for control of Chinatown vice. Rivalries to control the prostitution trade 
and illegal immigration was particularly intense from the 1880s forward. 
Prostitution 
The problem of prostitution in Portland's Chinatown was discussed by the 
city's council as early as 1859. To whites, Chinatown prostitutes represented a 
particularly depraved class, lower than white prostitutes, even, because, unlike their 
white counterparts, the Chinese were believed to have been sold into their profession 
by poor Chinese families. They were of the lowest class, unable to reform themselves 
after male Chinese immigrants purchased them. Among the male Chinese immigrant 
community, Chinese prostitutes represented something else. First, they provided the 
men with sexual relations in an overwhelmingly male society; second, as business 
28 Barth, Bitter Strength, 77, pp. 101-102. See, also, Lyman, The Asian in North 
America, pp. 86-92, and Yung-Deh, "Chinese Secret Societies in America," pp. 21-38. 
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commodities, they represented opportunities for profit. Heated competition between 
operators of prostitution houses and prostitution rings was the result, and this intra-
Chinese competition was often played out in the press. As early as 1859, for example, 
a group of Chinese men asked the Portland city council to rid Chinatown of 
prostitutes, and in December, 1861, the Daily Oregonian reported that competition to 
control Chinese prostitution in Portland was headed towards violence. Often, one 
district association charged another with keeping a bawdy house and threatened to 
close it down or, in some case, take it over. Judging by the press, whites feared the 
bloody fights between secret societies in the Chinese enclave that broke out after such 
battIe cries were called. 
By the 1880s, secret societies and Chinese organizations engaged in what 
seemed a constant struggle over control of prostitution in Portland's Chinatown. 
Arrests increased noticeably during the decade, partly because of new city ordinances 
that required checks on bawdy houses within city limits.29 In addition, Chinese men 
increasingly accused one another of keeping Chinese prostitutes and demanded that 
police raid the houses. In all likelihood, what was happening was that Chinese 
accused one another in order to shut down competitors and gain control of the 
business. The consequence of this competition was a focus on Chinatown prostitution 
29 The Oregon legislative assembly instituted the "bawdy house" law in 1864, which 
stated, "If any person shall keep or set up a house of ill-fame, brothel, or bawdy house, 
for the purpose of prostitution, fornication or lewdness, such person, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail, not less than three 
months, nor more than one year, or be fined not less than one hundred dollars, nor 
more than five hundred dollars." See, Charles A. Tracy, "Race, Crime and Social 
Policy: The Chinese in Oregon, 1871-1885," Crime and Social.lw,tice, (1980), pp. 14-
16. 
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by the authorities, increased raids on bawdy houses, and constant arrests, although 
seldom followed by prosecution.:lO 
It appears from court records that, when Chinese immigrants brought others to 
court for keeping prostitution houses, the primary conflict was over which group 
would control prostitution; concern for women seldom appeared to be at issue. 
Instead, men aligned with other members of their respective associations and accused 
members of competitor associations of keeping houses of prostitution or keeping 
women against their will in these houses. Hidden behind a veil of moral concern, 
these cases appeared frequently in the district and circuit courts under the auspices of 
writs of habeas corpus. For instance, in July 1884 Lee Sheng accused another Chinese 
immigrant, Wong Ah Tong, of holding Cheng Moy against her will at "No. 147, 2nd 
street on the third story." Lee Sheng sought a writ of habeas corpus to free her from 
captivity, pleading that "Cheng Moy is so restrained of her liberty to be used as an 
inmate of the defendants' house of prostitution and against her will and protest." 
Although this case eventually was dismissed, it was a representative instance of one 
association, Lee Sheng's, allying against another, Wong Ah Tong's.31 
30 In many respects, police raids on bawdy houses, and Chinese prostitution houses 
particularly, were used to quell public complaints. Generally, Chinese prostitutes 
were arrested en masse, tried on misdemeanor charges, and fined five dollars. They 
quickly returned to the Chinese quarter to continue their trade. See State oj Oref?on v. 
Ah You, Judgment #10212, July 1, 1884; State ojOregon v. Lang Ah Bing, Judgment 
#10214, July 1, 1884; State ojOregon v. Ah Ming, Judgment #9981, May 17,1884 
and July 3, 1884; State oj Oregon v. Lee May, Judgment #10216, July 3,1884, 
Multnomah County Circuit Court, Multnomah County Courthouse Files Room. 
31 Lee Shenf? v. Wong Ah Tong, Multnomah County Circuit Court, May 1884, 
Judgment # 10223, Multnomah County Courthouse Files Room. In a similar case, 
different associations aligned with one another for and against Moy Y ouk. In this 
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As in other Pacific Coast Chinatowns, in Portland wealthy merchants often 
headed the secret societies that competed for control of prostitution networks. 
Frequently, police officials were bribed to turn a blind eye to prostitution dens. When 
raids did occur, many judges also turned a blind eye to the testimony of Chinese 
witnesses accusing one another of keeping houses for prostitution.32 Cases were 
dismissed as judges decided that the men accused, and the women restrained, were not 
convictable under city or state statutes despite anti-prostitution laws at both the local 
and state levels.33 Indeed, in the 1880s, rather than prosecute alleged brothel owners, 
case, Ah Young, Ah Sing, and Ah Hin testified in court that Moy Y ouk operated a 
"house of ill-fame" on Stark Street between Second and Third Streets. After the judge 
dismissed the case on the grounds that the state could not validly make claims against 
the Chinese owner of the house, the complainants likely took their dispute outside of 
the courts. Other cases involving associations and prostitution, include State of 
Oregon v. Ah You, Judgment #10212, July 1, 1884; State of Oregon v. Lang Ah Bing, 
Judgment #10214, July 1, 1884; State of Oregon v. Ah Ming, Judgment #9981, May 
17,1884 and July 3,1884; State of Oregon v. Lee May, Judgment #10216, July 3, 
1884, Multnomah County Circuit Court, Multnomah County Courthouse Files Room. 
32 Prostitution-related arrests were low compared to the number of bawdy houses in 
Portland between 1870 and 1885. Between 1870 and 1880 under Police Chief James 
H. Lappeus, only 16 persons were arrested for prostitution; eight were Chinese. 
Between 1877 and 1879, Chief of Police Lucerne Besser arrested 60 persons for 
prostitution, twenty-nine of whom were Chinese. Between 1879 and 1883, Besser 
arrested forty-two, twenty-nine of whom were Chinese, remarkably low numbers 
considering Portland was reported to have thirty "bordellos" in 1880. See Tracy, 
"Race, Crime and Social Policy," p. 15. 
33 Details on dismissed cases are spare. Generally, records simply state that Chinese 
testimony, both male and female, was not admissible. The cases were tried and 
quickly dismissed with neither side receiving fines or official charges. Racism against 
Chinese likely tainted these cases. Judges, and the public at large, regularly saw 
Chinese men who brought others to trial on prostitution-related charges as doing so 
out of a competitive drive to control prostitution and not out of concern for Chinese 
prostitutes. Finally, disinterest in prosecuting prostitution generally, and Chinese 
prostitutes and bawdy-house owners particularly, surely played a role in the frequent 
dismissals. Judges apparently turned a blind eye to the 1875 Page Act, which stated 
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Mayor Thomas Holmes and other local officials called instead for a tax on Chinese 
bawdy houses and the removal of these houses from visible (to whites) areas between 
Morrison and Alder on Second Streets. Whites, fearful of Chinese unrest and the 
presence of Chinese outside of Chinatown, encouraged the city council to tax, rather 
the prosecute, men who ran houses that catered to the sexual needs of Chinese 
immigrants. 
These steps did not, however, stop conflict over prostitution. Nor did they 
discourage the cross-border trade in prostitution between Oregon, California, and 
Washington. In fact, by the 1890s Chinese highbinder societies had branched out, 
including in some cases white officials who aided the transport of Chinese prostitutes 
across state lines. A February 1893 District Court case concluded with the conviction 
of a white store owner from Seattle, David W. West, and a Chinese highbinder and 
secret society member, Ah Luie. Witnesses in the case testified that the woman at 
issue, referred to only as Mrs. Wing, was taken from Portland at the insistence of a 
highbinder who wanted to gain possession of her for commercial purposes.:14 
Prosecuting attorney Cecil Holcolm argued that Ah Luie and his secret society 
associates "did not hesitate to use the courts as a machine in order to attain their 
object," that being the cross-border sale of prostitutes to both white and Chinese 
customers.35 
that Chinese women who came to the United States as prostitutes, as well as those 
already in the country, could be deported. 
34 Daily Oregonian, Feb. 16, 1893. 
:15 Ibid. 
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Gambling, Smuggling, and Illegal Trade in Goods 
Prostitution networks were not the only areas of conflict among secret societies 
in Portland's Chinatown. Infighting between associations over a range of issues often 
produced heated battles and, sometimes, fatalities. Reports of bloody battles between 
clan and district associations and Chinese secret societies dot U.S. newspapers in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From these reports it is possible to 
reconstruct the reasons behind these battles as well as the ways Chinese aligned with 
one another to defend different interests. Two conflicts in Portland that took place 
between 1888 and 1890 show how the Chinese community mediated violence within 
the immigrant enclave by adapting the practices of transplanted Chinese associations 
and compromising with white law enforcement officials. In the process, these 
immigrants further reshaped class and status in Chinatown and produced new versions 
of traditional Chinese associations. 
Secret Societies and Conflict in Portland 
In many regards, Portland's network of traditional Chinese associations was 
part of a larger trend in Pacific Coast Chinese immigrant communities. Chinese 
organized themselves around a framework of associations based on status and 
geographic origins in China, governed by merchant elites whose power derived from 
economic success in West Coast Chinatowns.36 English-language newspapers 
frequently used the terms "secret society" and "highbinder" to describe the groups 
36 See Chapter Three for collaboration between Chinese and whites in both legal and 
illegal business activities. 
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involved in Chinatown violence. For instance, an 1890 Daily Oregonian article 
reported on a series of violent outbursts that had the headline, "Chinatown Up In 
Arms, Another Bloody Highbinder Riot Anticipated.,,37 But what constituted a 
highbinder most whites could not say. As one reporter put it: 
Highbinder really has no place in the English language. The dictionary and 
encyclopedia both fail to recognize it. It is a term like many others in the 
English language, colloquialized, and has acquired a standing through custom 
and usage. It is a conventional term, the same as "hobo," "hoodlum," and 
many others that have acquired a significance through a specified designation 
of some peculiar attribute of a general class.38 
For those Chinese, or "highbinders" involved in secret society and district association 
rivalries, however, the term, and the role highbinders played, was quite clear. A 
highbinder was a member of a secret society and often served as the henchman in 
attacks on rival secret societies. Competition, and the perpetuation of violence in the 
name of revenge, developed into ongoing battles that sometimes spanned many years. 
Increasingly, powerful merchant leaders who saw themselves as permanent residents 
with distinct local interests stepped in to mediate conflicts between secret societies. 
By the late 1880s, these merchants unified with whites to end Chinatown violence. 
37 Morning Oregonian, Aug. 15, 1890, p. 8. 
31' Ibid., Dec. 14, 1888, p. 3; See also, Ibid., Dec. 3, 1888. 
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Violence and Mediation 
On December 3, 1888, a battle began in Chinatown that would play out in 
newspapers and the courts for months to come. Repercussions from this initial 
conflict would eventually replay themselves in 1890. The Daily Oregonian report on 
the initial battle described it as "the most sanguinary shooting affray which has ever 
occurred in this city.,,39 The battle involved between fifteen or twenty Chinese men 
and ended with four Chinese immigrants dead and two seriously injured. From first 
reports, the battle was four-fold: Mah Bing stated that Wong Sing shot him over a 
gambling debt; Ah Lung claimed Pon Long shot him; Ah Sue claimed he was shot by 
Ah Lung; and finally Wong Chung testified that Mah Bing had been hit with a hatchet 
over the head and shot in the back by an unknown party. Mah Bing died of wounds 
sustained in the fighting, and the other three men and a fourth, Lup Yick, were brought 
to Good Samaritan Hospital, where they received treatment for their wounds. 
The December battle began when two rival secret societies came head to head 
over control of gambling in Chinatown. In the months before the battle, a newly 
established secret society, referred to as the Hop Sing Hong, had begun collecting 
members, weapons, and officers in an attempt to gain control of Chinatown's 
gambling dens. Headed by Pon Long, the society frequently met in the restaurant of 
the principal officer in the Hop Sing Hong, Frank Woon. On the other side of the 
rivalry was the Bow Lung society, whose members controlled much of the gambling 
in Portland's Chinatown before the establishment of the Hop Sing Hong society. The 
39 Ibid., Dec. 5, 1888, p. 8. 
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men involved in the case were members of one or the other of these societies. Mah 
Bing and two others belonged to the Bow Lung society, while Ah Sue and one other 
wounded Chinese man not identified by name, belonged to the Hop Sing Hong 
. 40 
society. 
In later interviews with a Daily Oregonian reporter, some of the more 
prominent merchants of Chinatown discussed the origins of the December 3, 1888 
confrontation. According to them, the fight was the outcome of a rivalry between the 
two leading highbinders that controlled Chinatown's gambling and prostitution 
networks. By the late 1880s there were five prominent secret societies in Portland. 
They were, in order of their original establishment, the Hip Sing Hong, Sue Sing 
Hong, Boo Leong Hong, Hung Sing Hong, and the recently formed Hong Sing Hong. 
Like secret societies elsewhere, these societies exacted tribute money by threat, bribe, 
and extortion, and from gambling houses, houses of prostitution, and immigrant and 
opium smuggling. At the time of the 1888 battle, the Boo Leong Hong numbered 
about one hundred members and the Hop Sing Hong counted three hundred 
members.41 
The competition to control illicit Chinatown businesses was complex, and in it 
Portland Chinese aligned according to their local association ties, used the U.S. legal 
40 Mah Bing, 30 years old and without family in China, died from a pistol shot in the 
Portland City Jail on December 4, 1888. Ah Sue also died days after the fight. Wong 
Sing, one of the accused, was never apprehended after the shooting; See, Ibid., Dec. 5, 
1888. 
41 Ibid. 
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system, and took direct action in the streets of Portland to resolve conflicts.42 In the 
weeks prior to the December 3 battle such a situation occurred. It began, like so many 
of these cases, in a seemingly simple manner. Chin You of the Boo Leong Hong 
society and Wong Lock of the Hop Sing Hong society were playing a game of 
dominos. When Chin You lost and refused to pay the two-dollars owed to Wong 
Lock, fellow members of the Boo Leong Hong-Mah Bing, Ah Bing, and Lum Gee-
all sided with fellow member Chin You's refusal. The rival gangs fought, and Mah 
Bing had Wong Lock arrested on charges of assault and battery. Wong Lock 
countered, filing the same charge against Chin You and Mah Bing. The judge 
convicted each of the men on the charges, fined each five dollars, and released them. 
The following day, the two parties met again. A second altercation occurred, 
this time at the corner of Second Avenue and Alder Street. During this second fight, 
Wong Lock, along with fellow Hop Sing Hong members Ching Mow and Ow Low, 
fought members of the Boo Leong Hong society. Again, the men were arrested, fined 
various amounts for assault and battery, and released. But the conflict simmered. 
Over the following days, the Boo Leong Hong society attempted to reach a 
compromise with Wong Lock and his Hop Sing Hong society by paying the two 
dollars under dispute. But this had become something more than a dispute over petty 
gambling debts between individuals. Association was pinned against association in a 
struggle for predominance in Chinatown. So, despite the two societies' agreement to 
42 Numerous cases found in the archives of the Multnomah County Circuit Court attest 
to such cases with most ending in minor fines to those involved. 
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settle the debt, the Boo Leong Hong society continued the feud, threatening "If you 
want to be boss come and have a fight with us and see who are the best men. ,,41 
For white policemen trying to sort out this conflict, one of the greatest 
challenges was getting Chinese to testify against one another. As one Chinese 
Portlander stated to a reporter, it was not that Chinese did not know who was 
responsible for the violence but that they would not tell for fear that they would be 
targeted by the accused society members. Another Chinese immigrant warned, "Don't 
mention my name in the paper for if you do the highbinders will come around and kill 
me." 44 Testifying against members of rival secret societies involved a genuine risk, 
one few Chinese were willing to take. But Chinatown residents were not completely 
silenced; support for intervention by the police escalated along with the violence. As 
one Chinese said, "the city authorities ought to send eight or ten policemen to make a 
thorough search of Chinatown. There are still quite a number of wounded Chinamen 
hidden and if they are not soon hunted up they will either sneak out of town or get 
well without medical attendance.,,45 
In the days and months following the December violence, a clear division 
developed within the Chinese community. Merchants with a stake in Portland, men 
who, planned to stay permanently in the city and raise their families there, began to 
speak out. The developing alliance against violence did not follow those of 
preexisting Chinese associations. Instead, they followed lines of class and status 
41 Comments were collected by reporters for the Morning Oregonian and were printed 
in the December 4, 1888 edition. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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regardless of race; Chinese merchants, especially, and even those that belonged to 
district associations, viewed the violence of secret societies as dangerous to their 
personal interests, both in the white and Chinese communities, and generally 
disruptive to the future of the Chinese in Portland. For them, peace was associated 
with community success, and violence was equated with the continued distrust of the 
dominant white population. Along with the violence of the 1880s and 1890s arose a 
new desire to mediate violence in Chinatown and, even, to collaborate with white 
authorities to this end. 
Newspaper reports highlighted some of the more outspoken members of the 
Chinese community who opposed secret societies. One prominent Chinese 
complained to the Daily Oregonian that part of the reason for the conflicts between 
Chinese secret societies was the fault of white law enforcement, that their failure to 
charge, arrest, and convict those responsible for illegal crime and violence in 
Chinatown allowed such activity to continue: 
The laws in this country ... are altogether too lax for the Chinamen. This fight 
is a natural outcome of the leniency shown the Chinese murderers in the 
county jail. The Chinamen here have no fear for the law and think that they 
can buy their freedom if they have plenty of money. No such highbinder 
societies are allowed in China. If there are any secret organizations of any 
kind discovered in China they are more summarily dealt with.46 
46 Ibid. A later article built on these comments and detailed the various mechanisms 
used in various Chinese cities to ferret out violent secret societies. See the Morning 
Oregonian, Dec. 14, 1888, p. 3. 
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Testifying in a similar vein, another stated that the Chinese secret societies could 
easily identify the guilty parties in every Chinatown fight, but that the more efficient 
solution would be for white authorities to break up the highbinder societies "and the 
police authorities must be more stringent if the community desires to have no 
recurrence of such a bloody fight.,,47 
The division within Chinatown was noted by white authorities. Shortly after 
the December 1888 battle, Portland's mayor appointed four special officers to patrol 
Chinatown. He also agreed to a meeting between white authorities and prominent 
Chinese merchants who wanted to quell the violence. Out of this came a new 
collaboration between whites and Chinese, one that testified not only to changes in 
Chinatown but also to the emergence of a Chinese elite and its ability to draw on 
resources outside the Chinese community. In meetings that followed, Mayor Van B. 
DeLashmutt and the Chief of Police Parrish met with Seid Back and other prominent 
Chinese merchants. The former announced: "Your highbinders are composed of the 
worst class of your people and are of no more benefit to you than our tramps or bags 
are to us. We want you to help us to break them up, and get the city rid of them." 
According to the Daily Oregonian reporter present at the meeting, Chinese merchants 
agreed with the Chief of Police's sentiment "it is to your interest as business men and 
47 Ibid. 
127 
law-abiding citizens of Portland to help us carryon this work and rout out every 
highbinder in this city.,,48 
What followed was a collaborative effort between whites and high-status 
Chinatown merchants to suppress the secret societies. The coalition placed posters 
printed in Chinese characters throughout Chinatown describing the agreement reached 
between Chinatown leaders, the police, and city hall officials. This notice constituted, 
in effect, a blacklist, for it stated openly the names of prominent secret society 
members and the location of their headquarters. It was attached to the door of the 
Chinese joss house, as well as on the doors of each secret society headquarters. Over 
the next two years, this initiative to disband the secret societies continued.49 
To the dismay of the allies in the move, Chinese and white alike, highbinder 
violence again erupted in 1890.50 The mayor and elite Chinese merchants again 
mounted a campaign to suppress the secret societies. In a statement prepared for the 
Daily Oregonian in May of 1890, Mayor DeLashmutt declared, "when I suppressed 
them before I had no law to back me ... The sentiment was so strong against the 
highbinders then that it would have been useless for them to resist."" I With even 
greater intensity, whites and Chinese again collaborated. Prominent Chinese 
48 Morning Oregonian, Dec. 5, 1888, p. 8. 
49 In keeping with Chinese merchants' tendency exert their authority when 
collaborating with the white community, the merchants involved in this campaign did 
not agree to cooperate until fellow immigrant, Lee Bing Hung, who they claimed 
belonged to no highbinder society, was released from the city jail. And in usual 
fashion, the white authorities agreed and released Lee Bing Hung the following 
afternoon under the agreement that the Chinese mediators be responsible for him 
should he be accused of any crime. 
50 See, Ibid., Mar. 8,1895; Ibid., Nov. 1, 1917. 
51 Ibid., May 9, 1890, p. 8. 
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merchants such as Seid Back and Moy Ham eventually formed the Chinese Peace 
Society as a means to ending secret society violence. Eventually, the Chinese Peace 
Society formed into the Portland chapter of the Chinese Benevolent Association.52 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed, in broad terms, the organization, development, and 
roles of traditional Chinese associations in Portland. These associations and societies 
were organized along a framework similar to those in San Francisco and other Far 
Western cities and were based on models originally developed in China. Clan 
associations developed to support members that shared a common family name, while 
district associations formed their membership according to a common place of origin 
in China. Membership often overlapped between clan and district associations, as it 
did between them and secret societies, a third traditional association that thrived on 
illegal activities and sought to control members and non-members alike through 
protection money, tribute from gambling and prostitution houses, and the smuggling 
of immigrants, opium, and prostitutes. While all these associations in Portland were 
based on a model similar to those found in other cities, they were autonomous, 
localized Portland organizations. 
Unique to Portland's Chinatown was the alliance between whites and elite 
Chinese merchants that formed to suppress the violence in the city's Chinatown. 
52 Despite the formation of the Chinese Peace S?ciety and Chinese .Benevolent 
Society, highbinder activity continued to occur mto the 1940s, albeIt to a lesser degree 
than was the case in the late nineteenth century. 
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Through this collaboration Chinese merchants increased their status within both the 
white and Chinese communities and also developed new community institutions, such 
as the CCBA, that legitimated their authority as community and business leaders. Seid 
Back emerged as an especially prominent figure in Portland's Chinatown (even after 
he himself was convicted of smuggling opium and immigrants into the United States 
in the case of U.S. v. Wilson) and carried on extensive trans-Pacific business on his 
own and with white partners. Moy Ham, another mediator in the movement against 
Chinese secret society violence, eventually became the U.S. Consul for China for the 
Pacific Northwest. Collaboration across the racial divide, therefore, not only helped 
the Chinese and white communities better understand each other, but it also promoted 
the status and authority of a specific class of Chinese in Portland. It was this group of 
immigrants that laid the foundations for the second generation of Chinese Americans 
who led the community into the twentieth century. 
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Conclusion 
Chinese Exclusion ended in the midst of World War II, in 1942. With China 
as an ally in the fight against Japan, the United States Congress revoked the 
discriminatory legislation that, for sixty years, had attempted to deny entry to Chinese 
immigrants and, in turn, prohibited the rights of citizenship to those in the country. 
With the end of Exclusion, Chinese already in the United States were allowed to bring 
their long separated wives and families to their homes. But, even though anti-Chinese 
sentiment expressed in U.S. law had permeated the lives of first-generation Chinese 
immigrants, they had demanded due process rights in U.S. courts. Through their legal 
struggles, which numbered in the thousands in Multnomah County alone, Chinese 
gained more than a small measure of economic and cultural autonomy. In these cases, 
Chinese allied with one another for financial and testimonial support in court, drawing 
on traditional institutions they had adapted to fit the challenges posed by an 
unwelcoming American society and its legal system. 
It would, however, be mistaken to assume that Chinese immigrants in Portland 
were a unified or homogenous group. Social distinctions based on class and levels of 
assimilation divided Chinese from one another, and these divisions affected the ways 
in which they interacted with one another and with the majority white population. 
Merchants, who began arriving in Portland in the 1850s, quickly carved a niche for 
themselves in Portland's Chinatown. With prior knowledge of, and a Willingness to 
adopt American models of business, these merchants, armed with English-language 
131 
skills, gained a central place in the development of Chinatown and became a force in 
shaping white-Chinese relations. In the 1860s and 1870s Chinese merchants 
established clan and district associations and served as labor contractors for hundreds 
of newly arrived Chinese immigrants. In the courts, merchants provided financial and 
testimonial support for fellow immigrants in both civil and criminal cases. By 
aligning themselves along lines of clan and district associations, Chinese merchants 
demanded that their cases against whites and Chinese alike be heard in the u.s. legal 
system. With the advent of exclusion, merchant elites took advantage of loopholes in 
the enforcement of exclusion laws. Through collaboration with whites, Chinese 
merchants helped hundreds of immigrants enter the United States illegally and, at the 
same time, turned profits off the misfortune of these people. Through illicit trade in 
opium and immigrant smuggling, Chinese merchants established locally their power in 
Portland's Chinatown. 
Laborers, on the other hand, did not gain the same control over their lives that 
Chinese merchants enjoyed. Sojourning laborers, instead, depended on the power of 
merchants. They relied on Chinatown merchants for jobs, financial assistance through 
the rotating-credit system, and representation, both financial and testimonial, in the 
U.S. courts. Their dependence on the merchant elite only increased in the 1880s, 
when exclusion severely limited the ability for laborers to enter and find work in the 
United States. The division between laborers and merchants was evident from the 
earliest days of immigrant settlement in Portland. Merchants, with their knowledge 
of English and access to the courts, could demand payment from other Chinese and 
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whites in business disputes. And in the 1880s and 1890s Chinese merchants who had , 
established themselves among the white community, served as translators in habeas 
corpus cases while Chinese laborers often sat idly in county jails awaiting trial and 
facing the prospect of deportation. 
Divisions in Portland's Chinatown continued through the 1890s as Chinese 
merchants allied themselves with others who shared a common heritage in China and a 
common purpose in the United States. Many Chinese subscribed to secret societies 
that profited off of illicit trade in Chinese immigrants and prostitutes, and from the 
gambling and opium dens of Portland's Chinatown. On the other side, merchants, 
who had sometimes engaged in illegal trade themselves, increasingly joined with 
white leaders and officials to end the violence in Portland's Chinatown that first 
erupted in the late 1880s. These Chinese merchants viewed collaboration with white 
authorities as a way of cementing their own status in Portland and gaining acceptance 
by the majority society. Similar to the experience of Chinese who assimilated to white 
religion and culture in the 1870s and 1880s, Chinese merchants, fighting against illicit 
trade, often met with deep-seated resentment from Chinese who survived 
economically through prostitution, gambling, and opium smuggling. 
Although they remain understudied, county, district, and circuit court records 
illuminate key aspects of the first-generation Chinese immigrant experience in the 
United States. Civil cases demonstrate the ways in which Chinese worked with and 
among white businesses, the treatment of Chinese laborers working for white 
employers, and the daily run-ins of Chinese with white authorities as well as their 
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fellow immigrants. Criminal cases display the violence and vice inside Portland's 
Chinatown. The ways in which Chinese defended themselves against prosecution in 
court shows their ingenuity and their understanding of the u.s. legal system. The 
court cases also show that more often than is generally believed Chinese in court 
received treatment similar to their white counterparts. 
If the records of local courts are not brought into the history of the first 
Chinese Americans, much will remain obscure, above all the daily workings of the 
Chinese immigrant enclave. And, in this case, we will miss the ways in which 
Chinese defiantly tackled discrimination and racism long before the concept of 
minority civil rights and protest took hold in the United States. 
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